Effects of a generalized dual-credit system on green technology investments and pricing decisions in a supply chain

Local residents living adjacent to ports are directly affected by the fine dust generated from the port operations. There is a need to prepare detailed measures according to cargo type given the high correlation between the types of dust-producing cargo primarily managed at ports and local industries. This study attempts to establish the attributes of the cargo handled at ports and the relationship between supply chains built for local key industries and the air quality of the local community. It aims to ascertain which cargo needs managing preemptively at the local level, based on the major cargo types handled in a port. A correlation analysis and Granger causality test were performed to investigate the causality between the factor of cargo and fine dust concentrations. The results in this study indicate the necessity for intensive management of scrap metal cargo among the major cargo handled at the target port, which confirms the large effect of management on fine dust reduction, as well as on reduction efficiency. The results suggest requirements to expand the regulations on the emissions of supply chains by cargo type, not by industry type. Additionally, it is required to minimize the blind spots of management and form an eco-friendly supply chain by introducing green technology. The preparation of emission control measures is also necessary. The findings provide useful insights for the sustainable operations of the local supply chain around the target port and will help the strategic agenda for future improvement.

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Joint Innovation Investment and Pricing Decisions in Retail Supply Chains with Customer Value

Sustainability ◽

10.3390/su13031309 ◽

2021 ◽

Vol 13 (3) ◽

pp. 1309

Author(s):

Jiali Qu ◽

Benyong Hu ◽

Chao Meng

Keyword(s):

Supply Chain ◽

Cooperative Game ◽

Customer Value ◽

Business Models ◽

Value Added ◽

Revenue Sharing ◽

Nash Bargaining ◽

Product Price ◽

Pricing Decisions ◽

Game Equilibrium

In the retail industry, customer value has become the key to maintaining competitive advantages. In the era of new retail, customer value is not only affected by the product price, but it is also closely related to innovations, such as value-added services and unique business models. In this paper, we study the joint innovation investment and pricing decisions in a retailer–supplier supply chain based on revenue sharing contracts and customer value. We first find that, in the non-cooperative game, equilibrium only exists in the supplier Stackelberg game. However, revenue sharing contracts cannot coordinate the supply chain in the non-cooperative game. By considering supply chain members’ bargaining power, we find that there exists a unique equilibrium for the Nash bargaining product. In addition, revenue sharing contracts can coordinate the supply chain and achieve the optimal consumer surplus. When the supply chain is coordinated, supply chain profit is allocated to the supply chain members based on their bargaining powers.

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Pricing decisions with different time sequences in a cross‐border dual‐channel supply chain

International Transactions in Operational Research ◽

10.1111/itor.12937 ◽

2021 ◽

Author(s):

Xue Chen ◽

Bo Li ◽

Simin An ◽

Yanran Li

Keyword(s):

Supply Chain ◽

Pricing Decisions ◽

Cross Border ◽

Dual Channel ◽

Dual Channel Supply Chain ◽

Time Sequences

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Effects of government subsidies on green technology investment and green marketing coordination of supply chain under Cap-and-trade mechanism

Energy Economics ◽

10.1016/j.eneco.2021.105426 ◽

2021 ◽

pp. 105426

Author(s):

Zhimin Li ◽

Yanchun Pan ◽

Wen Yang ◽

Jianhua Ma ◽

Ming Zhou

Keyword(s):

Supply Chain ◽

Green Technology ◽

Green Marketing ◽

Cap And Trade ◽

Government Subsidies ◽

Technology Investment

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Optimizing a Sustainable Supply Chain Inventory Model for Controllable Deterioration and Emission Rates in a Greenhouse Farm

Mathematics ◽

10.3390/math9050495 ◽

2021 ◽

Vol 9 (5) ◽

pp. 495

Author(s):

Umakanta Mishra ◽

Abu Hashan Md Mashud ◽

Ming-Lang Tseng ◽

Jei-Zheng Wu

Keyword(s):

