scholarly journals Hierarchy, power, and strategies to promote cooperation in social dilemmas [pre-print]

2019 ◽  
Author(s):  
Catherine Molho ◽  
Daniel Balliet ◽  
Junhui Wu
Keyword(s):  
Public Goods ◽  
Real Time ◽  
Social Life ◽  
Social Dilemmas ◽  
Dictator Game ◽  
Relative Power ◽  
Public Goods Game ◽  
Power Asymmetry ◽  
Fundamental Feature ◽  
Cooperative Behaviors

Previous research on cooperation has primarily focused on egalitarian interactions, overlooking a fundamental feature of social life: hierarchy and power asymmetry. While recent accounts posit that hierarchies can reduce within-group conflict, individuals who possess high rank or power tend to show less cooperation. Then how is cooperation achieved within groups that contain power asymmetries? To address this question, the present research examines how relative power affects cooperation and strategies, such as punishment and gossip, to promote cooperation in social dilemmas. In two studies involving online real-time interactions in dyads (N = 246) and four-person groups (N = 371), we manipulate power by varying individuals’ ability to distribute resources in a dictator game, and measure punishment, gossip, and cooperative behaviors in a multi-round public goods game. Findings largely replicate previous research showing that punishment and gossip opportunities increase contributions to public goods in four-person groups. However, we find no support for the hypotheses that power directly affects cooperation or the use of punishment and gossip to promote cooperation. We discuss the implications of these findings for understanding the influence of hierarchy and power on cooperation within dyads and groups.

scholarly journals Hierarchy, Power, and Strategies to Promote Cooperation in Social Dilemmas

Games ◽  
2019 ◽  
Vol 10 (1) ◽  
pp. 12
Author(s):  
Catherine Molho ◽  
Daniel Balliet ◽  
Junhui Wu
Keyword(s):  
Public Goods ◽  
Real Time ◽  
Social Life ◽  
Social Dilemmas ◽  
Dictator Game ◽  
Relative Power ◽  
Public Goods Game ◽  
Power Asymmetry ◽  
Fundamental Feature ◽  
Cooperative Behaviors

Previous research on cooperation has primarily focused on egalitarian interactions, overlooking a fundamental feature of social life: hierarchy and power asymmetry. While recent accounts posit that hierarchies can reduce within-group conflict, individuals who possess high rank or power tend to show less cooperation. How, then, is cooperation achieved within groups that contain power asymmetries? To address this question, the present research examines how relative power affects cooperation and strategies, such as punishment and gossip, to promote cooperation in social dilemmas. In two studies involving online real-time interactions in dyads (N = 246) and four-person groups (N = 371), we manipulate power by varying individuals’ ability to distribute resources in a dictator game, and measure punishment, gossip, and cooperative behaviors in a multi-round public goods game. Findings largely replicate previous research showing that punishment and gossip opportunities increase contributions to public goods in four-person groups. However, we find no support for the hypotheses that power directly affects cooperation or the use of punishment and gossip to promote cooperation. We discuss the implications of these findings for understanding the influence of hierarchy and power on cooperation within dyads and groups.

scholarly journals Methodological Aspects of Social Preferences Research in the Context of Solving Social Dilemmas

2021 ◽  
Vol 1 (13) ◽  
pp. 33-37
Author(s):  
Alla Kovalenko ◽  
◽  
Albina Holovina ◽  
Keyword(s):  
Public Goods ◽  
Social Preferences ◽  
Ultimatum Game ◽  
Social Dilemmas ◽  
Dictator Game ◽  
Psychological Research ◽  
Trust Game ◽  
Altruistic Behavior ◽  
Public Goods Game ◽  
Trust And Reciprocity

