scholarly journals The Calculus of Natural Calculation

Studia Logica ◽  
2021 ◽  
Author(s):  
René Gazzari

AbstractThe calculus of Natural Calculation is introduced as an extension of Natural Deduction by proper term rules. Such term rules provide the capacity of dealing directly with terms in the calculus instead of the usual reasoning based on equations, and therefore the capacity of a natural representation of informal mathematical calculations. Basic proof theoretic results are communicated, in particular completeness and soundness of the calculus; normalisation is briefly investigated. The philosophical impact on a proof theoretic account of the notion of meaning is considered.

Author(s):  
Timothy Williamson

The book argues that our use of conditionals is governed by imperfectly reliable heuristics, in the psychological sense of fast and frugal (or quick and dirty) ways of assessing them. The primary heuristic is this: to assess ‘If A, C’, suppose A and on that basis assess C; whatever attitude you take to C conditionally on A (such as acceptance, rejection, or something in between) take unconditionally to ‘If A, C’. This heuristic yields both the equation of the probability of ‘If A, C’ with the conditional probability of C on A and standard natural deduction rules for the conditional. However, these results can be shown to make the heuristic implicitly inconsistent, and so less than fully reliable. There is also a secondary heuristic: pass conditionals freely from one context to another under normal conditions for acceptance of sentences on the basis of memory and testimony. The effect of the secondary heuristic is to undermine interpretations on which ‘if’ introduces a special kind of context-sensitivity. On the interpretation which makes best sense of the two heuristics, ‘if’ is simply the truth-functional conditional. Apparent counterexamples to truth-functionality are artefacts of reliance on the primary heuristic in cases where it is unreliable. The second half of the book concerns counterfactual conditionals, as expressed with ‘if’ and ‘would’. It argues that ‘would’ is an independently meaningful modal operator for contextually restricted necessity: the meaning of counterfactuals is simply that derived compositionally from the meanings of their constituents, including ‘if’ and ‘would’, making them contextually restricted strict conditionals.


1994 ◽  
Vol 09 (12) ◽  
pp. 2103-2115 ◽  
Author(s):  
D.G. BARCI ◽  
L.E. OXMAN

We consider a fermionic field obeying a second order equation containing a pair of complex conjugate mass parameters. After obtaining a natural representation for the different degrees of freedom, we are able to construct a unique vacuum as the more symmetric state (zero energy-momentum, charge and spin). This representation, unlike the real mass case, is not holomorphic in the Grassmann variables. The vacuum eigenstate allows the calculation of the field propagator which turns out to be half advanced plus half retarded.


2021 ◽  
pp. 1-22
Author(s):  
SHAWN STANDEFER

Abstract Anderson and Belnap presented indexed Fitch-style natural deduction systems for the relevant logics R, E, and T. This work was extended by Brady to cover a range of relevant logics. In this paper I present indexed tree natural deduction systems for the Anderson–Belnap–Brady systems and show how to translate proofs in one format into proofs in the other, which establishes the adequacy of the tree systems.


2021 ◽  
Vol 43 (2) ◽  
pp. 1-55
Author(s):  
Bernardo Toninho ◽  
Nobuko Yoshida

This work exploits the logical foundation of session types to determine what kind of type discipline for the Λ-calculus can exactly capture, and is captured by, Λ-calculus behaviours. Leveraging the proof theoretic content of the soundness and completeness of sequent calculus and natural deduction presentations of linear logic, we develop the first mutually inverse and fully abstract processes-as-functions and functions-as-processes encodings between a polymorphic session π-calculus and a linear formulation of System F. We are then able to derive results of the session calculus from the theory of the Λ-calculus: (1) we obtain a characterisation of inductive and coinductive session types via their algebraic representations in System F; and (2) we extend our results to account for value and process passing, entailing strong normalisation.


2015 ◽  
Vol 8 (2) ◽  
pp. 296-305 ◽  
Author(s):  
NISSIM FRANCEZ

AbstractThe paper proposes an extension of the definition of a canonical proof, central to proof-theoretic semantics, to a definition of a canonical derivation from open assumptions. The impact of the extension on the definition of (reified) proof-theoretic meaning of logical constants is discussed. The extended definition also sheds light on a puzzle regarding the definition of local-completeness of a natural-deduction proof-system, underlying its harmony.


2010 ◽  
Vol 3 (2) ◽  
pp. 262-272 ◽  
Author(s):  
KLAUS GLASHOFF

Since Frege’s predicate logical transcription of Aristotelian categorical logic, the standard semantics of Aristotelian logic considers terms as standing for sets of individuals. From a philosophical standpoint, this extensional model poses problems: There exist serious doubts that Aristotle’s terms were meant to refer always to sets, that is, entities composed of individuals. Classical philosophy up to Leibniz and Kant had a different view on this question—they looked at terms as standing for concepts (“Begriffe”). In 1972, Corcoran presented a formal system for Aristotelian logic containing a calculus of natural deduction, while, with respect to semantics, he still made use of an extensional interpretation. In this paper we deal with a simple intensional semantics for Corcoran’s syntax—intensional in the sense that no individuals are needed for the construction of a complete Tarski model of Aristotelian syntax. Instead, we view concepts as containing or excluding other, “higher” concepts—corresponding to the idea which Leibniz used in the construction of his characteristic numbers. Thus, this paper is an addendum to Corcoran’s work, furnishing his formal syntax with an adequate semantics which is free from presuppositions which have entered into modern interpretations of Aristotle’s theory via predicate logic.


2021 ◽  
Vol 11 (1) ◽  
Author(s):  
Hao Hua ◽  
Ludger Hovestadt

AbstractThe Erdős-Rényi (ER) random graph G(n, p) analytically characterizes the behaviors in complex networks. However, attempts to fit real-world observations need more sophisticated structures (e.g., multilayer networks), rules (e.g., Achlioptas processes), and projections onto geometric, social, or geographic spaces. The p-adic number system offers a natural representation of hierarchical organization of complex networks. The p-adic random graph interprets n as the cardinality of a set of p-adic numbers. Constructing a vast space of hierarchical structures is equivalent for combining number sequences. Although the giant component is vital in dynamic evolution of networks, the structure of multiple big components is also essential. Fitting the sizes of the few largest components to empirical data was rarely demonstrated. The p-adic ultrametric enables the ER model to simulate multiple big components from the observations of genetic interaction networks, social networks, and epidemics. Community structures lead to multimodal distributions of the big component sizes in networks, which have important implications in intervention of spreading processes.


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