scholarly journals Data of CEO power, chair-CEO age dissimilarity and pay gap of Chinese listed firms

Data in Brief ◽  
2020 ◽  
Vol 32 ◽  
pp. 106158
Author(s):  
Jiajun ZHU ◽  
Jing GAO ◽  
Hongping TAN
Keyword(s):  
Pay Gap ◽  
2011 ◽  
Vol 56 (03) ◽  
pp. 307-326 ◽  
Author(s):  
DONGWEI SU

This article tests several predictions of tournament theory on executive compensation in the context of a transition economy. Using an unbalanced panel of 34,701 executives in 1,386 public listed firms in China during 1999 and 2006, the paper finds that (1) pay increases as executives move up the corporate hierarchy into higher ranks; (2) pay gap is the largest between the first- and second-tier executives; (3) pay dispersion increases with the number of tournament participants and the risk of the business environment; (4) state ownership of shares reduces pay, pay gap and the sensitivities of the contestant pool and business risk to pay dispersion; (5) board composition and independence, CEO duality and the independence of the supervisory committee all affect pay and pay dispersion. Overall, this paper shows that listed firms in China, as they become more and more market-oriented, have adopted a pay structure that is largely consistent with the predictions of tournament theory, and that it is important to consider both state ownership and corporate governance in analyzing executive compensation structure.


2019 ◽  
Vol 17 (1) ◽  
pp. 278-291
Author(s):  
Massimo Belcredi ◽  
Stefano Bozzi

Taking advantage of a unique database on Italian Corporate Governance, we study the determinants of remuneration paid to individual non-executive directors (NEDs) and, in particular, to independent directors (INEDs). Our results on a database covering around 16,000 positions/year for non-executive directors in Italian listed firms (over a 9-year period) show that: 1) Remuneration is strongly affected by firm characteristics, in particular by firm size. Independent directors are paid less than gray directors; the gap between the two categories is, however, gradually closing, due to lower additional compensation being paid to gray directors in subsidiaries. Contrary to what happens in other countries, NED remuneration remained quite stable: a small increase is observable only for independent directors; 2) NED remuneration is influenced by the functions performed by individual directors within the board. On the contrary, individual directors’ characteristics have little or no impact. We find evidence of a gender pay gap among independent directors in less recent years; however, this gap has gradually disappeared in conjunction with the increasing number and role of female directors, following the adoption of gender quotas; 3) The relationship between independent directors’ pay and some variables of interest has changed over time: this is true not only for gender but also for Tobin’s Q (a proxy for the benefits from monitoring) and for the number of positions held in other companies. The changes we observe are apparently consistent with the market for directors’ pay in Italy becoming more mature after the introduction of Say-on-Pay and other regulation favouring investor activism. This is also consistent with a positive role played by both institutional investors and their representatives sitting on the board of listed companies after the introduction of said legislation.


2021 ◽  
Author(s):  
HAIFAN LU

Abstract. This paper makes a research on the effect of pay gap in top management team on company performance under different promotion opportunities of managers by using panel data of Chinese A share listed firms during 2015-2019. The results show that when managers have less opportunities to be promoted, the pay gap in top management team is lager. But lager pay gap will not always improve performance.


2019 ◽  
Vol 7 (6) ◽  
pp. 550-567
Author(s):  
Shuai Fang

Abstract The occupational identity of nonexecutive directors exerts a considerable influence on their way of designing and distributing executive pay as well as ordinary employee pay in the focal firm. Integrating the status characteristics theory into the corporate governance literature, I theorize that status contest effect comes into play in the process of setting executive pay in the focal firm, specifically when its nonexecutive directors serve as executives on stakeholders. More often than not, such executive identity triggers the status competition with focal firm executives, which motivates nonexecutive directors to reduce the focal firm executive pay so as to secure and aggrandize their own status within the focal firm. However, since ordinary employees pose no threat to nonexecutive directors in the focal firm, they tend to increase ordinary employee pay. Basing upon the empirical test which adopts the data of China’s Shanghai and Shenzhen A-share listed firms, I find that the greater the focal firm’s nonexecutive director ratio, the less will be the top executives’ pay in the focal firm; the greater the focal firm’s nonexecutive director ratio, the greater will be ordinary employees’ pay in the focal firm; the greater the focal firm’s nonexecutive director ratio, the smaller will be the pay gap between top executives and ordinary employees in the focal firm. In addition, I also find that ownership power and gender can moderate the relationship between nonexecutive director ratio and executive pay: top executive ownership can alleviate the negative relationship between focal firm’s nonexecutive directors and top executives’ pay; female nonexecutive directors are more likely to increase focal firm’s ordinary employee pay than their male counterparts.


2021 ◽  
Vol 19 (1, special issue) ◽  
pp. 241-256
Author(s):  
Zhonghui Wang ◽  
Zonghui Li

Extant studies theoretically debate and empirically present inconsistent findings of the factors that influence the CEO-TMT pay gap. In this study, we extend the research of the antecedents of the CEO-TMT pay gap by directly comparing different theoretical predictions regarding the impacts of board power and CEO power on the CEO-TMT pay gap. Conducting dynamic panel analyses with GMM estimator on a sample of 2,117 firm-year observations in the S&P 500 between 2006 and 2013, we empirically test the contrasting predictions regarding the relationships among board power, CEO power, board-CEO power imbalance, and the CEO-TMT pay gap. In turn, we find that board power is negatively associated with the CEO-TMT pay gap and CEO power has the opposite effect. Moreover, the stronger board power against CEO power, the smaller the CEO-TMT pay gap becomes. Our theoretical analyses and empirical investigations contribute to the existing theoretical debate among agency theory, tournament theory, and managerial power theory regarding the determinants of the CEO-TMT pay gap. Consistent with agency theory predictions rather than tournament theory ones, our empirical results suggest that boards are conscientious about the potential negative effects of a larger CEO-TMT pay gap and therefore stronger boards usually do not rely on larger CEO-TMT pay gap to incentivize CEOs. This study also contributes to corporate governance literature by offering new aggregated proxies for board power and CEO power which reflect the multidimensional features of board-CEO relationships


2015 ◽  
Vol 57 (3) ◽  
pp. 789-813 ◽  
Author(s):  
Marion Hutchinson ◽  
Janet Mack ◽  
Peter Verhoeven

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