Knowledge, Action, and Defeasibility

2021 ◽  
pp. 177-200
Author(s):  
Carlotta Pavese
Keyword(s):  
Recent Literature ◽  
Intentional Action ◽  
Propositional Knowledge ◽  
Extreme Form ◽  
Know How ◽  
Center Stage

This essay reviews some motivations for a ‘knowledge-centered psychology’—a psychology where knowledge enters center stage in an explanation of intentional action (Section 8.2). Then it outlines a novel argument for the claim that knowledge is required for intentional action (Section 8.3) and discusses some of its consequences, in particular for the debate on the defeasibility of know-how. Section 8.4 argues that a knowledge-centered psychology motivates the intellectualist view that know-how is a species of know-that. In its more extreme form, the view is committed to an epistemologically substantial claim—i.e., that the epistemic profile of know-how is the same as that of propositional knowledge. Now, it is widely believed that know-that can be defeated by undermining and rebutting defeaters (e.g., Chisholm 1966; Goldman 1986; Pollock and Cruz 1999; Bergmann 2000). If that is correct, one corollary of intellectualism is that the defeasibility of know-how patterns with that of knowledge. A knowledge-centered psychology does predict that, for it predicts that both know-how and knowledge are defeated when one’s ability to intentionally act is defeated. In Section 8.5, by replying to a challenge raised in the recent literature (Carter and Navarro 2018), I argue that this prediction is actually borne out.

scholarly journals Industry Revolution IR 4.0: Future Opportunities and Challenges in Construction Industry

2018 ◽  
Vol 203 ◽  
pp. 02010 ◽  
Author(s):  
Wesam S Alaloul ◽  
Mohd Shahir Liew ◽  
Noor Amila Wan Abdullah Zawawi ◽  
Bashar S Mohammed
Keyword(s):  
Construction Industry ◽  
Industrial Revolution ◽  
Recent Literature ◽  
General Idea ◽  
The Sustainable Development ◽  
Practical Applications ◽  
Know How ◽  
Research Areas ◽  
Identical Construction ◽  
Special Rules

The future of construction industry development is the approach of the component-industrialization, the construction-breakdown, design-identical, construction-assembled, operation-data technique to maximize the life cycle value. This paper presents a general idea of Industrial Revolution (IR) 4.0 with the introduction descriptions of important aspects in Construction Industry (CI) development. The aim is to define and show possible research areas connected with the IR 4.0 into the CI. For this purpose, an analysis was made, based on the most recent literature, to point out actual needs in the CI in terms of its evolution into IR 4.0 level. It is shown that multidiscipline approaches are not investigated to create special rules, procedures and methods and know-how designed for introducing the principles of IR 4.0 in the CI. A popular from stakeholders in the CI understand how digitization is affecting each part of their trade, however, its practical applications are still in infancy stage. IR 4.0 concepts should be combined with construction production, novel expertise must be applied to the intellectual engineering of modern construction, enhance the level of incorporation, to achieve the sustainable development.

scholarly journals Propositional knowledge and know-how

Synthese ◽  
2007 ◽  
Vol 165 (1) ◽  
pp. 107-125 ◽  
Author(s):  
John N Williams
Keyword(s):  
Propositional Knowledge ◽  
Know How

scholarly journals Knowing How One Knows

2019 ◽  
Vol 10 (2) ◽  
pp. 195-205
Author(s):  
Giovanni Rolla ◽  
Keyword(s):  
Actual World ◽  
Possible Worlds ◽  
Practical Knowledge ◽  
Propositional Knowledge ◽  
Knowing How ◽  
Know How ◽  
First Order ◽  
Kk Principle

In this paper, I argue that knowledge is dimly luminous. That is: if a person knows that p, she knows how she knows that p. The argument depends on a safety-based account of propositional knowledge, which is salient in Williamson’s critique of the ‘KK’ principle. I combine that account with non-intellectualism about knowledge-how – according to which, if a person knows how to φ, then in nearly all (if not all) nearby possible worlds in which she φes in the same way as in the actual world, she only φes successfully. Thus, the possession of first-order propositional knowledge implies secondorder practical knowledge, and this can be iterated. Because of the assumed nonintellectualism about know-how, dim luminosity does not imply bright luminosity about knowledge, which is expressed by the traditional KK principle. I conclude by considering some potential counterexamples to the view that knowledge is dimly luminous.

