Know-How, Performance Enhancement, and Guidance Control

2021 ◽  
pp. 83-116
Author(s):  
J. Adam Carter
Keyword(s):  
Moral Responsibility ◽  
Virtue Epistemology ◽  
Performance Enhancement ◽  
Propositional Knowledge ◽  
Guidance Control ◽  
Knowing How ◽  
Know How ◽  
Apt Belief ◽  
The Devil ◽  
Performance Enhancing

If intellectualism about knowledge-how is true (and so, if knowledge-how is a species of knowledge-that), then to the extent that we need an autonomy condition on know-how, it will be (simply) an autonomy condition on know-that: a condition on propositional knowledge-apt belief. However, the anti-intellectualist—according to whom know-how is fundamentally dispositional rather than propositional—would need an entirely different story here––one that places an autonomy-related restriction not on propositional-knowledge-apt belief but, instead, on know-how-apt dispositions. Chapter 4 develops exactly this kind of restriction, by cobbling together some ideas about know-how and virtue epistemology with recent thinking in the moral responsibility literature about freedom, responsibility, and manipulation. The proposal is that one is in a state of knowing how to do something, φ‎, only if one has the skill to φ‎ successfully with guidance control, and one’s φ‎-ing exhibits guidance control (and furthermore, manifests know-how) only if one’s φ‎-ing is caused by a reasons-responsive mechanism that one owns. Unsurprisingly, the devil is in these details—and this chapter aims to spell them out in a way that rules out certain kinds of radical performance enhancing cases while not ruling out that, say, one knows how to do a maths problem when one’s performance is just mildly boosted by Adderall.

scholarly journals Knowing How One Knows

2019 ◽  
Vol 10 (2) ◽  
pp. 195-205
Author(s):  
Giovanni Rolla ◽  
Keyword(s):  
Actual World ◽  
Possible Worlds ◽  
Practical Knowledge ◽  
Propositional Knowledge ◽  
Knowing How ◽  
Know How ◽  
First Order ◽  
Kk Principle

In this paper, I argue that knowledge is dimly luminous. That is: if a person knows that p, she knows how she knows that p. The argument depends on a safety-based account of propositional knowledge, which is salient in Williamson’s critique of the ‘KK’ principle. I combine that account with non-intellectualism about knowledge-how – according to which, if a person knows how to φ, then in nearly all (if not all) nearby possible worlds in which she φes in the same way as in the actual world, she only φes successfully. Thus, the possession of first-order propositional knowledge implies secondorder practical knowledge, and this can be iterated. Because of the assumed nonintellectualism about know-how, dim luminosity does not imply bright luminosity about knowledge, which is expressed by the traditional KK principle. I conclude by considering some potential counterexamples to the view that knowledge is dimly luminous.

scholarly journals Expertise as a domain in interaction

2021 ◽  
pp. 146144562110167
Author(s):  
Ilkka Arminen ◽  
Mika Simonen
Keyword(s):  
Procedural Knowledge ◽  
Propositional Knowledge ◽  
Methodological Issues ◽  
Knowing How ◽  
Know How ◽  
Knowing That ◽  
New Research

We start this article from Gilbert Ryle’s distinction between propositional knowledge, ‘knowing-that’, and procedural knowledge, ‘knowing-how’, and investigate how participants in interaction display orientation to the latter in various settings. As the knowledge of how things are done, know-how can be analyzed in terms of its relevance and consequentiality for parties in interaction. Similarly, as participants adjust their actions and understandings according to their sense of what they know and assume others to know, their know-how and its distribution may form the basis for adjusting and reshaping their actions, forms of participation and identities. In this sense, we aim at opening an investigation of know-how, and its conventionalized form, expertise, in interaction. In as much as it forms a distinct domain, a new research object – expertise in interaction – is formulated. Methodological issues of how to study expertise in interaction are discussed. The data are in English and Finnish.

scholarly journals KNOWING HOW TO PUT KNOWLEDGE FIRST IN THE THEORY OF JUSTIFICATION

Episteme ◽  
2016 ◽  
Vol 14 (4) ◽  
pp. 393-412 ◽  
Author(s):  
Paul Silva
Keyword(s):  
Practical Knowledge ◽  
Propositional Knowledge ◽  
Knowing How ◽  
Know How

AbstractIn what follows I offer a novel knowledge-first account of justification that avoids the pitfalls of existing accounts while preserving the underlying insight of knowledge-first epistemologies: that knowledge comes first. The view is, roughly, this: justification is grounded in our practical knowledge (know-how) concerning the acquisition of propositional knowledge (knowledge-that). The upshot is a virtue-theoretic, knowledge-first view of justification that is internalist-friendly and able to explain more facts about justification than any other available view.

