ASSESSING THE PERFORMANCE OF AN ALLOCATION RULE

1986 ◽  
pp. 261-272
Author(s):  
G.J. MCLACHLAN
Keyword(s):  
Allocation Rule

scholarly journals Genetic Algorithm for the Retailers’ Shelf Space Allocation Profit Maximization Problem

2021 ◽  
Vol 11 (14) ◽  
pp. 6401
Author(s):  
Kateryna Czerniachowska ◽  
Karina Sachpazidu-Wójcicka ◽  
Piotr Sulikowski ◽  
Marcin Hernes ◽  
Artur Rot
Keyword(s):  
Genetic Algorithm ◽  
Profit Maximization ◽  
Allocation Rule ◽  
Maximization Problem ◽  
Shelf Space ◽  
Allocation Model ◽  
Space Allocation ◽  
Shelf Space Allocation ◽  
To Receive

This paper discusses the problem of retailers’ profit maximization regarding displaying products on the planogram shelves, which may have different dimensions in each store but allocate the same product sets. We develop a mathematical model and a genetic algorithm for solving the shelf space allocation problem with the criteria of retailers’ profit maximization. The implemented program executes in a reasonable time. The quality of the genetic algorithm has been evaluated using the CPLEX solver. We determine four groups of constraints for the products that should be allocated on a shelf: shelf constraints, shelf type constraints, product constraints, and virtual segment constraints. The validity of the developed genetic algorithm has been checked on 25 retailing test cases. Computational results prove that the proposed approach allows for obtaining efficient results in short running time, and the developed complex shelf space allocation model, which considers multiple attributes of a shelf, segment, and product, as well as product capping and nesting allocation rule, is of high practical relevance. The proposed approach allows retailers to receive higher store profits with regard to the actual merchandising rules.

scholarly journals An Optimal Water Resource Allocation Mechanism Based on Ex-Post Verification and Reward in Huangbai River

Water ◽  
2021 ◽  
Vol 13 (11) ◽  
pp. 1588
Author(s):  
Hui Zhang ◽  
Jiaying Li
Keyword(s):  
Resource Allocation ◽  
Water Resources ◽  
Water Resource ◽  
Water Allocation ◽  
Allocation Rule ◽  
Allocation Efficiency ◽  
Water Resource Allocation ◽  
Water Users ◽  
Ex Post ◽  
Demand Information

Under the current administrative system (AS) in China, the water resources governor allocates limited water resources to several users to realize the utility of water resources, leading to a principal–agent problem. The governor (referred to as the principal and she) wishes to maximize water resource allocation efficiency, while each user (referred to as the agent and he) only wishes to maximize his own quota. In addition, the governor cannot know water demand information exactly since it is the water users’ private information. Hence, this paper builds an ex ante improved bankruptcy allocation rule and an ex post verification and reward mechanism to improve water allocation efficiency from the governor’s perspective. In this mechanism, the governor allocates water among users based on an improved bankruptcy rule before the water is used up, verifies users’ information by various approaches, and poses a negative reward to them if their information is found to be false after the water is used up. Then, this mechanism is applied to Huangbai River Basin. Research results show that the improved allocation rule could motivate users to report demand information more honestly, and ex post verification could motivate water users to further report their true information, which, as a result, could improve the water allocation efficiency. Furthermore, this mechanism could be applied to the allocation of other resources.

scholarly journals Axiomatic Results for Weighted Allocation Rules under Multiattribute Situations

Mathematics ◽  
2021 ◽  
Vol 9 (6) ◽  
pp. 617
Author(s):  
Yu-Hsien Liao
Keyword(s):  
Bargaining Power ◽  
The Other ◽  
Target Type ◽  
Allocation Rule ◽  
Interactive Environments ◽  
Allocation Rules ◽  
Other Hand

In many interactive environments, operators may have to deal with different work objectives at the same time. In a realistic context, such as differences in the target type to be addressed, or changes in the behavior of other operators, operators may therefore have to cope with by adopting different work levels (strategies) at any given time. On the other hand, the importance or influence brought by operators may vary depending on many subjective and objective factors, such as the size of the constituency represented by a congressman, and the bargaining power of a business personnel which may vary. Therefore, it is reasonable that weights are apportioned to operators and arbitrary usability should be distributed according to these weights under various working levels and multiattribute situations. In pre-existing results for allocation rules, weights might be always apportioned to the “operators” or the “levels” to modify the differences among the operators or its working levels respectively. By applying weights to the operators and its working levels (strategies) simultaneously, we adopt the maximal marginal variations among working level (strategy) vectors to propose an allocation rule under multiattribute situations. Furthermore, we introduce some axiomatic outcomes to display the rationality for this weighted allocation rule. By replacing weights to be maximal marginal variations, a generalized index is also introduced.

scholarly journals The Myth of Teacher Shortage in India

2021 ◽  
Author(s):  
Sandip Datta ◽  
Geeta Gandhi Kingdon
Keyword(s):  
Public Schools ◽  
Education Policy ◽  
Teacher Shortage ◽  
Allocation Rule ◽  
Evidence Based ◽  
National Education ◽  
Public Elementary Schools ◽  
Median Size ◽  
National Education Policy ◽  
The Individual

