scholarly journals SATO–CRUTCHFIELD FORMULATION FOR SOME EVOLUTIONARY GAMES

2003 ◽  
Vol 14 (07) ◽  
pp. 963-971 ◽  
Author(s):  
E. AHMED ◽  
A. S. HEGAZI ◽  
A. S. ELGAZZAR
Keyword(s):  
Prisoner's Dilemma ◽  
Initial Conditions ◽  
Evolutionarily Stable Strategy ◽  
Prisoner’S Dilemma ◽  
Evolutionary Games ◽  
Theoretical Explanation ◽  
Battle Of The Sexes ◽  
Different Types ◽  
Evolutionarily Stable ◽  
Rules Of The Game

The Sato–Crutchfield equations are analytically and numerically studied. The Sato–Crutchfield formulation corresponds to losing memory. Then the Sato–Crutchfield formulation is applied for some different types of games including hawk–dove, prisoner's dilemma and the battle of the sexes games. The Sato–Crutchfield formulation is found not to affect the evolutionarily stable strategy of the ordinary games. But choosing a strategy becomes purely random, independent of the previous experiences, initial conditions, and the rules of the game itself. The Sato–Crutchfield formulation for the prisoner's dilemma game can be considered as a theoretical explanation for the existence of cooperation in a population of defectors.

scholarly journals Learning dynamics explains human behaviour in Prisoner's Dilemma on networks

2014 ◽  
Vol 11 (94) ◽  
pp. 20131186 ◽  
Author(s):  
Giulio Cimini ◽  
Angel Sánchez
Keyword(s):  
Social Factors ◽  
Prisoner's Dilemma ◽  
Evolutionary Dynamics ◽  
Prisoner’S Dilemma ◽  
Conditional Cooperation ◽  
The Past ◽  
Extensive Analysis ◽  
Emergence Of Cooperation ◽  
Experimental Findings ◽  
Evolutionarily Stable

Cooperative behaviour lies at the very basis of human societies, yet its evolutionary origin remains a key unsolved puzzle. Whereas reciprocity or conditional cooperation is one of the most prominent mechanisms proposed to explain the emergence of cooperation in social dilemmas, recent experimental findings on networked Prisoner's Dilemma games suggest that conditional cooperation also depends on the previous action of the player—namely on the ‘mood’ in which the player is currently in. Roughly, a majority of people behave as conditional cooperators if they cooperated in the past, whereas they ignore the context and free ride with high probability if they did not. However, the ultimate origin of this behaviour represents a conundrum itself. Here, we aim specifically to provide an evolutionary explanation of moody conditional cooperation (MCC). To this end, we perform an extensive analysis of different evolutionary dynamics for players' behavioural traits—ranging from standard processes used in game theory based on pay-off comparison to others that include non-economic or social factors. Our results show that only a dynamic built upon reinforcement learning is able to give rise to evolutionarily stable MCC, and at the end to reproduce the human behaviours observed in the experiments.

After the Fall

2018 ◽  
Author(s):  
C. Daniel Batson
Keyword(s):  
Prisoner's Dilemma ◽  
Paradise Lost ◽  
Prisoner’S Dilemma ◽  
Moral Principle ◽  
Self Interest ◽  
The World ◽  
Different Types

Like Milton’s couple at the end of Paradise Lost, we find ourselves banished from the Eden of Egoism and needing to reassess what it means to be human. Evidence for empathy-induced altruism, including two prisoner’s dilemma experiments described here, challenges the parsimonious assumption that we only want to maximize self-interest (egoism). And, the world outside Eden is even more challenging because, in addition to egoism and altruism, two more motives must be considered: collectivism (concern for the welfare of a group) and principlism (concern to uphold some moral principle, standard, or ideal). These four types of motivation sometimes conflict, sometimes cooperate. One way to promote a more just and caring society may be to orchestrate motives of different types so that the strengths of one type can overcome the weaknesses of another. Combining an appeal to empathy-induced altruism with an appeal to principle seems especially promising. Examples of such orchestration are provided.