Autonomous Knowledge

2021 ◽  
Author(s):  
J. Adam Carter
Keyword(s):  
Virtue Epistemology ◽  
True Belief ◽  
Performance Enhancement ◽  
Specific Form ◽  
Propositional Knowledge ◽  
Value Of Knowledge ◽  
New Class ◽  
And Performance

A central conclusion developed and defended throughout the book is that epistemic autonomy is necessary for knowledge (both knowledge-that and knowledge-how) and in ways that epistemologists have not yet fully appreciated. The book is divided into five chapters. Chapter 1 motivates (using a series of twists on Lehrer’s TrueTemp case) the claim that propositional knowledge requires autonomous belief. Chapters 2 and 3 flesh out this proposal in two ways, by defending a specific form of history-sensitive externalism with respect to propositional knowledge-apt autonomous belief (Chapter 2) and by showing how the idea that knowledge requires autonomous belief—understood along the externalist lines proposed—corresponds with an entirely new class of knowledge defeaters (Chapter 3). Chapter 4 extends the proposal to (both intellectualist and anti-intellectualist) knowledge-how and performance enhancement, and in a way that combines insights from virtue epistemology with research on freedom, responsibility, and manipulation. Chapter 5 concludes with a new twist on the Value of Knowledge debate, by vindicating the value of epistemically autonomous knowledge over that which falls short, including (mere) heteronomous but otherwise epistemically impeccable justified true belief.

Is all knowledge prepositional?

2005 ◽  
Vol 48 (1-2) ◽  
pp. 7-19
Author(s):  
Miroslava Andjelkovic
Keyword(s):  
Propositional Knowledge ◽  
The Other ◽  
Infinite Regress ◽  
Important Distinction ◽  
Knowing How ◽  
The Asymmetry ◽  
Contemporary Epistemology

This paper deals with a criticism of Ryle's claim that the so called Intellectualist legend leads to an infinite regress. Critics have attempted to show that Ryle's argument cannot even get off the ground since its two basic premises cannot be true at the same time. In the paper I argue that this objection is based on a misinterpretation of Ryle's argumentation, which is complex and consists of two arguments, not of a single one as it is claimed. One of Ryle's argument attacks the thesis that an intelligent act is an indirect result of propositional knowledge, while the other, which I call the Asymmetry argument, claims that not every manifestation of knowledge that is accompanied with the manifestation of knowing how. In the paper I argue that both Ryle's arguments are valid and resistant to recent critique so it can be said that Ryle's distinction between knowledge that and knowing how is still an important distinction within contemporary epistemology.

Virtue Epistemology as Anti-luck Epistemology

2021 ◽  
Vol 58 (4) ◽  
pp. 77-94
Author(s):  
Alexey Z. Chernyak ◽  
Keyword(s):  
Critical Analysis ◽  
Virtue Epistemology ◽  
Propositional Knowledge ◽  
General Study ◽  
Intellectual Virtues ◽  
Mental Attitude ◽  
Justified Belief ◽  
The Status ◽  
Veritic Luck ◽  
Contemporary Epistemology

The idea that knowledge as an individual mental attitude with certain propositional content is not only true justified belief but a belief the truth of which does not result from any kind of luck, is widely spread in contemporary epistemology. This account is known as anti-luck epistemology. A very popular explanation of the inconsistency of that concept of knowledge with the luck-dependent nature of truth (so called veritic luck taking place when a subject’s belief could not be true if not by mere coincidence) presumes that the status of propositional knowledge crucially depends on the qualities of actions that result in the corresponding belief, or processes backing them, which reflect the socalled intellectual virtues mainly responsible for subject’s relevant competences. This account known as Virtue Epistemology presumes that if a belief is true exclusively or mainly due to its dependence on intellectual virtues, it just cannot be true by luck, hence no place for lucky knowledge. But this thesis is hard to prove given the existence of true virtuous beliefs which could nevertheless be false if not for some lucky (for the knower) accident. This led to an appearance of virtue epistemological theories aimed specifically at an assimilation of such cases. Their authors try to represent the relevant situations as such where the contribution of luck is not crucial whereas the contribution of virtues is crucial. This article provides a critical analysis of the corresponding arguments as part of a more general study of the ability of Virtue Epistemology to provide justification for the thesis of incompatibility of propositional knowledge with veritic luck. It is shown that there are good reasons to doubt that Virtue Epistemology can do this.

scholarly journals ‘Knowing How’ in Slovene: Treading the Other Path

Slovene ◽  
2017 ◽  
Vol 6 (1) ◽  
pp. 95-117 ◽  
Author(s):  
Barbara Sonnenhauser
Keyword(s):  
Point Of View ◽  
The Other ◽  
Peculiar Feature ◽  
Linguistic Expression ◽  
Knowing How ◽  
Know How ◽  
Slavic Languages ◽  
Modal Verb ◽  
Contemporary Standard