This paper examines the widespread perception in India that the country has an acute teacher shortage of about one million teachers in public elementary schools, a view repeated in India’s National Education Policy 2020. Using official DISE data, we show that there is hardly any net teacher deficit in the country since there is roughly the same number of surplus teachers as the number of teacher vacancies. Secondly, we show that measuring teacher requirements after removing the estimated fake students from enrolment data greatly reduces the required number of teachers and increases the number of surplus teachers, yielding an estimated net surplus of about 342,000 teachers. Thirdly, we show that if we both remove fake enrolment and also make a suggested hypothetical change to the teacher allocation rule to adjust for the phenomenon of emptying public schools (which has slashed the national median size of public schools to a mere 64 students, and rendered many schools ‘tiny’), the estimated net teacher surplus is about 764,000 teachers. Fourthly, we highlight that if government does fresh recruitment to fill the supposed nearly one-million vacancies as promised in the National Education Policy 2020, the already modest national mean pupil-teacher-ratio of 22.8 would fall to 15.9, at a permanent fiscal cost of nearly Rupees 480 billion (USD 6.6 billion) per year in 2017-18 prices, which is higher than the individual GDPs of 56 countries in that year. The paper highlights the major economic efficiencies that can result from an evidence-based approach to teacher recruitment and deployment policies.

The Myth and Reality of Teacher Shortage in India: An Investigation Using 2019-20 Data

2021 ◽  
Author(s):  
Sandip Datta ◽  
Geeta Gandhi Kingdon
Keyword(s):  
Public Schools ◽  
Education Policy ◽  
Teacher Shortage ◽  
Allocation Rule ◽  
Teacher Shortages ◽  
National Education ◽  
Public Elementary Schools ◽  
Median Size ◽  
National Education Policy ◽  
The Individual

This paper examines the widespread perception in India that the country has an acute teacher shortage of about one million teachers in public elementary schools, a view repeated in India’s National Education Policy 2020. Using official DISE data, we show that teacher vacancies cannot be equated with teacher shortages: while the number of teacher vacancies (in teacher-deficit schools) is 766,487, the number of teacher surpluses (in surplus-teacher schools) is 520,141, giving a net deficit of only 246,346 teachers in the country. Secondly, removing estimated fake student numbers from enrolment data greatly reduces the required number of teachers and raises the number of surplus teachers, converting the net deficit of 246,346 teachers into an estimated net surplus of 98,371 teachers. Thirdly, if we both remove estimated fake enrolment and also make a hypothetical change to the teacher allocation rule to adjust for the phenomenon of emptying public schools (which has slashed the national median size of public schools to a mere 63 students, and rendered many schools ‘tiny’), the estimated net teacher surplus rises to 239,800 teachers. Fourthly, we show that if government does fresh recruitment to fill the supposed approximately one-million vacancies as promised in National Education Policy 2020, the already modest national mean pupil-teacher-ratio of 25.1 would fall to 19.9, at a permanently increased fiscal cost of nearly Rupees 637 billion (USD 8.7 billion) per year in 2019-20 prices, which is higher than the individual GDPs of 50 countries that year. The paper highlights the major efficiencies that can result from evidence-based policy on minimum viable school-size, teacher allocation norms, permissible maximum pupil teacher ratios, and teacher deployment.

Regulating Quality in the Water Sector: A Theoretical Perspective

2021 ◽  
Author(s):  
Emmanuelle Auriol
Keyword(s):  
Theoretical Perspective ◽  
Consumer Surplus ◽  
Optimal Level ◽  
Allocation Rule ◽  
Rent Extraction ◽  
Public Funds ◽  
Water And Sanitation ◽  
Ex Post ◽  
Quality Investment ◽  
Quality Provision

Regulating quality is challenging because in public utilities such as water and sanitation, quality is multidimensional, is not always objectively measurable, and can be hard to verify, both ex ante and ex post. It is therefore useful to review the main insights from the New Economics of Regulation theoretical literature on quality provision to guide public policy. Focusing on formal utilities, this normative approach emphasizes the asymmetry of information between a regulator and the regulated companies. The analysis shows that when quality is verifiable, it can be included in a contract exactly like a quantity variable. Its provision, however, will be distorted as a result of regulated quantities also being distorted due to asymmetric information. When quality and quantity are complements, service quality ends up being lower because in the optimal regulatory contract, quantities are distorted downward for rent extraction. If quality is not verifiable but is observable by the users, the operator freely chooses its quality investment. It tends to underprovide quality when an improvement in quality raises the gross consumer surplus more than it increases the gross profit of sales because it does not take into account the nonmonetary benefit generated by its investment. It tends to overprovide quality otherwise. In order to correct these distortions, the regulator has to use a production allocation rule to simultaneously lower the informational rent and boost quality. The regulator has a single instrument to achieve the conflicting goals of rent extraction and quality provision. Quantities can be higher or lower than the first-best optimal levels depending on the correction needed to control quality. Finally, when quality is neither verifiable nor observable by consumers, as is typically the case with credence attributes such as those concerning process of production impacting security or pollution, the optimal level of quality investment from the firm’s perspective is zero. In this case, the easiest solution is often to impose a minimum standard and either rely on certification agencies to ensure that this minimum target is met or directly audit the quality investments made by the regulator. Finally, when improving the quality of water and sanitation services requires the creation of new infrastructure or institution, the high opportunity cost of public funds in developing countries raises the question of whether it is optimal to commit public funds for such investments. The analysis illuminates the trade-off between financing those investments with private funds and protecting consumer surplus.

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