Shared Intentionality in Nonhuman Great Apes: a Normative Model

2021 ◽  
Author(s):  
Dennis Papadopoulos
Keyword(s):  
Great Apes ◽  
Normative Model ◽  
Shared Intentionality

scholarly journals The Centrality of Ancestral Grandmothering in Human Evolution

2020 ◽  
Vol 60 (3) ◽  
pp. 765-781 ◽  
Author(s):  
Kristen Hawkes
Keyword(s):  
Human Evolution ◽  
Life History Theory ◽  
Large Fraction ◽  
Great Apes ◽  
Cultural Learning ◽  
Hunter Gatherers ◽  
Shared Intentionality ◽  
Grandmother Hypothesis ◽  
And Behavior ◽  
Human Brains

Abstract When Fisher, Williams, and Hamilton laid the foundations of evolutionary life history theory, they recognized elements of what became a grandmother hypothesis to explain the evolution of human postmenopausal longevity. Subsequent study of modern hunter-gatherers, great apes, and the wider mammalian radiation has revealed strong regularities in development and behavior that show additional unexpected consequences that ancestral grandmothering likely had on human evolution, challenging the hypothesis that ancestral males propelled the evolution of our radiation by hunting to provision mates and offspring. Ancestral grandmothering has become a serious contender to explain not only the large fraction of post-fertile years women live and children’s prolonged maturation yet early weaning; it also promises to help account for the pair bonding that distinguishes humans from our closest living evolutionary cousins, the great apes (and most other mammals), the evolution of our big human brains, and our distinctive preoccupation with reputations, shared intentionality and persistent cultural learning that begins in infancy.

scholarly journals How children come to understand false beliefs: A shared intentionality account

2018 ◽  
Vol 115 (34) ◽  
pp. 8491-8498 ◽  
Author(s):  
Michael Tomasello
Keyword(s):  
Executive Function ◽  
Great Apes ◽  
False Belief ◽  
False Beliefs ◽  
Older Children ◽  
Linguistic Communication ◽  
Shared Intentionality ◽  
Individual Cognition ◽  
Response Measures ◽  
Different Response

To predict and explain the behavior of others, one must understand that their actions are determined not by reality but by their beliefs about reality. Classically, children come to understand beliefs, including false beliefs, at about 4–5 y of age, but recent studies using different response measures suggest that even infants (and apes!) have some skills as well. Resolving this discrepancy is not possible with current theories based on individual cognition. Instead, what is needed is an account recognizing that the key processes in constructing an understanding of belief are social and mental coordination with other persons and their (sometimes conflicting) perspectives. Engaging in such social and mental coordination involves species-unique skills and motivations of shared intentionality, especially as they are manifest in joint attention and linguistic communication, as well as sophisticated skills of executive function to coordinate the different perspectives involved. This shared intentionality account accords well with documented differences in the cognitive capacities of great apes and human children, and it explains why infants and apes pass some versions of false-belief tasks whereas only older children pass others.

scholarly journals Cognitive consequences of our grandmothering life history: cultural learning begins in infancy

2020 ◽  
Vol 375 (1803) ◽  
pp. 20190501 ◽  
Author(s):  
Kristen Hawkes
Keyword(s):  
Life History ◽  
Old Age ◽  
Social Relationships ◽  
Brain Size ◽  
Great Apes ◽  
Cultural Learning ◽  
Theme Issue ◽  
Economic Productivity ◽  
Shared Intentionality ◽  
Cognition And Culture

Postmenopausal longevity distinguishes humans from our closest living evolutionary cousins, the great apes, and may have evolved in our lineage when the economic productivity of grandmothers allowed mothers to wean earlier and overlap dependents. Since increased longevity retards development and expands brain size across the mammals, this hypothesis links our slower developing, bigger brains to ancestral grandmothering. If foraging interdependence favoured postmenopausal longevity because grandmothers' subsidies reduced weaning ages, then ancestral infants lost full maternal engagement while their slower developing brains were notably immature. With survival dependent on social relationships, sensitivity to reputations is wired very early in neural ontogeny, beginning our lifelong preoccupation with shared intentionality. This article is part of the theme issue ‘Life history and learning: how childhood, caregiving and old age shape cognition and culture in humans and other animals’.

scholarly journals How apes get into and out of joint actions

2021 ◽  
Vol 21 (3) ◽  
Author(s):  
Emilie Genty ◽  
Raphaela Heesen ◽  
Jean-Pascal Guéry ◽  
Federico Rossano ◽  
Klaus Zuberbühler ◽  
...  
Keyword(s):  
Joint Action ◽  
Great Apes ◽  
Mental States ◽  
Joint Commitment ◽  
Shared Intentionality ◽  
Joint Actions ◽  
Joint Activities ◽  
Evolutionary Response ◽  
Action Coordination ◽  
Complex Joint

Abstract Compared to other animals, humans appear to have a special motivation to share experiences and mental states with others (Clark, 2006; Grice, 1975), which enables them to enter a condition of ‘we’ or shared intentionality (Tomasello & Carpenter, 2005). Shared intentionality has been suggested to be an evolutionary response to unique problems faced in complex joint action coordination (Levinson, 2006; Tomasello, Carpenter, Call, Behne, & Moll, 2005) and to be unique to humans (Tomasello, 2014). The theoretical and empirical bases for this claim, however, present several issues and inconsistencies. Here, we suggest that shared intentionality can be approached as an interactional achievement, and that by studying how our closest relatives, the great apes, coordinate joint action with conspecifics, we might demonstrate some correlate abilities of shared intentionality, such as the appreciation of joint commitment. We provide seven examples from bonobo joint activities to illustrate our framework.

How is the moral stance related to the intentional stance and group thinking?

2020 ◽  
Vol 43 ◽  
Author(s):  
Hannes Rakoczy
Keyword(s):  
Natural History ◽  
Social Cognitive ◽  
Intentional Stance ◽  
Cognitive Capacities ◽  
Shared Intentionality ◽  
History Of ◽  
Group Thinking ◽  
Moral Stance

Abstract The natural history of our moral stance told here in this commentary reveals the close nexus of morality and basic social-cognitive capacities. Big mysteries about morality thus transform into smaller and more manageable ones. Here, I raise questions regarding the conceptual, ontogenetic, and evolutionary relations of the moral stance to the intentional and group stances and to shared intentionality.

Shared Intentionality, joint commitment, and directed obligation

2020 ◽  
Vol 43 ◽  
Author(s):  
Margaret Gilbert
Keyword(s):  
Detailed Account ◽  
Joint Commitment ◽  
Shared Intentionality

Abstract Tomasello frequently refers to joint commitment, but does not fully characterize it. In earlier publications, I have offered a detailed account of joint commitment, tying it to a sense that the parties form a “we,” and arguing that it grounds directed obligations and rights. Here I outline my understanding of joint commitment and its normative impact.

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