scholarly journals A Semantics for Hyperintensional Belief Revision Based on Information Bases

Studia Logica ◽  
2021 ◽  
Author(s):  
Sena Bozdag
Keyword(s):  
Belief Revision ◽  
Epistemic Logic ◽  
Belief Change ◽  
Dynamic Epistemic Logic ◽  
Doxastic Logic ◽  
Dynamic Operation ◽  
Belief Dynamics ◽  
Dynamic Doxastic Logic ◽  
New Framework

AbstractI propose a novel hyperintensional semantics for belief revision and a corresponding system of dynamic doxastic logic. The main goal of the framework is to reduce some of the idealisations that are common in the belief revision literature and in dynamic epistemic logic. The models of the new framework are primarily based on potentially incomplete or inconsistent collections of information, represented by situations in a situation space. I propose that by shifting the representational focus of doxastic models from belief sets to collections of information, and by defining changes of beliefs as artifacts of changes of information, we can achieve a more realistic account of belief representation and belief change. The proposed dynamic operation suggests a non-classical way of changing beliefs: belief revision occurs in non-explosive environments which allow for a non-monotonic and hyperintensional belief dynamics. A logic that is sound with respect to the semantics is also provided.

scholarly journals Iterated Belief Base Revision: A Dynamic Epistemic Logic Approach

2019 ◽  
Vol 33 ◽  
pp. 3076-3083 ◽  
Author(s):  
Marlo Souza ◽  
Álvaro Moreira ◽  
Renata Vieira
Keyword(s):  
Belief Revision ◽  
Epistemic Logic ◽  
Belief Change ◽  
Dynamic Epistemic Logic ◽  
Belief State ◽  
Revision Operation ◽  
Belief Bases ◽  
Negative Results ◽  
Base Revision ◽  
Iterated Belief Revision

AGM’s belief revision is one of the main paradigms in the study of belief change operations. In this context, belief bases (prioritised bases) have been largely used to specify the agent’s belief state - whether representing the agent’s ‘explicit beliefs’ or as a computational model for her belief state. While the connection of iterated AGM-like operations and their encoding in dynamic epistemic logics have been studied before, few works considered how well-known postulates from iterated belief revision theory can be characterised by means of belief bases and their counterpart in dynamic epistemic logic. This work investigates how priority graphs, a syntactic representation of preference relations deeply connected to prioritised bases, can be used to characterise belief change operators, focusing on well-known postulates of Iterated Belief Change. We provide syntactic representations of belief change operators in a dynamic context, as well as new negative results regarding the possibility of representing an iterated belief revision operation using transformations on priority graphs.

SOME COMPLETENESS THEOREMS IN THE DYNAMIC DOXASTIC LOGIC OF ITERATED BELIEF REVISION

2010 ◽  
Vol 3 (2) ◽  
pp. 228-246 ◽  
Author(s):  
KRISTER SEGERBERG
Keyword(s):  
Belief Revision ◽  
Belief Change ◽  
Doxastic Logic ◽  
New Information ◽  
Incoming Information ◽  
Iterated Belief Revision ◽  
Dynamic Doxastic Logic ◽  
Completeness Theorems ◽  
Nested Beliefs

The success of the AGM paradigm—the theory of belief change initiated by Alchourrón, Gärdenfors, and Makinson—is remarkable, as even a quick look at the literature it has generated will testify. But it is also remarkable, at least in hindsight, how limited was the original effort. For example, the theory concerns the beliefs of just one agent; all incoming information is accepted; belief change is uniquely determined by the new information; there is no provision for nested beliefs. And perhaps most surprising: there is no analysis of iterated change.In this paper it is that last restriction that is at issue. Our medium of study is dynamic doxastic logic (DDL). The success of the AGM paradigm The particular contribution of the paper is detailed completeness proofs for three dynamic doxastic logics of iterated belief revision.The problem of extending the AGM paradigm to include iterated change has been discussed for years, but systematic discussions have appeared only recently (see Segerberg, 2007 and forthcoming, but also van Benthem, 2007; Rott, 2006; Zvesper, 2007).

