Adaptive persistence based on environment comparison enhances cooperation in evolutionary games

2022 ◽  
Vol 421 ◽  
pp. 126912
Author(s):  
Liming Zhang ◽  
Haihong Li ◽  
Qionglin Dai ◽  
Junzhong Yang
Keyword(s):  
1983 ◽  
Vol 28 (6) ◽  
pp. 421-422
Author(s):  
John C. Fentress
Keyword(s):  

Author(s):  
Stefano Almi ◽  
Marco Morandotti ◽  
Francesco Solombrino

AbstractA multi-step Lagrangian scheme at discrete times is proposed for the approximation of a nonlinear continuity equation arising as a mean-field limit of spatially inhomogeneous evolutionary games, describing the evolution of a system of spatially distributed agents with strategies, or labels, whose payoff depends also on the current position of the agents. The scheme is Lagrangian, as it traces the evolution of position and labels along characteristics, and is a multi-step scheme, as it develops on the following two stages: First, the distribution of strategies or labels is updated according to a best performance criterion, and then, this is used by the agents to evolve their position. A general convergence result is provided in the space of probability measures. In the special cases of replicator-type systems and reversible Markov chains, variants of the scheme, where the explicit step in the evolution of the labels is replaced by an implicit one, are also considered and convergence results are provided.


2021 ◽  
Vol 74 (7) ◽  
pp. 1353-1402
Author(s):  
Luigi Ambrosio ◽  
Massimo Fornasier ◽  
Marco Morandotti ◽  
Giuseppe Savaré

2021 ◽  
Vol 144 ◽  
pp. 110709
Author(s):  
Lan Zhang ◽  
Changwei Huang ◽  
Haihong Li ◽  
Qionglin Dai ◽  
Junzhong Yang

2003 ◽  
Vol 14 (07) ◽  
pp. 963-971 ◽  
Author(s):  
E. AHMED ◽  
A. S. HEGAZI ◽  
A. S. ELGAZZAR

The Sato–Crutchfield equations are analytically and numerically studied. The Sato–Crutchfield formulation corresponds to losing memory. Then the Sato–Crutchfield formulation is applied for some different types of games including hawk–dove, prisoner's dilemma and the battle of the sexes games. The Sato–Crutchfield formulation is found not to affect the evolutionarily stable strategy of the ordinary games. But choosing a strategy becomes purely random, independent of the previous experiences, initial conditions, and the rules of the game itself. The Sato–Crutchfield formulation for the prisoner's dilemma game can be considered as a theoretical explanation for the existence of cooperation in a population of defectors.


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