scholarly journals Knowledge of consequences: an explanation of the epistemic side-effect effect

Synthese ◽  
2018 ◽  
Vol 197 (12) ◽  
pp. 5457-5490
Author(s):  
Katarzyna Paprzycka-Hausman

AbstractThe Knobe effect (Analysis 63(3):190–194, 2003a) consists in our tendency to attribute intentionality to bringing about a side effect when it is morally bad but not when it is morally good. Beebe and Buckwalter (Mind Lang 25:474–498, 2010) have demonstrated that there is an epistemic side-effect effect (ESEE): people are more inclined to attribute knowledge when the side effect is bad in Knobe-type cases. ESEE is quite robust. In this paper, I present a new explanation of ESEE. I argue that when people attribute knowledge in morally negative cases, they express a consequence-knowledge claim (knowledge that a possible consequence of an action is that harm will occur) rather than a predictive claim (knowledge that harm will actually occur). I use the omissions account (Paprzycka in Mind Lang 30(5):550–571, 2015) to explain why the consequence-knowledge claim is particularly salient in morally negative cases. Unlike the doxastic heuristic account (Alfano et al. in Monist 95(2):264–289, 2012), the omissions account can explain the persistence of ESEE in the so-called slight-chance of harm conditions. I present the results of empirical studies that test the predictions of the account. I show that ESEE occurs in Butler-type scenarios. Some of the studies involve close replications of Nadelhoffer’s (Analysis 64(3):277–284, 2004) study.

1993 ◽  
Vol 28 (6) ◽  
pp. 56-67 ◽  
Author(s):  
William Landi ◽  
Barbara G. Ryder ◽  
Sean Zhang

2020 ◽  
Author(s):  
John Turri

Traditionally it has been thought that the moral valence of a proposition is, strictly speaking, irrelevant to whether someone knows that the proposition is true, and thus irrelevant to the truth-value of a knowledge ascription. On this view, it’s no easier to know, for example, that a bad thing will happen than that a good thing will happen (other things being equal). But a series of very surprising recent experiments suggest that this is actually not how we view knowledge. On the contrary, people are much more willing to ascribe knowledge of a bad outcome. This is known as the epistemic side-effect effect (ESEE), and is a specific instance of a widely documented phenomenon, the side-effect effect (a.k.a. “the Knobe effect”), which is the most famous finding in experimental philosophy. In this paper, I report a new series of five experiments on ESEE, and in the process accomplish three things. First, I confirm earlier findings on the effect. Second, I show that the effect is virtually unlimited. Third, I introduce a new technique for detecting the effect, which potentially enhances its theoretical significance. In particular, my findings make it more likely that the effect genuinely reflects the way we think about and ascribe knowledge, rather than being the result of a performance error.


Author(s):  
Andrea Flexeder ◽  
Michael Petter ◽  
Helmut Seidl

2012 ◽  
Vol 98 ◽  
pp. 80-84 ◽  
Author(s):  
Adeleh Divsalar ◽  
Ali Akbar Saboury ◽  
Mohammad Nabiuni ◽  
Zohre Zare ◽  
Mohammad Esmaeil Kefayati ◽  
...  

Studia Humana ◽  
2018 ◽  
Vol 7 (4) ◽  
pp. 9-15
Author(s):  
Andrzej Waleszczyński ◽  
Michał Obidziński ◽  
Julia Rejewska

Abstract The characteristic asymmetry in the attribution of intentionality in causing side effects, known as the Knobe effect, is considered to be a stable model of human cognition. This article looks at whether the way of thinking and analysing one scenario may affect the other and whether the mutual relationship between the ways in which both scenarios are analysed may affect the stability of the Knobe effect. The theoretical analyses and empirical studies performed are based on a distinction between moral and non-moral normativity possibly affecting the judgments passed in both scenarios. Therefore, an essential role in judgments about the intentionality of causing a side effect could be played by normative competences responsible for distinguishing between normative orders.


2021 ◽  
Vol 20 (1) ◽  
pp. 283-304
Author(s):  
Marta Maksimczuk ◽  

Subsequent economic crises (including the COVID-19 crisis) have shared many common characteristics relating to this phase of the business cycle. In each subsequent, their differences also appear-especially in terms of the methods used by economic practice to overcome them, resulting from existing new economic realities. The main topic addressed by this paper is the evolution of theory and practice of fiscalism both in Poland and the world. The subject has aimed at presenting a study providing an overview including taxation and fiscalism with the potential for further consideration of aspects and directions of change which, suitably modified for the new conditions, may also be helpful nowadays in seeking ways out of economic crises, especially the most recent one related to the COVID-19 pandemic. A research hypothesis pointing to the special importance of fiscalism in the conditions of economic breakdowns – including the current crisis caused by the COVID-19 pandemic, indicates that it is difficult to unequivocally clarify the boundaries (upper and lower) of the application of fiscalism. The descriptive method, supported by analytical elements, illustrates the evolution of views on taxes, fiscalism, and public debt and present empirical studies in this field from the global literature. Furthermore, the method was supported by a cause-effect analysis of the described relations. Finally, generalizations and conclusions allowing to verify the previously stated research hypothesis were derived.


2007 ◽  
Vol 80 (1) ◽  
pp. 92-105 ◽  
Author(s):  
Jingling Xue ◽  
Phung Hua Nguyen ◽  
John Potter

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