scholarly journals Modeling Belief in Dynamic Systems, Part II: Revision and Update

1999 ◽  
Vol 10 ◽  
pp. 117-167 ◽  
Author(s):  
N. Friedman ◽  
J. Y. Halpern
Keyword(s):  
Artificial Intelligence ◽  
Belief Revision ◽  
Dynamic Systems ◽  
Belief Change ◽  
Companion Paper ◽  
Minimal Change ◽  
Special Cases ◽  
Epistemic Modalities ◽  
Over Time ◽  
New Framework

The study of belief change has been an active area in philosophy and AI. In recent years two special cases of belief change, belief revision and belief update, have been studied in detail. In a companion paper (Friedman & Halpern, 1997), we introduce a new framework to model belief change. This framework combines temporal and epistemic modalities with a notion of plausibility, allowing us to examine the change of beliefs over time. In this paper, we show how belief revision and belief update can be captured in our framework. This allows us to compare the assumptions made by each method, and to better understand the principles underlying them. In particular, it shows that Katsuno and Mendelzon's notion of belief update (Katsuno & Mendelzon, 1991a) depends on several strong assumptions that may limit its applicability in artificial intelligence. Finally, our analysis allow us to identify a notion of minimal change that underlies a broad range of belief change operations including revision and update.

scholarly journals ARROW UPDATE LOGIC

2011 ◽  
Vol 4 (4) ◽  
pp. 536-559 ◽  
Author(s):  
BARTELD KOOI ◽  
BRYAN RENNE
Keyword(s):  
Epistemic Logic ◽  
Belief Change ◽  
Common Knowledge ◽  
Dynamic Epistemic Logic ◽  
Epistemic Access ◽  
Multi Agent ◽  
Logic Approach ◽  
Action Models ◽  
Information Change ◽  
Update Logic

We presentArrow Update Logic, a theory of epistemic access elimination that can be used to reason about multi-agent belief change. While the belief-changing “arrow updates” of Arrow Update Logic can be transformed into equivalent belief-changing “action models” from the popular Dynamic Epistemic Logic approach, we prove that arrow updates are sometimes exponentially more succinct than action models. Further, since many examples of belief change are naturally thought of from Arrow Update Logic’s perspective of eliminating access to epistemic possibilities, Arrow Update Logic is a valuable addition to the repertoire of logics of information change. In addition to proving basic results about Arrow Update Logic, we introduce a new notion of common knowledge that generalizes both ordinary common knowledge and the “relativized” common knowledge familiar from the Dynamic Epistemic Logic literature.

scholarly journals A Note on the Epistemological Value of Pretense Imagination

Episteme ◽  
2021 ◽  
pp. 1-20
Author(s):  
Tom Schoonen
Keyword(s):  
Risk Assessment ◽  
General Theory ◽  
Belief Revision ◽  
Epistemic Logic ◽  
Pretend Play ◽  
Dynamic Epistemic Logic ◽  
Rational Belief

Abstract Pretense imagination is imagination understood as the ability to recreate rational belief revision. This kind of imagination is used in pretend-play, risk-assessment, etc. Some even claim that this kind of hypothetical belief revision can be grounds to justify new beliefs in conditionals, in particular conditionals that play a foundational role in the epistemology of modality. In this paper, I will argue that it cannot. I will first provide a very general theory of pretense imagination, which I formalise using tools from dynamic epistemic logic. As a result, we can clearly see that pretense imagination episodes are build up out of two kinds of imaginative stages, so I will present an argument by cases. This argument shows that pretense imagination might indeed provide us with justification for believing certain conditionals. Despite this, I will argue that these are not the kind of conditionals that allow pretense imagination to play a foundational role in the epistemology of modality.

Dynamic epistemic logic of belief change in legal judgments

2017 ◽  
Vol 26 (3) ◽  
pp. 201-249
Author(s):  
Pimolluck Jirakunkanok ◽  
Katsuhiko Sano ◽  
Satoshi Tojo
Keyword(s):  
Epistemic Logic ◽  
Belief Change ◽  
Dynamic Epistemic Logic ◽  
Legal Judgments
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