Political alternation and the fiscal deficits

2009 ◽  
Vol 102 (2) ◽  
pp. 138-140 ◽  
Author(s):  
Cecilia Rumi
2020 ◽  
Vol 71 (1) ◽  
pp. 15-41
Author(s):  
Dominik Maltritz ◽  
Sebastian Wüste

AbstractWe search for drivers of fiscal deficits in Europe using a data panel containing annual data of 27 EU countries in the years 1991–2012. Our special focus is on the influence of fiscal rules as well as on fiscal councils, i. e. institutions that may help to reduce deficits and enforce fiscal rules by advising governments. We distinguish between internal fiscal rules and external rules that result from EMU membership. In addition, we consider the impact of “creative accounting”, i. e. measures that help to circumvent fiscal rules, which we approximate by so called stock-flow-adjustments. We especially analyze the interactive influence of the mentioned variables on the budget balance.


2020 ◽  
Vol 48 (4) ◽  
pp. 421-429
Author(s):  
Robert N. McCauley

Abstract Since the late 1950s, the rest of the world has come to use the dollar to an extent that justifies speaking of the dollar’s global domain. The rest of the world denominates much debt in U.S. dollars, extending U.S. monetary policy’s sway. In addition, in outstanding foreign exchange deals, the rest of the world has undertaken to pay still more in U.S. dollars: off-balance-sheet dollar debts buried in footnotes. Consistent with the scale of dollar debt, most of the world economic activity takes place in countries with currencies tied to or relatively stable against the dollar, forming a dollar zone much larger than the euro zone. Even though the dollar assets of the world (minus the United States) exceed dollar liabilities, corporate sector dollar debts seem to make dollar appreciation akin to a global tightening of credit. Since the 1960s, claims that the dollar’s global role suffers from instability and confers great benefits on the U.S. economy have attracted much support. However, evidence that demand for dollars from official reserve managers forces unsustainable U.S. current account or fiscal deficits is not strong. The so-called exorbitant privilege is small or shared. In 2008 and again in 2020, the Federal Reserve demonstrated a willingness and capacity to backstop the global domain of the dollar. Politics could constrain the Fed’s ability to backstop the growing share of the domain of the dollar accounted for by countries that are not on such friendly terms with the U.S.


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