scholarly journals The carry propagation of the successor function

2020 ◽  
Vol 120 ◽  
pp. 102062
Author(s):  
Valérie Berthé ◽  
Christiane Frougny ◽  
Michel Rigo ◽  
Jacques Sakarovitch
Keyword(s):  
2020 ◽  
Author(s):  
Junyi Chu ◽  
Pierina Cheung ◽  
Rose M. Schneider ◽  
Jess Sullivan ◽  
David Barner

By around the age of 5½, many children in the US judge that numbers never end, and that it is always possible to add +1 to a set. These same children also generally perform well when asked to label the quantity of a set after 1 object is added (e.g., judging that a set labeled “five” should now be “six”). These findings suggest that children have implicit knowledge of the “successor function”: every natural number, n, has a successor, n+1. Here, we explored how children discover this recursive function, and whether it might be related to discovering productive morphological rules that govern language-specific counting routines (e.g., the rules in English that represent base 10 structure). We tested 4- and 5-year-old children’s knowledge of counting with three tasks, which we then related to (1) children’s belief that 1 can always be added to any number (the successor function), and (2) their belief that numbers never end (infinity). Children who exhibited knowledge of a productive counting rule were significantly more likely to believe that numbers are infinite (i.e., there is no largest number), though such counting knowledge wasn’t directly linked to knowledge of the successor function, per se. Also, our findings suggest that children as young as four years of age are able to implement rules defined over their verbal count list to generate number words beyond their spontaneous counting range, an insight which may support reasoning over their acquired verbal count sequence to infer that numbers never end.


2021 ◽  
pp. 268-311
Author(s):  
Paolo Mancosu ◽  
Sergio Galvan ◽  
Richard Zach

This chapter opens the part of the book that deals with ordinal proof theory. Here the systems of interest are not purely logical ones, but rather formalized versions of mathematical theories, and in particular the first-order version of classical arithmetic built on top of the sequent calculus. Classical arithmetic goes beyond pure logic in that it contains a number of specific axioms for, among other symbols, 0 and the successor function. In particular, it contains the rule of induction, which is the essential rule characterizing the natural numbers. Proving a cut-elimination theorem for this system is hopeless, but something analogous to the cut-elimination theorem can be obtained. Indeed, one can show that every proof of a sequent containing only atomic formulas can be transformed into a proof that only applies the cut rule to atomic formulas. Such proofs, which do not make use of the induction rule and which only concern sequents consisting of atomic formulas, are called simple. It is shown that simple proofs cannot be proofs of the empty sequent, i.e., of a contradiction. The process of transforming the original proof into a simple proof is quite involved and requires the successive elimination, among other things, of “complex” cuts and applications of the rules of induction. The chapter describes in some detail how this transformation works, working through a number of illustrative examples. However, the transformation on its own does not guarantee that the process will eventually terminate in a simple proof.


2016 ◽  
Vol 26 (09) ◽  
pp. 1650153
Author(s):  
Fangfang Jiang ◽  
Wei D. Lu ◽  
Jitao Sun

In this paper, we investigate the existence problem of periodic orbits for a planar Liénard system, whose solution mappings are interrupted by abrupt changes of state. We first present the geometrical properties of solutions for the planar Liénard system with state impulses, then by using Bendixson theorem of impulsive differential equations and successor function method, several new criteria on the closed orbits and discontinuous periodic orbits are established in the impulsive Liénard system.


1957 ◽  
Vol 22 (1) ◽  
pp. 39-54 ◽  
Author(s):  
Hilary Putnam

There are a number of open problems involving the concepts of decidability and essential undecidability. This paper will present solutions to some of these problems. Specifically:(1) Can a decidable theory have an essentially undecidable, axiomatizable extension (with the same constants)?(2) Are all the complete extensions of an undecidable theory ever decidable?We shall show that the answer to both questions is in the affirmative. In answering question (1), the decidable theory for which an essentially undecidable axiomatizable extension will be constructed is the theory of the successor function and a single one-place predicate. It will also be shown that the decidability of this theory is a “best possible” result in the following direction: the theory of either of the common diadic arithmetic functions and a one-place predicate; i.e., of addition and a one-place predicate, or of multiplication and a one-place predicate, is undecidable.Before establishing the main result, it is convenient to give a simple proof that a decidable theory can have an axiomatizable (simply) undecidable extension. This is, of course, an immediate consequence of the main result; but the proof is simple and illustrates the methods that we are going to use in this paper.


2016 ◽  
Vol 9 (3) ◽  
pp. 429-455
Author(s):  
LUCA BELLOTTI

AbstractWe consider the consistency proof for a weak fragment of arithmetic published by von Neumann in 1927. This proof is rather neglected in the literature on the history of consistency proofs in the Hilbert school. We explain von Neumann’s proof and argue that it fills a gap between Hilbert’s consistency proofs for the so-called elementary calculus of free variables with a successor and a predecessor function and Ackermann’s consistency proof for second-order primitive recursive arithmetic. In particular, von Neumann’s proof is the first rigorous proof of the consistency of an axiomatization of the first-order theory of a successor function.


2020 ◽  
Author(s):  
Rose M. Schneider ◽  
Jess Sullivan ◽  
Kaiqi Guo ◽  
David Barner

Although many US children can count sets by 4 years, it is not until 5½-6 years that they understand how counting relates to number - i.e., that adding 1 to a set necessitates counting up one number. This study examined two knowledge sources that 3½-6-year-olds (N = 136) may leverage to acquire this “successor function”: (1) mastery of productive rules governing count list generation; and (2) training with “+1” math facts. Both productive counting and “+1” math facts were related to understanding that adding 1 to sets entails counting up one number in the count list; however, even children with robust successor knowledge struggled with its arithmetic expression, suggesting they do not generalize the successor function from “+1” math facts.


Author(s):  
Barbara W. Sarnecka ◽  
Meghan C. Goldman ◽  
Emily B. Slusser

Young children initially learn to ‘count’ without understanding either what counting means, or what numerical quantities the individual number words pick out. Over a period of many months, children assign progressively more sophisticated meanings to the number words, linking them to discrete objects, to quantification, to numerosity, and so on. Eventually, children come to understand the logic of counting. Along with this knowledge comes an implicit understanding of the successor function, as well as of the principle of equinumerosity, or exact equality between sets. Thus, when children arrive at a mature understanding of counting, they have (for the first time in their lives) a way of mentally representing exact, large numbers.


1997 ◽  
Vol 139 (1) ◽  
pp. 17-38 ◽  
Author(s):  
Christiane Frougny
Keyword(s):  

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