For the linguistic expression of the concept of knowledge, the Slavic languages use verbs deriving from the Indo-European roots *ĝnō and *ṷei̭d. They differ in terms of the availability of both types of verbs in the contemporary standard languages and in terms of their semantic range. As will be shown in this paper, these differences are interesting not only from a language-specific lexicological point of view, but also in the context of the intersection of lexicon and grammar. Covering the domain of ‘knowing how,’ the *ĝnō-based verb in Slovene (znati) has been extending into the domain of possibility and, on this basis, developing into a modal verb. While this development is not surprising from a typological point of view, it is remarkable from a Slavic perspective, since this particular grammaticalisation path towards possibility is otherwise unknown to Slavic. This peculiar feature of Slovene, which most probably relates to its long-lasting and intensive contact with German, is illustrated in the present paper by comparing Slovene to Russian on the basis of three main questions: 1) the semantic range of vedeti / vedatʹ and znati / znatʹ, 2) the lexicalisation of ‘know how,’ and 3) the relation between knowledge, ability, and possibility. The focus is on contemporary Slovene and Russian, leaving a detailed diachronic investigation and the further embedding into a larger Slavic and areal perspective for future analyses.

scholarly journals Heteronomy of architecture

2021 ◽  
pp. 337-359
Author(s):  
Maria Pilar Vettori
Keyword(s):  
Daily Basis ◽  
Great Pleasure ◽  
Knowing How ◽  
Know How ◽  
The People ◽  
Way Of Knowing ◽  
The Way

I’m not calling today about the competition we are holding for Reinventing Cities here in Lambrate - I am calling to ask you if you would like it if we had a dialogue together on the Heteronomy of Architecture. Benedetta Tagliabue: Hello Matteo! Don’t even talk about it, everything is so sad. You know just how important it is for me to travel and meet people all the time... in person. Dialogue? Absolutely! But... what is this “heteronomy”? You don’t mean it’s something that excludes someone? You know I don’t like it...   M.R. Come on, we’ve known each other for years! Look, it’s exactly the opposite. A very interesting concept which Giancarlo De Carlo summed up well in a sentence I am going to read to you. «As you can tell as you listen, one cannot help but think of your way of knowing, investigating and reading the places and cities in which you design. It is also impossible not to think of how you live together with others, and how this has always been the way you live architecture on a daily basis, and how you know how to transmit it and build it together with all the people you meet: collaborators, citizens, users, clients, politicians, artists, producers of materials, craftsmen, friends, etc. [...]». B.T. Oh well... I was actually joking a bit, you know it amuses me. I remembered this idea of Giancarlo’s from when I was studying at the Faculty of Architecture in Venice, and I was struck by his strength and energy in knowing how to interpret it at its best and translate it into splendid practice on many occasions. Thank you also for your kind words, it was so kind of you to have thought of me. It certainly is an interesting theme to delve into in a monographic issue of a magazine, and I would like to congratulate those who thought of it. So... Yes, I like it: let’s dialogue! You already know that we’ll have to talk again a few times. M.R. Of course I know... it’s always a great pleasure!

scholarly journals Skill, Drill, and Intelligent Performance: Ryle and Intellectualism

2017 ◽  
Vol 5 (5) ◽  
Author(s):  
Stina Bäckström ◽  
Martin Gustafsson
Keyword(s):  
Current Debate ◽  
Regress Argument ◽  
Knowing How ◽  
Know How ◽  
Dispositional Account ◽  
Knowing That ◽  
Category Distinction

In this paper, we aim to show that a study of Gilbert Ryle’s work has much to contribute to the current debate between intellectualism and anti-intellectualism with respect to skill and know-how. According to Ryle, knowing how and skill are distinctive from and do not reduce to knowing that. What is often overlooked is that for Ryle this point is connected to the idea that the distinction between skill and mere habit is a category distinction, or a distinction in form. Criticizing the reading of Ryle presented by Jason Stanley, we argue that once the formal nature of Ryle’s investigation is recognized it becomes clear that his dispositional account is not an instance of reductionist behaviorism, and that his regress argument has a broader target than Stanley appears to recognize.

ICT Based Performance Measurement and Benchmarking Methodology

2020 ◽  
pp. 188-196
Author(s):  
Nadja Yang Meng ◽  
Karthikeyan K
Keyword(s):  
Best Practices ◽  
Performance Measurement ◽  
Performance Metrics ◽  
Performance Enhancement ◽  
Performance Measurements ◽  
Know How ◽  
Performance Benchmarking ◽  
Measurement Framework ◽  
And Performance ◽  
Made In

Performance benchmarking and performance measurement are the fundamental principles of performance enhancement in the business sector. For businesses to enhance their performance in the modern competitive world, it is fundamental to know how to measure the performance level in business that also incorporates telling how they will performance after a change has been made. In case a business improvement has been made, the performance processes have to be evaluated. Performance measurements are also fundamental in the process of doing comparisons of performance levels between corporations. The best practices within the industry are evaluated by the businesses with desirable levels of the kind of performance measures being conducted. In that regard, it is fundamental if similar businesses applied the same collection of performance metrics. In this paper, the NETIAS performance measurement framework will be applied to accomplish the mission of evaluating performances in business by producing generic collection of performance metrics, which businesses can utilize to compare and measure their organizational activities.

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