scholarly journals Propositional knowledge and know-how

Synthese ◽  
2007 ◽  
Vol 165 (1) ◽  
pp. 107-125 ◽  
Author(s):  
John N Williams
Keyword(s):  
Propositional Knowledge ◽  
Know How

scholarly journals Knowing How One Knows

2019 ◽  
Vol 10 (2) ◽  
pp. 195-205
Author(s):  
Giovanni Rolla ◽  
Keyword(s):  
Actual World ◽  
Possible Worlds ◽  
Practical Knowledge ◽  
Propositional Knowledge ◽  
Knowing How ◽  
Know How ◽  
First Order ◽  
Kk Principle

In this paper, I argue that knowledge is dimly luminous. That is: if a person knows that p, she knows how she knows that p. The argument depends on a safety-based account of propositional knowledge, which is salient in Williamson’s critique of the ‘KK’ principle. I combine that account with non-intellectualism about knowledge-how – according to which, if a person knows how to φ, then in nearly all (if not all) nearby possible worlds in which she φes in the same way as in the actual world, she only φes successfully. Thus, the possession of first-order propositional knowledge implies secondorder practical knowledge, and this can be iterated. Because of the assumed nonintellectualism about know-how, dim luminosity does not imply bright luminosity about knowledge, which is expressed by the traditional KK principle. I conclude by considering some potential counterexamples to the view that knowledge is dimly luminous.

Knowledge, Action, and Defeasibility

2021 ◽  
pp. 177-200
Author(s):  
Carlotta Pavese
Keyword(s):  
Recent Literature ◽  
Intentional Action ◽  
Propositional Knowledge ◽  
Extreme Form ◽  
Know How ◽  
Center Stage

This essay reviews some motivations for a ‘knowledge-centered psychology’—a psychology where knowledge enters center stage in an explanation of intentional action (Section 8.2). Then it outlines a novel argument for the claim that knowledge is required for intentional action (Section 8.3) and discusses some of its consequences, in particular for the debate on the defeasibility of know-how. Section 8.4 argues that a knowledge-centered psychology motivates the intellectualist view that know-how is a species of know-that. In its more extreme form, the view is committed to an epistemologically substantial claim—i.e., that the epistemic profile of know-how is the same as that of propositional knowledge. Now, it is widely believed that know-that can be defeated by undermining and rebutting defeaters (e.g., Chisholm 1966; Goldman 1986; Pollock and Cruz 1999; Bergmann 2000). If that is correct, one corollary of intellectualism is that the defeasibility of know-how patterns with that of knowledge. A knowledge-centered psychology does predict that, for it predicts that both know-how and knowledge are defeated when one’s ability to intentionally act is defeated. In Section 8.5, by replying to a challenge raised in the recent literature (Carter and Navarro 2018), I argue that this prediction is actually borne out.

scholarly journals Expertise as a domain in interaction

2021 ◽  
pp. 146144562110167
Author(s):  
Ilkka Arminen ◽  
Mika Simonen
Keyword(s):  
Procedural Knowledge ◽  
Propositional Knowledge ◽  
Methodological Issues ◽  
Knowing How ◽  
Know How ◽  
Knowing That ◽  
New Research

We start this article from Gilbert Ryle’s distinction between propositional knowledge, ‘knowing-that’, and procedural knowledge, ‘knowing-how’, and investigate how participants in interaction display orientation to the latter in various settings. As the knowledge of how things are done, know-how can be analyzed in terms of its relevance and consequentiality for parties in interaction. Similarly, as participants adjust their actions and understandings according to their sense of what they know and assume others to know, their know-how and its distribution may form the basis for adjusting and reshaping their actions, forms of participation and identities. In this sense, we aim at opening an investigation of know-how, and its conventionalized form, expertise, in interaction. In as much as it forms a distinct domain, a new research object – expertise in interaction – is formulated. Methodological issues of how to study expertise in interaction are discussed. The data are in English and Finnish.

scholarly journals KNOWING HOW TO PUT KNOWLEDGE FIRST IN THE THEORY OF JUSTIFICATION

Episteme ◽  
2016 ◽  
Vol 14 (4) ◽  
pp. 393-412 ◽  
Author(s):  
Paul Silva
Keyword(s):  
Practical Knowledge ◽  
Propositional Knowledge ◽  
Knowing How ◽  
Know How

AbstractIn what follows I offer a novel knowledge-first account of justification that avoids the pitfalls of existing accounts while preserving the underlying insight of knowledge-first epistemologies: that knowledge comes first. The view is, roughly, this: justification is grounded in our practical knowledge (know-how) concerning the acquisition of propositional knowledge (knowledge-that). The upshot is a virtue-theoretic, knowledge-first view of justification that is internalist-friendly and able to explain more facts about justification than any other available view.