scholarly journals Expertise as a domain in interaction

2021 ◽  
pp. 146144562110167
Author(s):  
Ilkka Arminen ◽  
Mika Simonen
Keyword(s):  
Procedural Knowledge ◽  
Propositional Knowledge ◽  
Methodological Issues ◽  
Knowing How ◽  
Know How ◽  
Knowing That ◽  
New Research

We start this article from Gilbert Ryle’s distinction between propositional knowledge, ‘knowing-that’, and procedural knowledge, ‘knowing-how’, and investigate how participants in interaction display orientation to the latter in various settings. As the knowledge of how things are done, know-how can be analyzed in terms of its relevance and consequentiality for parties in interaction. Similarly, as participants adjust their actions and understandings according to their sense of what they know and assume others to know, their know-how and its distribution may form the basis for adjusting and reshaping their actions, forms of participation and identities. In this sense, we aim at opening an investigation of know-how, and its conventionalized form, expertise, in interaction. In as much as it forms a distinct domain, a new research object – expertise in interaction – is formulated. Methodological issues of how to study expertise in interaction are discussed. The data are in English and Finnish.

The Self-Knowledge That Externalists Leave Out

1998 ◽  
pp. 112-118
Author(s):  
Lisa L. Hall
Keyword(s):  
Practical Reason ◽  
Mental Content ◽  
Intentional Action ◽  
The Self ◽  
Know How ◽  
Theories Of Mind ◽  
Self Knowledge ◽  
The Relationship

This paper addresses the relationship between self-knowledge, practical reason and Externalist theories of mind. Specifically, I argue that the kind of self-knowledge defended by Externalists is insufficient for intentional action. I claim that we know how to act only if we have access to beliefs about how our circumstances are related to our intended actions. I then go on to argue that the kind of mental content we need to characterize these beliefs is incompatible with the Externalist’s assumptions.

scholarly journals KNOWING HOW TO PUT KNOWLEDGE FIRST IN THE THEORY OF JUSTIFICATION

Episteme ◽  
2016 ◽  
Vol 14 (4) ◽  
pp. 393-412 ◽  
Author(s):  
Paul Silva
Keyword(s):  
Practical Knowledge ◽  
Propositional Knowledge ◽  
Knowing How ◽  
Know How

AbstractIn what follows I offer a novel knowledge-first account of justification that avoids the pitfalls of existing accounts while preserving the underlying insight of knowledge-first epistemologies: that knowledge comes first. The view is, roughly, this: justification is grounded in our practical knowledge (know-how) concerning the acquisition of propositional knowledge (knowledge-that). The upshot is a virtue-theoretic, knowledge-first view of justification that is internalist-friendly and able to explain more facts about justification than any other available view.

scholarly journals Anti-intellectualism, instructive representations, and the intentional action argument

Synthese ◽  
2021 ◽  
Author(s):  
Alison Ann Springle ◽  
Justin Humphreys
Keyword(s):  
Propositional Attitudes ◽  
Intentional Action ◽  
Mental States ◽  
Propositional Knowledge ◽  
Theory Of Action ◽  
Alternative Theory ◽  
Reasons For Action ◽  
Causal Theory Of Action ◽  
Theoretical Support ◽  
The Right

AbstractIntellectualists hold that knowledge-how is a species of knowledge-that, and consequently that the knowledge involved in skill is propositional. In support of this view, the intentional action argument holds that since skills manifest in intentional action and since intentional action necessarily depends on propositional knowledge, skills necessarily depend on propositional knowledge. We challenge this argument, and suggest that instructive representations, as opposed to propositional attitudes, can better account for an agent’s reasons for action. While a propositional-causal theory of action, according to which intentional action must be causally produced “in the right way” by an agent’s proposition-involving reasons, has long held sway, we draw on Elizabeth Anscombe’s insights offer a path toward an alternative theory of action. In so doing, we reject the implicitly Cartesian conception of knowledge at the core of the intentional action argument, while hanging on to the idea that mental states are representations of a certain kind. Our argument provides theoretical support for anti-intellectualism by equipping philosophers with an account of non-propositional, practical content.

