Nash equilibrium solutions in multi-agent project scheduling with milestones

2021 ◽  
Author(s):  
Přemysl Šůcha ◽  
Alessandro Agnetis ◽  
Marko Šidlovský ◽  
Cyril Briand
Keyword(s):  
Nash Equilibrium ◽  
Project Scheduling ◽  
Equilibrium Solutions ◽  
Multi Agent ◽  
Nash Equilibrium Solutions

UNCERTAINTY BASED ROBUST OPTIMIZATION IN AERODYNAMICS

2009 ◽  
Vol 23 (03) ◽  
pp. 477-480 ◽  
Author(s):  
ZHILI TANG
Keyword(s):  
Nash Equilibrium ◽  
Robust Design ◽  
Single Point ◽  
Optimization Method ◽  
Equilibrium Solutions ◽  
Design Problems ◽  
Nash Equilibrium Solutions ◽  
Definition Of ◽  
Taguchi Robust Design ◽  
Statistical Definition

The Taguchi robust design concept is combined with the multi-objective deterministic optimization method to overcome single point design problems in Aerodynamics. Starting from a statistical definition of stability, the method finds, Nash equilibrium solutions for performance and its stability simultaneously.

On the noninferiority of Nash equilibrium solutions

1971 ◽  
Vol 16 (2) ◽  
pp. 170-173 ◽  
Author(s):  
Z. Rekasius ◽  
W. Schmitendorf
Keyword(s):  
Nash Equilibrium ◽  
Equilibrium Solutions ◽  
Nash Equilibrium Solutions

scholarly journals Finding an optimal Nash equilibrium to the multi-agent project scheduling problem

2017 ◽  
Vol 20 (5) ◽  
pp. 475-491 ◽  
Author(s):  
Cyril Briand ◽  
Sandra Ulrich Ngueveu ◽  
Přemysl Šůcha
Keyword(s):  
Nash Equilibrium ◽  
Project Scheduling ◽  
Scheduling Problem ◽  
Multi Agent ◽  
Project Scheduling Problem

OPEN-LOOP AND CLOSED-LOOP MODELS OF DYNAMIC OLIGOPOLY IN THE CRUISE LINE INDUSTRY

2004 ◽  
Vol 21 (04) ◽  
pp. 517-541 ◽  
Author(s):  
BYUNG-WOOK WIE
Keyword(s):  
Nash Equilibrium ◽  
Closed Loop ◽  
Open Loop ◽  
Future Research ◽  
Capacity Investment ◽  
Equilibrium Solutions ◽  
Dynamic Oligopoly ◽  
Nash Equilibrium Solutions ◽  
Cruise Line ◽  
Cruise Lines

In this paper, the competition of dynamic oligopoly in the cruise line industry is modeled as an N-person nonzero-sum noncooperative dynamic game where a finite number of cruise lines compete to maximize their profits over a fixed planning horizon. The noncooperative Nash equilibrium capacity investment strategies of cruise lines are theoretically analyzed under the open-loop and closed-loop information structures. The optimality conditions for open-loop and closed-loop Nash equilibrium solutions are derived using a Pontryagin-type maximum principle and given economic interpretations so as to demonstrate the differences between the open-loop and closed-loop Nash equilibrium solutions. The dynamic oligopolistic competition of three cruise lines in a hypothetical setting is numerically analyzed by using the iterative algorithms for open-loop and closed-loop models. Numerical results provide a number of important managerial guidelines for cruise capacity investment decisions. The paper concludes with a discussion on future research directions.

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