Supply Chain ◽

Carbon Emissions ◽

Trade Credit ◽

Numerical Study ◽

Inventory Model ◽

Green Technology ◽

Solution Technique ◽

Emission Rates ◽

Sustainable Supply Chain ◽

Green Technologies

This study investigated how greenhouse managers should invest in preservation and green technologies and introduce trade credit to increase their profits. We propose a supply chain inventory model with controllable deterioration and emission rates under payment schemes for shortage and surplus, where demand depends on price and trade credit. Carbon emissions and deterioration are factors affecting global warming, and many greenhouse managers have focused on reducing carbon emissions. Carbon caps and tax-based incentives have been used in many greenhouses to achieve such reduction. Because of the importance of reducing carbon emissions for developing a green supply chain, various studies have investigated how firms deal with carbon emission constraints. In this continuation, we have used green technology to curb the excessive emissions from the environment or make it clean from CO2. In a seller–buyer relationship, the seller can offer a trade credit period to the buyer to manage stock and stimulate demand. Deterioration may become a challenge for most firms as they are under time constraints control, and preservation technology could help. This study proposes three novel inventory strategies for a sustainable supply chain (full backorder, partial backorder, and no backorder), linking all these important issues. The solution optimizes total annual profit for inventory shortage or surplus. We conducted a numerical study with three examples to evaluate the model’s authenticity and effectiveness and demonstrate the solution technique. The deterioration and emission rates can be included in a trade credit policy to increase greenhouse profits. The results suggest that greenhouse managers could apply the proposed model to manage real-world situations.

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Cooperative Green Technology Innovation of an E-Commerce Sales Channel in a Two-Stage Supply Chain

Sustainability ◽

10.3390/su13137499 ◽

2021 ◽

Vol 13 (13) ◽

pp. 7499

Author(s):

Zongyu Mu ◽

Yuangang Zheng ◽

Hao Sun

Keyword(s):

Supply Chain ◽

Technology Innovation ◽

Spillover Effect ◽

Product Market ◽

Free Riding ◽

Green Technology ◽

Market Demand ◽

Two Stage ◽

Sales Channel ◽

Innovation Activities

The potential broad market of green consumption has encouraged an increasing number of enterprises to carry out green technology innovation activities. This paper examines a two-stage supply chain of e-commerce sales channels under different cooperative models. We find that consumers’ green preferences are the main factor that affects green product market demand. The manufacturer and the retailer can raise the levels of green technology innovation and extend green promotional services to expand product market demand in online and offline channels. However, consumers’ e-commerce preferences and online free-riding behaviors affect the manufacturer’s sales channel choice. The retailer can improve the level of green promotional services to hold offline channel market demand, while promotional behaviors have a positive/negative spillover effect on online market demand if the level of free riding falls above/below consumers’ e-commerce preferences. The higher the cooperative level is, the later the manufacturer will open the online channel and close the offline channel to ensure a high level of green promotional service from the cooperative retailer. The results show that the stronger the level of cooperation among all members is, the better the economic, ecological, and social benefits will be. Therefore, we design a revenue-cost sharing contract that can effectively motivate green technology innovation and green promotional services and afford all members win-win profits.

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The effect of customer value and power structure on retail supply chain product choice and pricing decisions

Omega ◽

10.1016/j.omega.2017.06.003 ◽

2018 ◽

Vol 77 ◽

pp. 115-126 ◽

Cited By ~ 31

Author(s):

Zheng Luo ◽

Xu Chen ◽

Ming Kai

Keyword(s):

Supply Chain ◽

Customer Value ◽

Power Structure ◽

Product Choice ◽

Pricing Decisions

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The Impact of Food Quality Information Services on Food Supply Chain Pricing Decisions and Coordination Mechanisms Based on the O2O E-Commerce Mode

Journal of Food Quality ◽

10.1155/2018/8956820 ◽

2018 ◽

Vol 2018 ◽

pp. 1-18 ◽

Cited By ~ 2

Author(s):

Xiaoqiu Yu ◽

Xiaoxue Ren

Keyword(s):

Supply Chain ◽

Food Quality ◽

Food Supply ◽

Food Processing ◽

Stackelberg Game ◽

Information Service ◽

Quality Information ◽

Food Supply Chain ◽

Quantity Discount ◽

Pricing Decisions

This paper considers the price conflict problem between the online channel of a food processing factory and the offline channel of the food retailers in food supply chains by analyzing the pricing decisions and coordination mechanisms between the food processing factory and food retailers under the influence of a food quality information service. First, the Stackelberg game method and the Bertrand game method are used to optimize the pricing decisions with the goal of maximizing the profits of the food processing factory and retailer. The analysis shows that the food quality information service level is positively correlated with the price of the factory’s own channel, and the influence of the food quality information service level on the price of the food processing factory’s or the food retailer’s own channel is stronger than its influence on the price of a competitor’s channel. Second, the food supply chain members’ pricing decisions are analyzed using the case analysis method by considering practical problems in the food supply chain. The results indicate that the food processing factory should use the Stackelberg game to make pricing decisions. However, it is optimal for the food retailer to make pricing decisions under the Bertrand game, and the total profit of the food supply chain is optimized under centralized decision making. Finally, we use both the quantitative discount mechanism and the Stackelberg game method to analyze the profits obtained by the food processing factory and retailer. The results indicate that the food processing factory should implement a quantitative discount mechanism when the quantity discount coefficient is greater than 0.4, and the retailer should implement a quantity discount mechanism when the quantity discount coefficient is in the range of 0.25 to 0.4.

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