Know-How, Performance Enhancement, and Guidance Control

2021 ◽  
pp. 83-116
Author(s):  
J. Adam Carter
Keyword(s):  
Moral Responsibility ◽  
Virtue Epistemology ◽  
Performance Enhancement ◽  
Propositional Knowledge ◽  
Guidance Control ◽  
Knowing How ◽  
Know How ◽  
Apt Belief ◽  
The Devil ◽  
Performance Enhancing

If intellectualism about knowledge-how is true (and so, if knowledge-how is a species of knowledge-that), then to the extent that we need an autonomy condition on know-how, it will be (simply) an autonomy condition on know-that: a condition on propositional knowledge-apt belief. However, the anti-intellectualist—according to whom know-how is fundamentally dispositional rather than propositional—would need an entirely different story here––one that places an autonomy-related restriction not on propositional-knowledge-apt belief but, instead, on know-how-apt dispositions. Chapter 4 develops exactly this kind of restriction, by cobbling together some ideas about know-how and virtue epistemology with recent thinking in the moral responsibility literature about freedom, responsibility, and manipulation. The proposal is that one is in a state of knowing how to do something, φ‎, only if one has the skill to φ‎ successfully with guidance control, and one’s φ‎-ing exhibits guidance control (and furthermore, manifests know-how) only if one’s φ‎-ing is caused by a reasons-responsive mechanism that one owns. Unsurprisingly, the devil is in these details—and this chapter aims to spell them out in a way that rules out certain kinds of radical performance enhancing cases while not ruling out that, say, one knows how to do a maths problem when one’s performance is just mildly boosted by Adderall.

Teacher and His/Her Role in Teaching English

2017 ◽  
Vol 7 (2) ◽  
pp. 49-53
Author(s):  
Ervin Balla
Keyword(s):  
English Language ◽  
Recent Literature ◽  
English Teacher ◽  
Teaching English ◽  
Know How ◽  
Ideal Teacher ◽  
Teacher Needs ◽  
The Subject ◽  
The Ideal

Abstract Teachers play e key role in the process of teaching. In this article it is tried to focus on some of the most important roles that the teacher of English language plays during the difficult process of teaching. The role of the teacher in class is important. In the class teachers are: leaders of the language, thinkers, administrators, surces experts, vigilants, material furnishers, organizers, performers, estimators, listeners and controllers. At the recent literature is posed the question of the ideal teacher, so what makes a good teacher? According to Medgyes P. All the teachers are extraordinary according to their ways and different from eacher other. According to him the concept of the ideal teacher does not fit to a single concept, because many things have to be taken into consideration. Another image of English teacher is the teacher who is expert of the English language. According to Whitaker the English teacher needs to own the subject and to make the students to follow willingly the subject. He not only should own the subject but he should also know how to explain it.

Inference and Its Role in Rational Action

2020 ◽  
pp. 194-209
Author(s):  
Robert Audi
Keyword(s):  
Reasoned Action ◽  
Intentional Action ◽  
Propositional Knowledge ◽  
Rational Action ◽  
Wide Scope ◽  
Rational Actions

Action, like knowledge, is portrayed in this chapter as having grounds, but neither acting nor knowing requires a basis in inference. We can view agency as information-responsive, reasons-responsive, and rational without endorsing such intellectualist views. Acting for a reason need not be reasoned action. Beliefs or perceptible cues can guide intentional action without constituting knowledge. Intentions may have wide scope and complex content, much as beliefs can have complex propositional objects, and this enables a single intention to govern multiple deeds. Rational actions, moreover, are immensely various, extending to things we do rationally, without these actions being reason-based or even intentional. Granted, learning how to do many of the important things we do, say in speaking, playing instruments, and hiking, normally requires gaining propositional knowledge along the developmental route. Nonetheless, some propositional knowledge is like a ladder that, once having climbed up on it, we can do without.

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