scholarly journals Weighing the costs: the epistemic dilemma of no-platforming

Synthese ◽  
2021 ◽  
Author(s):  
Uwe Peters ◽  
Nikolaj Nottelmann
Keyword(s):  
Choice Situation ◽  
Epistemic Reasons

Abstract‘No-platforming’—the practice of denying someone the opportunity to express their opinion at certain venues because of the perceived abhorrent or misguided nature of their view(s)—is a hot topic. Several philosophers have advanced epistemic reasons for using the policy in certain cases. Here we introduce epistemic considerations against no-platforming that are relevant for the reflection on the cases at issue. We then contend that three recent epistemic arguments in favor of no-platforming fail to factor these considerations in and, as a result, offer neither a conclusive justification nor strong epistemic support for no-platforming in any of the relevant cases. Moreover, we argue that, taken together, our epistemic considerations against no-platforming and the three arguments for the policy suggest that no-platforming poses an epistemic dilemma (i.e., a difficult choice situation involving two equally undesirable options). While advocates and opponents of no-platforming alike have so far overlooked this dilemma, it should be addressed not only to prevent that actual no-platforming decisions create more epistemic harm than good, but also to put us into a better position to justify the policy when it is indeed warranted.

Why Only Evidential Considerations Can Justify Belief

2018 ◽  
Author(s):  
Kate Nolfi
Keyword(s):  
Alternative Explanation ◽  
Justify Belief ◽  
Epistemic Normativity ◽  
Epistemic Reasons ◽  
Aim Of Belief ◽  
The Way

At least when we restrict our attention to the epistemic domain, it seems clear that only considerations which bear on whether p can render a subject’s belief that p epistemically justified, by constituting the reasons on the basis of which she believes that p. And we ought to expect any account of epistemic normativity to explain why this is so. Extant accounts generally appeal to the idea that belief aims at truth, in an effort to explain why there is a kind of evidential constraint on the sorts of considerations that can be epistemic reasons. However, there are grounds for doubting that belief, in fact, aims at truth in the way that these accounts propose. This chapter develops an alternative explanation of why it is that non-evidential considerations cannot be epistemic reasons by taking seriously the idea that the constitutive aim of belief is fundamentally action-oriented.

scholarly journals Who is afraid of black box algorithms? On the epistemological and ethical basis of trust in medical AI

2021 ◽  
pp. medethics-2020-106820 ◽  
Author(s):  
Juan Manuel Durán ◽  
Karin Rolanda Jongsma
Keyword(s):  
Artificial Intelligence ◽  
Medical Informatics ◽  
Patient Autonomy ◽  
Black Box ◽  
Epistemic Reasons ◽  
Potential Bias ◽  
Ethical Concerns ◽  
Normative Issues ◽  
Ethical Basis ◽  
Computational Processes

The use of black box algorithms in medicine has raised scholarly concerns due to their opaqueness and lack of trustworthiness. Concerns about potential bias, accountability and responsibility, patient autonomy and compromised trust transpire with black box algorithms. These worries connect epistemic concerns with normative issues. In this paper, we outline that black box algorithms are less problematic for epistemic reasons than many scholars seem to believe. By outlining that more transparency in algorithms is not always necessary, and by explaining that computational processes are indeed methodologically opaque to humans, we argue that the reliability of algorithms provides reasons for trusting the outcomes of medical artificial intelligence (AI). To this end, we explain how computational reliabilism, which does not require transparency and supports the reliability of algorithms, justifies the belief that results of medical AI are to be trusted. We also argue that several ethical concerns remain with black box algorithms, even when the results are trustworthy. Having justified knowledge from reliable indicators is, therefore, necessary but not sufficient for normatively justifying physicians to act. This means that deliberation about the results of reliable algorithms is required to find out what is a desirable action. Thus understood, we argue that such challenges should not dismiss the use of black box algorithms altogether but should inform the way in which these algorithms are designed and implemented. When physicians are trained to acquire the necessary skills and expertise, and collaborate with medical informatics and data scientists, black box algorithms can contribute to improving medical care.