The article presents an analysis of the main methodological principles and schemes of social preferences experimental research, which are determined as a fundamental concept to understanding the behavior of decision-makers in the process of resolving social dilemmas. The models presented in the article include an analysis of the factors that determine social preferences. Among them are the factors of trust, reliability, reciprocity, rejection of inequality, unconditional altruism and competitive advantage. The article provides a description of the strengths and weaknesses of the classic methods for studying social preferences, which usually take the form of ultimatum game, dictator game, trust game and public goods game. The study reveals the importance of the Nash equilibrium as a way to interpret human behavior in resource allocation during the game. Analysis of numerous literary sources shows that the ultimatum game is a classic scheme for studying the altruistic behavior of people. The submission of a proposal and its acceptance is an example of Nash's ideal equilibrium. Deviation from this balance can be interpreted as altruism. In turn, the trust game is a classic scheme for studying the reciprocity and prosocial orientation. If the behavior of players deviates from Nash's equilibrium, it is interpreted as being caused by trust and reciprocity. The dictator game is a classic scheme for studying the rejection of inequality. The subject's behavior can be interpreted as a rejection of inequality or altruism, but not as a rejection of risk, as the offer of Player 1 is mandatory for Player 2. Public goods game is a classic scheme for studying the competitive orientation. Nash's ideal balance in this form of play is to do nothing for public consumption, but deviating from this rule is interpreted as altruistic behavior that is the opposite of competitive orientation. As a result, the design of psychological research is presented, which most accurately typologies the social preferences of the subjects and can contribute to the creation of a representative model of decision-making process.

scholarly journals Bringing tax avoiders to light: moral framing and shaming in a public goods experiment

2021 ◽  
pp. 1-24
Author(s):  
Stefanos A. Tsikas
Keyword(s):  
Public Goods ◽  
Public Good ◽  
Social Dilemmas ◽  
Tax Avoidance ◽  
Social Contagion ◽  
Public Goods Game ◽  
Free Riders ◽  
Social Sanctions ◽  
Moral Framing ◽  
Public Goods Experiment

Abstract With a linear public goods game played in six different variants, this article studies two channels that might moderate social dilemmas and increase cooperation without using pecuniary incentives: moral framing and shaming. We find that cooperation is increased when noncontributing to a public good is framed as morally debatable and socially harmful tax avoidance, while the mere description of a tax context has no effect. However, without social sanctions in place, cooperation quickly deteriorates due to social contagion. We find ‘shaming’ free-riders by disclosing their misdemeanor to act as a strong social sanction, irrespective of the context in which it is applied. Moralizing tax avoidance significantly reinforces shaming, compared with a simple tax context.

Sharing Money With Humans Versus Computers: On the Role of Honesty-Humility and (Non-)Social Preferences

2021 ◽  
pp. 194855062110556
Author(s):  
Yngwie Asbjørn Nielsen ◽  
Isabel Thielmann ◽  
Ingo Zettler ◽  
Stefan Pfattheicher
Keyword(s):  
Public Goods ◽  
Social Preferences ◽  
Dictator Game ◽  
Game Studies ◽  
Public Goods Game ◽  
Economic Games ◽  
Social Game ◽  
The Social ◽  
As If

Does giving behavior in economic games reflect true prosocial preferences or is it due to confusion? Research showing that trait Honesty-Humility accounts for giving behavior suggests the former, whereas research showing that participants give money to a computer might suggest the latter. In three preregistered, well-powered studies, we examined the relation of Honesty-Humility with behavior in the Dictator Game (Study 1, N = 468) and Public Goods Game (Studies 2 and 3, each N = 313), while participants interacted either with humans (“social game”) or with a computer (“non-social game”). We found that (a) decisions in the non-social game predicted decisions in the social game, supporting the confusion hypothesis; (b) the effect of Honesty-Humility differed within and between games; and (b) participants who gave money to the computer reported acting as if they were playing with humans. Overall, the studies suggest that both prosocial preferences and confusion underlie giving behavior.

Common-Value Public Goods and Informational Social Dilemmas

2021 ◽  
Vol 13 (2) ◽  
pp. 343-369
Author(s):  
Caleb A. Cox ◽  
Brock Stoddard
Keyword(s):  
Public Goods ◽  
Private Information ◽  
Social Dilemmas ◽  
Cheap Talk ◽  
Public Goods Game ◽  
Common Value ◽  
Private Signals ◽  
Information And Communication

We experimentally examine private information and communication in a public goods environment with uncertain returns. We consider a common-value public goods game in which the return to contribution is either high or low. Before contributing, three players observe private signals correlated with the return and send cheap talk messages to one another. There are social gains from truthfulness, but a private incentive to exaggerate. We compare treatments with and without cheap talk, finding that communication is largely truthful and increases efficiency. In further treatments, we increase the incentive to exaggerate and find reduced truthfulness and smaller gains from communication. (JEL C72, D82, D83, H41)

scholarly journals Defectors’ intolerance of others promotes cooperation in the repeated public goods game with opting out