scholarly journals The Vote with the Wallet Game: Responsible Consumerism as a Multiplayer Prisoner’s Dilemma

2019 ◽  
Vol 11 (4) ◽  
pp. 1109 ◽  
Author(s):  
Leonardo Becchetti ◽  
Francesco Salustri
Keyword(s):  
Environmental Sustainability ◽  
Prisoner's Dilemma ◽  
Economic Value ◽  
Prisoner’S Dilemma ◽  
Evolutionary Games ◽  
Coordination Failure ◽  
Socially Responsible ◽  
Policy Suggestions ◽  
Consumption And Saving ◽  
The Creation

Socially responsible consumers and investors are increasingly using their consumption and saving choices as a ‘vote with the wallet’ to award companies that are at vanguard in reconciling the creation of economic value with social and environmental sustainability. In our paper, we model the vote with the wallet as a multiplayer prisoner’s dilemma, outline equilibria and possible solutions to the related coordination failure problem in evolutionary games, apply our analysis to domains in which the vote with the wallet is empirically more relevant, and provide policy suggestions.

MORE SPATIAL GAMES

1994 ◽  
Vol 04 (01) ◽  
pp. 33-56 ◽  
Author(s):  
MARTIN A. NOWAK ◽  
SEBASTIAN BONHOEFFER ◽  
ROBERT M. MAY
Keyword(s):  
Prisoner's Dilemma ◽  
Evolutionary Dynamics ◽  
Evolutionary Game ◽  
Prisoner’S Dilemma ◽  
Evolutionary Games ◽  
Reproductive Rate ◽  
Spatial Effects ◽  
Random Drift ◽  
Low Frequencies ◽  
Spatial Games

We extend our exploration of the dynamics of spatial evolutionary games [Nowak & May 1992, 1993] in three distinct but related ways. We analyse, first, deterministic versus stochastic rules; second, discrete versus continuous time (see Hubermann & Glance [1993]); and, third, different geometries of interaction in regular and random spatial arrays. We show that spatial effects can change some of the intuitive concepts in evolutionary game theory: (i) equilibria among strategies are no longer necessarily characterised by equal average payoffs; (ii) the strategy with the higher average payoff can steadily converge towards extinction; (iii) strategies can become extinct even though their basic reproductive rate (at very low frequencies) is larger than one. The equilibrium properties of spatial games are instead determined by “local relative payoffs.” We characterise the conditions for coexistence between cooperators and defectors in the spatial prisoner’s dilemma game. We find that cooperation can be maintained if the transition rules give more weight to the most successful neighbours, or if there is a certain probability that cells may remain unoccupied in the next generations when they are surrounded by players with low payoffs. In this second case the cooperators can survive despite a very large payoff advantage to defectors. We also compute average extinction times for random drift in neutral spatial models. Finally we briefly describe the spatial dynamics of an interaction among three species which dominate each other in a cyclic fashion. The emphasis of this paper is presenting a variety of ideas and possibilities for further research in the evolutionary dynamics of spatial games. The overall conclusion is that interactions with local neighbours in 2- or 3-dimensional spatial arrays can promote coexistence of different strategies (such as cooperators and defectors in the Prisoner’s Dilemma), in situations where one strategy would exclude all others if the interactions occurred randomly and homogeneously.

Cooperation in a repeated game with random payment function

1988 ◽  
Vol 25 (3) ◽  
pp. 478-491 ◽  
Author(s):  
Ilan Eshel ◽  
Daphna Weinshall
Keyword(s):  
Prisoner's Dilemma ◽  
Prisoner’S Dilemma ◽  
Repeated Game ◽  
Rules Of The Game

A model of cooperation versus defection in a sequence of games is analysed under the assumptions that the rules of the game are randomly changed from one encounter to another, that the decisions are to be made each time anew, according to the (random) rules of the specific local game, and that the result of one such game affects the ability of a player to participate and thus, cooperate in the next game. Under plausible assumptions, it is shown that all Nash solutions of the supergame determine cooperation over a non-degenerate range of rules, determining encounters of the prisoner's dilemma type.

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