scholarly journals Refining Value Sensitive Design: A (Capability-Based) Procedural Ethics Approach to Technological Design for Well-Being

2020 ◽  
Vol 26 (5) ◽  
pp. 2629-2662
Author(s):  
Alessandra Cenci ◽  
Dylan Cawthorne

Abstract Fundamental questions in value sensitive design include whether and how high-tech products/artefacts could embody values and ethical ideals, and how plural and incommensurable values of ethical and social importance could be chosen rationally and objectively at a collective level. By using a humanitarian cargo drone study as a starting point, this paper tackles the challenges that VSD’s lack of commitment to a specific ethical theory generates in practical applications. Besides, it highlights how mainstream ethical approaches usually related to VSD are incapable of solving main ethical dilemmas raised by technological design for well-being in democratic settings. Accordingly, it is argued that VSD’s ethical-democratic import would substantially be enhanced by the espousal of a procedural ethics stance and the deliberative approach to value and welfare entailed by Amartya Sen’s capability approach. Differently from rival ethical–political theories, its normative and meta-ethical foundations better handle human diversity, value-goal pluralism, conflicting vested interests as well as the epistemic-moral disagreements typical of contemporary complex democracies. Particularly, Sen’s capability approach procedural-deliberative tenets result in an “objective-impartial” choice procedure selecting a “hierarchy” of plural incommensurable values and rational goals thus, suitable to validate an applied science such as welfare-oriented technological design in concrete social environments. Conclusions suggest that refining VSD with a capability-based procedural approach to ethics fosters the concern for democracy and social justice while preserving vital scientific-technical standards. Major advantages are at an applied level to delivering ethically and socially justified, but yet highly functional technologies and high-tech products/artefacts.

2018 ◽  
Vol 8 (2) ◽  
pp. 93-108
Author(s):  
Akinjide Aboluwodi

Most of the students studying entrepreneurship in Nigerian universities lack entrepreneurial capability- that is, they lack the freedom to pursue and achieve entrepreneurial opportunity. Freedom is seen here in terms of those conditions that must be in place for students to be able to carry out their entrepreneurship studies. These are conditions that support the well-being of the students and may be seen as having good shelter, being well nourished, being healthy, being able to do their normal studies among others. The paper examined why the presence of these conditions is likely to assist students to improve their creative thinking and strengthen their entrepreneurial capability. It explored Amartya Sen’s Capability Approach, focusing on freedom, opportunities, and functionings to explain the required favourable conditions that make learning worthwhile for students, and how it accounts for students’ ability to strengthen their entrepreneurial capability. The paper argued for the deployment of creative thinking to strengthen entrepreneurial capability among students of entrepreneurship in universities in Nigeria. It concluded by urging universities in Nigeria to adopt relevant curriculum in addition to providing students with a decent learning environment to enable them to develop creative thinking that could be used in entrepreneurship education.


2009 ◽  
pp. 125-152
Author(s):  
Diego Lanzi

- In this paper we propose a model of Gender Auditing (GA) inspired by Amartya Sen's capability approach. The methodological and normative assumptions and features of the model are outlined in order to list the relevant dimensions of human development. Then, the paper proposes indicators and a simple variation of the Gender Empowerment Measure to evaluate the impact of public policies on gender issues of equal opportunities between men and women.JEL D63, I31, J16Keywords: Economia di Genere, Politiche Pubbliche, Capacitŕ, Well-being


2018 ◽  
Vol 4 (2) ◽  
pp. 226-235
Author(s):  
Christopher Robert Lowry

Based on a close reading of the debate between Rawls and Sen on primary goods versus capabilities, I argue that liberal theory cannot adequately respond to Sen’s critique within a conventionally neutralist framework. In support of the capability approach, I explain why and how it defends a more robust conception of opportunity and freedom, along with public debate on substantive questions about well-being and the good life. My aims are: (i) to show that Sen’s capability approach is at odds with Rawls’s political liberal version of neutrality; (ii) to carve out a third space in the neutrality debate; and (iii) to begin to develop, from Sen’s approach, the idea of public value liberalism as a position that falls within that third space.


2020 ◽  
Vol 27 (1) ◽  
pp. 221-241
Author(s):  
Zoltán Bajmócy ◽  
Judit Gébert ◽  
György Málovics ◽  
Boglárka Méreiné Berki ◽  
Judit Juhász

The present paper evaluates Hungarian strategic urban planning from the perspective of well-being. It conceptualises well-being in line with Amartya Sen’s capability approach (CA). We argue that the CA provides a meaningful concept of common good or public interest for evaluation. The open-ended nature of CA allows one to embrace the complexity of strategic planning, but it is definite enough to provide a clear normative framework for evaluation. We base our conclusions on 49 interviews with various local actors in three second-tier cities. We conclude that the CA-based evaluation can supplement the dominantly used conformance or performance-based evaluation approaches. We also found that instead of depicting an unachievable ideal state, the CA is able to provide guidance for feasible steps to further well-being.


2005 ◽  
Vol 21 (1) ◽  
pp. 89-108 ◽  
Author(s):  
SERENA OLSARETTI

A central question for assessing the merits of Amartya Sen's capability approach as a potential answer to the “distribution of what”? question concerns the exact role and nature of freedom in that approach. Sen holds that a person's capability identifies that person's effective freedom to achieve valuable states of beings and doings, or functionings, and that freedom so understood, rather than achieved functionings themselves, is the primary evaluative space. Sen's emphasis on freedom has been criticised by G. A. Cohen, according to whom the capability approach either uses too expansive a definition of freedom or rests on an implausibly active, indeed “athletic,” view of well-being. This paper defends the capability approach from this criticism. It argues that we can view the capability approach to be underpinned by an account of well-being which takes the endorsement of valuable functionings as constitutive of well-being, and by a particular view of the way in which endorsement relates to force and choice.


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