Does geopolitical risk promote mergers and acquisitions of listed companies in energy and electric power industries

2021 ◽  
Vol 95 ◽  
pp. 105115
Author(s):  
Huayu Shen ◽  
Yue Liang ◽  
Hanwen Li ◽  
Jie Liu ◽  
Guangxi Lu
2021 ◽  
Vol 14 (11) ◽  
pp. 46
Author(s):  
Luyao Huangfu ◽  
Fang Wang ◽  
Dan Liu ◽  
Nan Wu

Based on the panel data of Chinese listed companies in the information technology industry from 2007 to 2018, this paper uses a fixed-effect model to study the relationship between corporate performance expectation gap and strategic change and analyzes the moderating effect of private benefits of management control and equity incentive. It is found that the greater the gap between corporate performance expectations is, the lower the frequency of corporate mergers and acquisitions is, and the higher the frequency of corporate asset divestment is. Further research finds that private benefits of management control weaken the positive correlation between corporate performance expectation gap and asset stripping frequency. Equity incentive strengthens the negative correlation between corporate performance expectation gap and corporate mergers and acquisitions frequency, and the positive correlation between corporate performance expectation gap and corporate asset stripping frequency. Based on this, when enterprises carry out strategic change, enterprises should choose the direction of strategic change according to the degree of performance expectation gap, and promote the effective realization of strategic change by improving the governance of the board of directors and optimizing the management incentive mechanism.


Author(s):  
Александр Викторович Стерхов

The purpose of the article is to build a model for estimating the relative premium in mergers and acquisitions of electric power companies, based on four groups of factors: the company's operating and financial results, the country affiliation, the industry affiliation, the debt market conjuncture. The research methodology is based on a comparative business valuation method. The empirical base of the research includes data on 6504 deals that occurred throughout the world from 1997 to 2018. The research database includes data on both public and non-public companies for which the amount paid in the deal is known, as well as the value of total assets. The scientific novelty consists in clarifying the conceptual apparatus (the concept of relative premium in a deal has been introduced); the selection and grouping of factors affecting the size of the relative premium; identifying and quantifying the influence of variables included in each group of factors. The article proposed the author's approach to the grouping of countries and industries, based on the equality of premium coefficients in the regression and obtained groups of countries and industries with equal premiums. It is shown that the grouping of industries, obtained by the mathematical algorithm, almost completely corresponds to the industry structure of the electric power industry. The coefficient of determination of the final econometric model is more than 20 per cent, which can be estimated as a high-quality assessment. That is because the relative premium, not the amount paid in the deal, is predicted which is in close correlation with the value of the company's assets. The practical significance of the research study consists in the possibility of predicting the value of a business, as well as determining the value paid in a deal in cases where such information is not available in available sources.


2020 ◽  
Vol 8 (4) ◽  
pp. 64
Author(s):  
Jiao Xue ◽  
Heng Fan ◽  
Zhanxun Dong

This study empirically examines the relationship between executive compensation and mergers and acquisitions (M&A) behaviors by identifying the influence of short- and long-term incentive on the propensity and scale of M&A. When the short-term incentive is insufficient, M&A behaviors serve as a beneficial compensation mechanism. Thus, lack of executives’ incentive promotes the propensity to engage in M&A and significantly affects the scale of M&A. With regard to long-term incentives, M&A behaviors serve as a beneficial creation mechanism. Shareholding of executives promotes M&A propensity, and does not significantly affect the scale of M&A. This study significantly contributes to research in M&A behaviors by revealing the beneficial distribution mechanisms of M&A behaviors.


2021 ◽  
Vol 71 (5&6) ◽  
pp. 82
Author(s):  
Zhibin Liu ◽  
Nian Xie ◽  
Xiaoning Li

With the constant revision of accounting standards, the earnings management methods are constantly changed and innovated in order to achieve the purpose of beautifying the statements and manipulating profits. This paper took the electricity listed companies as the research object, selected the financial data of 52 listed companies in the Shanghai Stock Exchange and the Shenzhen Stock Exchange from 2014 to 2016 as the sample, and employed the SPSS statistics software to analyze the earnings management methods of the listed companies in the electric power industry and to draw the conclusions through empirical research. Based on the preliminary statistical analysis of the earnings management methods of listed companies in the electric power industry, this paper used the modified Jones model to verify the empirical analysis. The main conclusions of this paper are as follows: There is a positive linear relationship between fixed assets management, assets impairment management and discretional accruals of the listed companies in the electric power industry. The degree of its influence is more obvious and stable than that of other earnings management methods, and passed the significance test. The collinear diagnostics can also prove a more reasonable correlation among the variables, indicating that the results obtained from the modified Jones model is more significant.


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