Channel and pricing decisions in a supply chain with advance selling of gift cards

In the retail industry, customer value has become the key to maintaining competitive advantages. In the era of new retail, customer value is not only affected by the product price, but it is also closely related to innovations, such as value-added services and unique business models. In this paper, we study the joint innovation investment and pricing decisions in a retailer–supplier supply chain based on revenue sharing contracts and customer value. We first find that, in the non-cooperative game, equilibrium only exists in the supplier Stackelberg game. However, revenue sharing contracts cannot coordinate the supply chain in the non-cooperative game. By considering supply chain members’ bargaining power, we find that there exists a unique equilibrium for the Nash bargaining product. In addition, revenue sharing contracts can coordinate the supply chain and achieve the optimal consumer surplus. When the supply chain is coordinated, supply chain profit is allocated to the supply chain members based on their bargaining powers.

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Pricing decisions with different time sequences in a cross‐border dual‐channel supply chain

International Transactions in Operational Research ◽

10.1111/itor.12937 ◽

2021 ◽

Author(s):

Xue Chen ◽

Bo Li ◽

Simin An ◽

Yanran Li

Keyword(s):

Supply Chain ◽

Pricing Decisions ◽

Cross Border ◽

Dual Channel ◽

Dual Channel Supply Chain ◽

Time Sequences

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The effect of customer value and power structure on retail supply chain product choice and pricing decisions

Omega ◽

10.1016/j.omega.2017.06.003 ◽

2018 ◽

Vol 77 ◽

pp. 115-126 ◽

Cited By ~ 31

Author(s):

Zheng Luo ◽

Xu Chen ◽

Ming Kai

Keyword(s):

Supply Chain ◽

Customer Value ◽

Power Structure ◽

Product Choice ◽

Pricing Decisions

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The Impact of Food Quality Information Services on Food Supply Chain Pricing Decisions and Coordination Mechanisms Based on the O2O E-Commerce Mode

Journal of Food Quality ◽

10.1155/2018/8956820 ◽

2018 ◽

Vol 2018 ◽

pp. 1-18 ◽

Cited By ~ 2

Author(s):

Xiaoqiu Yu ◽

Xiaoxue Ren

Keyword(s):

Supply Chain ◽

Food Quality ◽

Food Supply ◽

Food Processing ◽

Stackelberg Game ◽

Information Service ◽

Quality Information ◽

Food Supply Chain ◽

Quantity Discount ◽

Pricing Decisions

This paper considers the price conflict problem between the online channel of a food processing factory and the offline channel of the food retailers in food supply chains by analyzing the pricing decisions and coordination mechanisms between the food processing factory and food retailers under the influence of a food quality information service. First, the Stackelberg game method and the Bertrand game method are used to optimize the pricing decisions with the goal of maximizing the profits of the food processing factory and retailer. The analysis shows that the food quality information service level is positively correlated with the price of the factory’s own channel, and the influence of the food quality information service level on the price of the food processing factory’s or the food retailer’s own channel is stronger than its influence on the price of a competitor’s channel. Second, the food supply chain members’ pricing decisions are analyzed using the case analysis method by considering practical problems in the food supply chain. The results indicate that the food processing factory should use the Stackelberg game to make pricing decisions. However, it is optimal for the food retailer to make pricing decisions under the Bertrand game, and the total profit of the food supply chain is optimized under centralized decision making. Finally, we use both the quantitative discount mechanism and the Stackelberg game method to analyze the profits obtained by the food processing factory and retailer. The results indicate that the food processing factory should implement a quantitative discount mechanism when the quantity discount coefficient is greater than 0.4, and the retailer should implement a quantity discount mechanism when the quantity discount coefficient is in the range of 0.25 to 0.4.

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