Principle of Time Stretching in Evolutionary Games of Approach

2016 ◽  
Vol 48 (5) ◽  
pp. 12-26 ◽  
Author(s):  
Greta Ts. Chikrii
Keyword(s):  
Evolutionary Games ◽  
Time Stretching

Evolutionary Games and Population Dynamics

1998 ◽  
Author(s):  
Josef Hofbauer ◽  
Karl Sigmund
Keyword(s):  
Population Dynamics ◽  
Evolutionary Games

Evolutionary Games

1983 ◽  
Vol 28 (6) ◽  
pp. 421-422
Author(s):  
John C. Fentress
Keyword(s):  
Evolutionary Games

scholarly journals A multi-step Lagrangian scheme for spatially inhomogeneous evolutionary games

2021 ◽  
Author(s):  
Stefano Almi ◽  
Marco Morandotti ◽  
Francesco Solombrino
Keyword(s):  
Mean Field ◽  
Evolutionary Games ◽  
Type Systems ◽  
Convergence Result ◽  
Performance Criterion ◽  
Mean Field Limit ◽  
Spatially Inhomogeneous ◽  
Convergence Results ◽  
Special Cases ◽  
Lagrangian Scheme

AbstractA multi-step Lagrangian scheme at discrete times is proposed for the approximation of a nonlinear continuity equation arising as a mean-field limit of spatially inhomogeneous evolutionary games, describing the evolution of a system of spatially distributed agents with strategies, or labels, whose payoff depends also on the current position of the agents. The scheme is Lagrangian, as it traces the evolution of position and labels along characteristics, and is a multi-step scheme, as it develops on the following two stages: First, the distribution of strategies or labels is updated according to a best performance criterion, and then, this is used by the agents to evolve their position. A general convergence result is provided in the space of probability measures. In the special cases of replicator-type systems and reversible Markov chains, variants of the scheme, where the explicit step in the evolution of the labels is replaced by an implicit one, are also considered and convergence results are provided.

scholarly journals Spatially Inhomogeneous Evolutionary Games

2021 ◽  
Vol 74 (7) ◽  
pp. 1353-1402
Author(s):  
Luigi Ambrosio ◽  
Massimo Fornasier ◽  
Marco Morandotti ◽  
Giuseppe Savaré
Keyword(s):  
Evolutionary Games ◽  
Spatially Inhomogeneous

Effects of directional migration for pursuit of profitable circumstances in evolutionary games

2021 ◽  
Vol 144 ◽  
pp. 110709
Author(s):  
Lan Zhang ◽  
Changwei Huang ◽  
Haihong Li ◽  
Qionglin Dai ◽  
Junzhong Yang
Keyword(s):  
Evolutionary Games ◽  
Directional Migration

scholarly journals SATO–CRUTCHFIELD FORMULATION FOR SOME EVOLUTIONARY GAMES

2003 ◽  
Vol 14 (07) ◽  
pp. 963-971 ◽  
Author(s):  
E. AHMED ◽  
A. S. HEGAZI ◽  
A. S. ELGAZZAR
Keyword(s):  
Prisoner's Dilemma ◽  
Initial Conditions ◽  
Evolutionarily Stable Strategy ◽  
Prisoner’S Dilemma ◽  
Evolutionary Games ◽  
Theoretical Explanation ◽  
Battle Of The Sexes ◽  
Different Types ◽  
Evolutionarily Stable ◽  
Rules Of The Game

The Sato–Crutchfield equations are analytically and numerically studied. The Sato–Crutchfield formulation corresponds to losing memory. Then the Sato–Crutchfield formulation is applied for some different types of games including hawk–dove, prisoner's dilemma and the battle of the sexes games. The Sato–Crutchfield formulation is found not to affect the evolutionarily stable strategy of the ordinary games. But choosing a strategy becomes purely random, independent of the previous experiences, initial conditions, and the rules of the game itself. The Sato–Crutchfield formulation for the prisoner's dilemma game can be considered as a theoretical explanation for the existence of cooperation in a population of defectors.

Memory mechanism with weighting promotes cooperation in the evolutionary games

2019 ◽  
Vol 120 ◽  
pp. 17-24 ◽  
Author(s):  
Feng Shu ◽  
Min Li ◽  
Xingwen Liu
Keyword(s):  
Evolutionary Games ◽  
Memory Mechanism

scholarly journals Fitness-based models and pairwise comparison models of evolutionary games are typically different—even in unstructured populations

2015 ◽  
Vol 17 (2) ◽  
pp. 023043 ◽  
Author(s):  
Bin Wu ◽  
Benedikt Bauer ◽  
Tobias Galla ◽  
Arne Traulsen
Keyword(s):  
Pairwise Comparison ◽  
Evolutionary Games

In evolutionary games, enlightened self-interests are still ultimately self-interests

2007 ◽  
Vol 30 (1) ◽  
pp. 25-26 ◽  
Author(s):  
Thomas Getty
Keyword(s):  
Human Behavior ◽  
Evolutionary Theory ◽  
Evolutionary Games ◽  
Analytical Tool ◽  
Behavioral Sciences ◽  
Other Regarding ◽  
Other Regarding Preferences

Evolutionary theory provides a firm foundation for the unification of the behavioral sciences, and the beliefs, preferences, and constraints (BPC) model is a useful analytical tool for understanding human behavior. However, evolutionary theory suggests that if other-regarding preferences expressed by humans have evolved under selection, they are ultimately, if not purely, in the constrained, relative self-interests of individuals who express them.

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