scholarly journals Epistemic Blame and the Normativity of Evidence

Erkenntnis ◽  
2021 ◽  
Author(s):  
Sebastian Schmidt
Keyword(s):  
Conclusive Evidence ◽  
Normative Reasons ◽  
Epistemic Reasons ◽  
Epistemic Norms ◽  
Plausible Assumption ◽  
Reasons For Belief ◽  
Normative Force ◽  
Epistemic Trust ◽  
Conceptual Connection ◽  
Epistemic Blame

AbstractThe normative force of evidence can seem puzzling. It seems that having conclusive evidence for a proposition does not, by itself, make it true that one ought to believe the proposition. But spelling out the condition that evidence must meet in order to provide us with genuine normative reasons for belief seems to lead us into a dilemma: the condition either fails to explain the normative significance of epistemic reasons or it renders the content of epistemic norms practical. The first aim of this paper is to spell out this challenge for the normativity of evidence. I argue that the challenge rests on a plausible assumption about the conceptual connection between normative reasons and blameworthiness. The second aim of the paper is to show how we can meet the challenge by spelling out a concept of epistemic blameworthiness. Drawing on recent accounts of doxastic responsibility and epistemic blame, I suggest that the normativity of evidence is revealed in our practice of suspending epistemic trust in response to impaired epistemic relationships. Recognizing suspension of trust as a form of epistemic blame allows us to make sense of a purely epistemic kind of normativity the existence of which has recently been called into doubt by certain versions of pragmatism and instrumentalism.

scholarly journals Frege’s puzzle and the ex ante Pareto principle

2020 ◽  
Author(s):  
Anna Mahtani
Keyword(s):  
Policy Choice ◽  
Choice Situation ◽  
Pareto Principle ◽  
Social Situations ◽  
Central Importance ◽  
Ex Ante ◽  
Definition Of ◽  
Almost All ◽  
Rational Behaviour ◽  
Fixed Population

Abstract The ex ante Pareto principle has an intuitive pull, and it has been a principle of central importance since Harsanyi’s defence of utilitarianism (to be found in e.g. Harsanyi, Rational behaviour and bargaining equilibrium in games and social situations. CUP, Cambridge, 1977). The principle has been used to criticize and refine a range of positions in welfare economics, including egalitarianism and prioritarianism. But this principle faces a serious problem. I have argued elsewhere (Mahtani, J Philos 114(6):303-323 2017) that the concept of ex ante Pareto superiority is not well defined, because its application in a choice situation concerning a fixed population can depend on how the members of that population are designated. I show in this paper that in almost all cases of policy choice, there will be numerous sets of rival designators for the same fixed population. I explore two ways that we might complete the definition of ex ante Pareto superiority. I call these the ‘supervaluationist’ reading and the ‘subvaluationist’ reading. I reject the subvaluationist reading as uncharitable, and argue that the supervaluationist reading is the most promising interpretation of the ex ante Pareto principle. I end by exploring some of the implications of this principle for prioritarianism and egalitarianism.

Faith and Reason

2016 ◽  
Author(s):  
Linda Zagzebski
Keyword(s):  
Epistemic Reasons ◽  
Word Of God ◽  
Potential Conflict ◽  
Faith And Reason

This article examines the potential conflict between faith and reason, with emphasis on the relation between beliefs arising from revelation and beliefs arising from reason. It analyses the reasonableness or unreasonableness of faith, focusing on the conditions that make believing what one is told reasonable, or unreasonable, and the sense of reasonable intended when applied to faith. In order to have a method for determining the reasonableness of a belief, it considers two kinds of epistemic reasons: theoretical and deliberative. The chapter argues that trust in ourselves when we are epistemically conscientious is more basic than either theoretical or deliberative reasons, and more basic than any norms of reasoning. It concludes by considering the place of faith in the epistemically conscientious person and suggesting that faith has a component of belief on the word of God which does not conflict with reason directly, but which can be reasonable or unreasonable.

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