Exploring the dynamics of low-carbon technology diffusion among enterprises: An evolutionary game model on a two-level heterogeneous social network

2021 ◽  
pp. 105399
Author(s):  
Yingying Shi ◽  
Zixiang Wei ◽  
Muhammad Shahbaz ◽  
Yongchao Zeng
Keyword(s):  
Social Network ◽  
Technology Diffusion ◽  
Evolutionary Game ◽  
Game Model ◽  
Low Carbon ◽  
Heterogeneous Social Network

scholarly journals Profit Distribution and Stability Analysis of Joint Distribution Alliance Based on Tripartite Evolutionary Game Theory Under the Background of Green and Low-Carbon

2021 ◽  
Author(s):  
Renbin Han ◽  
Mengke Yang
Keyword(s):  
Information Disclosure ◽  
Joint Distribution ◽  
Evolutionary Game ◽  
Game Model ◽  
Low Carbon ◽  
Environmental Benefit ◽  
Logistics Industry ◽  
Government Subsidies ◽  
Profit Distribution ◽  
The Government

Abstract Joint distribution is an advanced logistics organization model for improving the quality and efficiency of express logistics industry and achieve high-quality development of logistics, but the distribution of common profit has always been a key obstacle to the effective development of joint distribution. Based on the background of green and low-carbon, this paper explores a fairer and more reasonable profit distribution scheme. The profit game between the government and the two types of member enterprises is analyzed. By focusing on how the government plays a role in inducing the joint distribution alliance to bring the green and low-carbon requirements into the profit distribution, the strategy evolution process of the three parties, the factors affecting the profit distribution and the stability of alliance are discussed through the establishment of "government-member enterprise A-member enterprise B" tripartite evolutionary game model. Finally, the evolutionary game model is numerically simulated based on system dynamics. It is found that: (1) It is necessary for the government to guide and motivate the alliance to create internal incentives and constraints. The effect of government subsidies and rewards to member enterprises is greater than the penalties for member enterprises. (2) The member enterprises are likely to conspire together to defraud government subsidies and rewards, carry out "free riding" and other speculative activities, which makes it necessary for the government and the alliance to establish supervision mechanism, information disclosure mechanism, and property rights protection system. (3) The willingness of member enterprise to positively cooperate will increase with the increase of the additional benefit coefficient, the proportion of profit distribution and the importance of environmental benefit factor; and will decrease with the increase of the cost of promoting green distribution operations.

scholarly journals An Evolutionary Game Model of Multi-Topics Diffusion in Social Network

2017 ◽  
Vol 12 ◽  
pp. 03045
Author(s):  
Jia-Hao Su ◽  
Ming Fang ◽  
Jiang Jiang ◽  
Ying-Wu Chen
Keyword(s):  
Social Network ◽  
Evolutionary Game ◽  
Game Model

Low-Carbon Selection Decision for Logistics Enterprises Based on Evolutionary Game under the Supervision of Government

2011 ◽  
Vol 219-220 ◽  
pp. 736-741
Author(s):  
Ye Zhou ◽  
Hui He ◽  
Yan Feng Wang
Keyword(s):  
Global Climate ◽  
Evolutionary Game ◽  
Game Model ◽  
Low Carbon ◽  
Global Climate Warming ◽  
Logistics Enterprises ◽  
Selection Decision ◽  
The Government ◽  
Supervision Strategies ◽  
Emission Of Greenhouse Gases

The emission of greenhouse gases leading to global climate warming has caused widespread concern on the part of governments worldwide. As one of the main sources of carbon emissions, modern logistics occupies a unique position for energy saving. But as economic entities, logistics enterprises have no real incentive to implement low-carbon logistics operations, which needs government to stimulate logistics enterprises to implement low-carbon strategy through regulations. Constructed an Evolutionary Game Model for logistics enterprises to implement low-carbon selection decision under the supervision of the government, analyzed the effcts of different regulative parameters on the implementation of low-carbon strategy in logistics business. The results show that government's regulation and strategies play a crucial role in carrying out the low-carbon strategy. Finally, according to different evolution conditions and conclusions, it proposes appropriate supervision strategies for government to promote logistics enterprises to put the low-carbon strategy into effect.

scholarly journals The Evolutionary Game Theoretic Analysis for Emission Reduction and Promotion in Low-Carbon Supply Chains

2018 ◽  
Vol 8 (10) ◽  
pp. 1965 ◽  
Author(s):  
Baiyun Yuan ◽  
Longfei He ◽  
Bingmei Gu ◽  
Yi Zhang
Keyword(s):  
Supply Chain ◽  
Emission Reduction ◽  
Evolutionary Game ◽  
Game Model ◽  
Low Carbon ◽  
Carbon Reduction ◽  
Game Theoretic Analysis ◽  
Carbon Supply ◽  
Evolutionary Stable Strategies ◽  
Game Theoretic

Aiming at exploring the interplay principles of operations strategies among members of dvertising and emission reduction cost sharing contracts and coordination in low-carbon sulow-carbon supply chain, as well as their impact on system performance, we develop an evolutionary game model to capture emission reduction and low-carbon promotion actions, which are typically conducted by one manufacturer and one retailer in every two-echelon supply chain, respectively. We exploit the evolutionary game model to analyze players’ behavioral patterns of their interacting strategies, whereby we attain the evolutionary stable strategies and their associated existing preconditions under various scenarios. We acquire a number of managerial insights, and particularly find that the evolutionary stable strategies of the channel carbon reduction and promotion are remarkably influenced by incremental profits resulted from causes, such as every player’s unilateral participation in emission reduction. In addition, we investigate a player’s free-rider opportunistic practice in cooperative carbon reduction and joint participation in emission reduction. However, the magnitude of profit increment will heavily influence the result of Evolutionary Stable Strategy (ESS). Finally, the extensive computational studies enable us to verify the effectiveness of preceding models.

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