UNCERTAINTY BASED ROBUST OPTIMIZATION IN AERODYNAMICS

2009 ◽  
Vol 23 (03) ◽  
pp. 477-480 ◽  
Author(s):  
ZHILI TANG

The Taguchi robust design concept is combined with the multi-objective deterministic optimization method to overcome single point design problems in Aerodynamics. Starting from a statistical definition of stability, the method finds, Nash equilibrium solutions for performance and its stability simultaneously.

2021 ◽  
Vol 9 ◽  
Author(s):  
Jinyi Xu ◽  
Chengchu Yan ◽  
Yizhe Xu ◽  
Jingfeng Shi ◽  
Kai Sheng ◽  
...  

Building demand-side management is an effective solution for relieving the peak and imbalance problems of electrical grids. How to explore the energy flexibility of buildings and to coordinate a variety of buildings with different energy flexibilities for effective interactions with smart grids are a great challenge. This paper proposes a game theory–based hierarchical demand optimization method for energy flexible buildings for achieving better grid interactions. This method consists of two optimization strategies at the grid and building levels. At the grid level, a demand-price interaction model for buildings and the grid is established to identify the Nash equilibrium solutions based on game theory; these solutions are used to determine the optimized energy demand of buildings and the associated electricity prices by accommodating the interests of all participants involved. At the building level, three types of buildings with different energy flexibilities are investigated to analyze the influence of building management strategies on grid interactions. The effectiveness of the proposed method is verified in a simulated case study. The results show that the optimization method can reduce building operational cost by 3–18%, reduce the fluctuation of the power grid by 30–50%, and ensure that the power grid increases income by 8–20%.


2004 ◽  
Vol 21 (04) ◽  
pp. 517-541 ◽  
Author(s):  
BYUNG-WOOK WIE

In this paper, the competition of dynamic oligopoly in the cruise line industry is modeled as an N-person nonzero-sum noncooperative dynamic game where a finite number of cruise lines compete to maximize their profits over a fixed planning horizon. The noncooperative Nash equilibrium capacity investment strategies of cruise lines are theoretically analyzed under the open-loop and closed-loop information structures. The optimality conditions for open-loop and closed-loop Nash equilibrium solutions are derived using a Pontryagin-type maximum principle and given economic interpretations so as to demonstrate the differences between the open-loop and closed-loop Nash equilibrium solutions. The dynamic oligopolistic competition of three cruise lines in a hypothetical setting is numerically analyzed by using the iterative algorithms for open-loop and closed-loop models. Numerical results provide a number of important managerial guidelines for cruise capacity investment decisions. The paper concludes with a discussion on future research directions.


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