2020 ◽  
Vol 10 (1) ◽  
Author(s):  
Vlastimil Křivan ◽  
Ross Cressman
Keyword(s):  
Public Goods ◽  
Nash Equilibria ◽  
Common Property ◽  
Cooperative Behavior ◽  
Social Dilemmas ◽  
Public Goods Game ◽  
Strong Argument ◽  
Opting Out ◽  
Opt Out ◽  
The Common

Abstract The theoretical and experimental research on opting out (also called conditional dissociation) in social dilemmas has concentrated on the effect this behavior has on the level of cooperation when used against defectors. The intuition behind this emphasis is based on the common property of social dilemmas that individuals are worse off the more their opponents defect. However, this article shows clearly that other opting out mechanisms are better at increasing cooperative behavior. In fact, by analyzing the stable Nash equilibria for the repeated multi-player public goods game with opting out, our results provide a strong argument that the best opting out rule is one whereby the only groups that voluntarily stay together between rounds are those that are homogeneous (i.e., those groups that are either all cooperators or all defectors), when these groups stay together for enough rounds. This outcome emerges when defectors are completely intolerant of individuals who cooperate (e.g., defectors exhibit xenophobic behavior toward cooperators) and so opt out whenever their group has a cooperator in it. The strong preference by defectors to be with like-minded individuals causes all heterogeneous groups to disband after one round.

Prosociality Beyond Big Five Agreeableness and HEXACO Honesty-Humility: Is Openness/Intellect Associated With Cooperativeness in the Public Goods Game?

2021 ◽  
pp. 089020702110281
Author(s):  
Erin C. R. Lawn ◽  
Kun Zhao ◽  
Simon M. Laham ◽  
Luke D. Smillie
Keyword(s):  
Public Goods ◽  
Big Five ◽  
Cooperative Behavior ◽  
Dictator Game ◽  
Analytic Formula ◽  
Strongly Correlated ◽  
Public Goods Game ◽  
The Public ◽  
Charitable Behavior ◽  
The One

Who is cooperative? Although Big Five (B5) Agreeableness and HEXACO Honesty-Humility are correlates of charitable prosociality, distinctions between “charity” and “cooperation” suggest that additional traits could be associated with cooperative prosociality. Echoing prior theoretical and empirical indications that B5 Openness/Intellect may play a role in cooperation, Study 1 ( N = 119; exploratory) revealed a significant correlation between Openness/Intellect and cooperativeness in the one-shot Public Goods Game that did not generalize to charitableness in the Dictator Game. We therefore conducted three preregistered replications to discern the robustness of this Openness/Intellect–cooperativeness link. As expected, Openness/Intellect showed no consistent correlation with charitable behavior. Surprisingly, the predicted correlation between Openness/Intellect and cooperative behavior was also inconsistent, partially replicating in Study 3 ( N = 304) but not Studies 2 or 4 ( Ns = 131; 552). Across our replications, cooperative behavior was most strongly correlated with Honesty-Humility (internal meta-analytic [Formula: see text] = .15, p = .005). The correlation between Openness/Intellect and cooperative behavior across our replications was significant and identical in magnitude to that between Agreeableness and cooperative behavior, though this effect-size was weak (internal meta-analytic [Formula: see text] = .08, p < .001). We therefore conclude that Openness/Intellect is a nonnull but very modest correlate of cooperativeness.

scholarly journals Sharing money with humans versus computers: On Honesty-Humility and (non-)social preferences

2021 ◽  
Author(s):  
Yngwie Asbjørn Nielsen ◽  
Isabel Thielmann ◽  
Ingo Zettler ◽  
Stefan Pfattheicher
Keyword(s):  
Public Goods ◽  
Social Preferences ◽  
Dictator Game ◽  
Game Studies ◽  
Public Goods Game ◽  
Economic Games ◽  
Social Game ◽  
The Social ◽  
As If

Does giving behavior in economic games reflect true prosocial preferences or is it due to confusion? Research showing that trait Honesty-Humility accounts for giving behavior suggests the former, whereas research showing that participants give money to a computer might suggest the latter. In three preregistered, well-powered studies, we examined the relation of Honesty-Humility with behavior in the Dictator Game (Study 1, N = 468) and Public Goods Game (Studies 2 and 3, each N = 313), while participants interacted either with humans (“social game”) or with a computer (“non-social game”). We found that (1) decisions in the non-social game predicted decisions in the social game, supporting the confusion hypothesis; (2) the effect of Honesty-Humility differed within and between games; and (3) participants who gave money to the computer reported acting as if they were playing with humans. Overall, the studies suggest that both prosocial preferences and confusion underlie giving behavior.

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