Know-How, Performance Enhancement, and Guidance Control

2021 ◽  
pp. 83-116
Author(s):  
J. Adam Carter
Keyword(s):  
Moral Responsibility ◽  
Virtue Epistemology ◽  
Performance Enhancement ◽  
Propositional Knowledge ◽  
Guidance Control ◽  
Knowing How ◽  
Know How ◽  
Apt Belief ◽  
The Devil ◽  
Performance Enhancing

If intellectualism about knowledge-how is true (and so, if knowledge-how is a species of knowledge-that), then to the extent that we need an autonomy condition on know-how, it will be (simply) an autonomy condition on know-that: a condition on propositional knowledge-apt belief. However, the anti-intellectualist—according to whom know-how is fundamentally dispositional rather than propositional—would need an entirely different story here––one that places an autonomy-related restriction not on propositional-knowledge-apt belief but, instead, on know-how-apt dispositions. Chapter 4 develops exactly this kind of restriction, by cobbling together some ideas about know-how and virtue epistemology with recent thinking in the moral responsibility literature about freedom, responsibility, and manipulation. The proposal is that one is in a state of knowing how to do something, φ‎, only if one has the skill to φ‎ successfully with guidance control, and one’s φ‎-ing exhibits guidance control (and furthermore, manifests know-how) only if one’s φ‎-ing is caused by a reasons-responsive mechanism that one owns. Unsurprisingly, the devil is in these details—and this chapter aims to spell them out in a way that rules out certain kinds of radical performance enhancing cases while not ruling out that, say, one knows how to do a maths problem when one’s performance is just mildly boosted by Adderall.

scholarly journals Know-How and Non-Propositional Intentionality

2018 ◽  
Author(s):  
Katalin Farkas
Keyword(s):  
Practical Knowledge ◽  
Propositional Knowledge ◽  
Cognitive Achievement ◽  
Know How ◽  
Normative Aspect

This chapter addresses the question of whether know-how is non-propositional. The question is usually approached through asking whether “know-how” is distinct from “know-that”. The chapter proposes that we should narrow our question. It briefly recalls a certain tradition of talking about knowledge that sees it as a uniquely human cognitive achievement with a normative aspect. The central and paradigmatic case has been a certain kind of possession of truth. But is there another, similarly valuable and uniquely human cognitive achievement? The outlines of such a concept are presented: it’s an ability to reliably succeed in performing some action, which was developed and refined through reflection. Practical knowledge is evaluated for reliable success in action, rather than for truth, so it’s not propositional; but it has a reflective element which makes it similar to propositional knowledge. This conception combines elements of intellectualism and anti-intellectualism about knowledge-how.

Beam-radiation effects on wool in the ESEM

1986 ◽  
Vol 44 ◽  
pp. 674-675
Author(s):  
G.D. Danilatos
Keyword(s):  
Electron Beam ◽  
Radiation Effects ◽  
Research Work ◽  
Beam Radiation ◽  
Liquid Environment ◽  
Know How ◽  
Environmental Sem

The advent of the environmental SEM (ESEM) has made possible the examination of uncoated and untreated specimen surfaces in the presence of a gaseous or liquid environment. However, the question arises as to what degree the examined surface remains unaffected by the action of the electron beam. It is reasonable to assume that the beam invariably affects all specimens but the type and degree of effect may be totally unimportant for one class of applications and totally unacceptable for another; yet, for a third class, it is imperative to know how our observations are modified by the presence of the beam. The aim of this report is to create an awareness of the need to initiate research work in various fields in order to determine the guiding rules of the limitations (or even advantages) due to irradiation.

Computer programs for the calculation of x-ray intensities emitted by elements in multi-layer structures

1990 ◽  
Vol 48 (2) ◽  
pp. 216-217
Author(s):  
G.F. Bastin ◽  
H.J.M. Heijligers ◽  
J.M. Dijkstra
Keyword(s):  
Software Package ◽  
Light Element ◽  
Matrix Correction ◽  
Excellent Performance ◽  
Element Analysis ◽  
X Ray ◽  
Know How ◽  
Accurate Knowledge ◽  
Layer Structures ◽  
Bulk Matrix

For the calculation of X-ray intensities emitted by elements present in multi-layer systems it is vital to have an accurate knowledge of the x-ray ionization vs. mass-depth (ϕ(ρz)) curves as a function of accelerating voltage and atomic number of films and substrate. Once this knowledge is available the way is open to the analysis of thin films in which both the thicknesses as well as the compositions can usually be determined simultaneously.Our bulk matrix correction “PROZA” with its proven excellent performance for a wide variety of applications (e.g., ultra-light element analysis, extremes in accelerating voltage) has been used as the basis for the development of the software package discussed here. The PROZA program is based on our own modifications of the surface-centred Gaussian ϕ(ρz) model, originally introduced by Packwood and Brown. For its extension towards thin film applications it is required to know how the 4 Gaussian parameters α, β, γ and ϕ(o) for each element in each of the films are affected by the film thickness and the presence of other layers and the substrate.

Spreading the Word: Raise Your Profession's Profile With Local Angles on National News

ASHA Leader ◽  
2013 ◽  
Vol 18 (2) ◽  
Keyword(s):  
Know How ◽  
The Media

How to use your local know-how to get the media to pay attention.

Experience With Grant Writing: Where Do I Even Begin?

2010 ◽  
Vol 11 (1) ◽  
pp. 21-24
Author(s):  
Nicole M. Mancini
Keyword(s):  
Lessons Learned ◽  
Economic Situation ◽  
Grant Writing ◽  
Personal Journey ◽  
Know How ◽  
Daunting Task

Abstract At first, grant writing may look like a daunting task. You may ask yourself, “Is it really worth the time and effort?” With today's economic situation, teachers and therapists need ways to supplement their programs and grants provide such an opportunity. However, many of us do not know how to get started. After a few experiences and many lessons learned, I have come to enjoy researching and writing grants to supplement my students' learning. It is well worth the time and effort. This article provides information about a personal journey, lessons learned, and resources to get you started.

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