The evolution of moral rules in a model of indirect reciprocity with private assessment

Moral rules allow humans to cooperate by indirect reciprocity. Yet, it is not clear which moral rules best implement indirect reciprocity and are favoured by natural selection. Previous studies either considered only public assessment, where individuals are deemed good or bad by all others, or compared a subset of possible strategies. Here we fill this gap by identifying which rules are evolutionary stable strategies (ESS) among all possible moral rules while considering private assessment. We develop an analytical model describing the frequency of long-term cooperation, determining when a strategy can be invaded by another. We show that there are numerous ESSs in absence of errors, which however cease to exist when errors are present. We identify the underlying properties of cooperative ESSs. Overall, this paper provides a first exhaustive evolutionary invasion analysis of moral rules considering private assessment. Moreover, this model is extendable to incorporate higher-order rules and other processes.

Multi-Player Evolutionary Game of Network Attack and Defense Based on System Dynamics

We formalize the adversarial process between defender and attackers as a game and study the non-cooperative evolutionary game mechanism under bounded rationality. We analyze the long-term dynamic process between the attacking and defending parties using the evolutionary stable strategies derived from the evolutionary game model. First, we construct a multi-player evolutionary game model consisting of a defender and multiple attackers, formally describe the strategies, and construct a three-player game payoff matrix. Then, we propose two punishment schemes, i.e., static and dynamic ones. Moreover, through the combination of mathematical derivation with simulation, we obtain the evolutionary stable strategies of each player. Different from previous work, in this paper, we consider the influence of strategies among different attackers. The simulation shows that (1) in the static punishment scheme, increasing the penalty can quickly control the occurrence of network attacks in the short term; (2) in the dynamic punishment scheme, the game can be stabilized effectively, and the stable state and equilibrium values are not affected by the change of the initial values.

The Impact of Penalty and Subsidy Mechanisms On The Decisions of Governments, Businesses, and Consumers During COVID-19 ——Tripartite Evolutionary Game Theory Analysis

Purpose – Based on the fact that punishment and subsidy mechanisms affect the anti-epidemic incentives of major participants in a society, the issue of this paper is how the penalty and subsidy mechanisms affect the decisions of governments, businesses, and consumers during Corona Virus Disease 2019. The goal of this paper is to understand strategic selections from governments, enterprises, and consumers to maximize their respective utility during Corona Virus Disease 2019, and the impact of penalty and subsidy mechanism on the decisions of governments, businesses, and consumers.Design/Methodology/approach - This paper proposes a tripartite evolutionary game theory, involving governments, businesses, and consumers, to firstly analyze the evolutionary stable strategies and to secondly analyze the impact of penalty and subsidy mechanism on their strategy selection during Corona Virus Disease 2019. Thirdly, this paper uses numerical analysis to simulate the strategy formation process of governments, enterprises, and consumers in Japan and India based on their different penalty and subsidy mechanism.Findings – This paper suggests that there are four evolutionarily stable strategies corresponding to the actual anti-epidemic situations of different countries in reality. We find that different subsidy and penalty mechanisms lead to different evolutionary stable strategies. If governments, enterprises, and consumers fighting the pandemic together, the government need to set a low subsidy mechanism and a high penalty mechanism.Originality/value - There are some limitations in the literature, such as long term strategies, rational hypothesis, and convergence path analysis in higher dimensional evolutionary game theory. This paper fills the gap and extends the theory of COVID-19 management theory. Firstly, this paper has important practical significance. This paper finds out the long-term equilibrium strategies of governments, businesses, and consumers under Corona Virus Disease 2019, which can provide an important theoretical and decision-making basis for pandemic prevention and control. Secondly, our paper extends the analytical paradigm of the tripartite evolutionary game theory. We extend the analysis of the dynamic process from the initial point to the convergence point and make a theoretical contribution to the development of high-dimensional evolutionary game theory.

The Decision-Making Analysis on End-of-Life Vehicle Recycling and Remanufacturing under Extended Producer Responsibility Policy

This research develops a dual-cycle ELV recycling and remanufacturing system to better understand and improve the efficiency of the ELV recycling and remanufacturing businesses. For the flawless operation of this system, the researchers employed evolutionary game theory to establish a game model between original vehicle manufacturers (OVMs) and third-party recyclers with the government involved. This research presents evolutionary stable strategies (ESS) that could promote an ELV recycling and remanufacturing system. Results show that OVMs’ expected profit difference between choosing and not choosing authorization is crucial in their ESS. The licensing fee plays a part of OVMs’ expected profit difference. Based on the results, optimal ESS could be achieved when the OVMs’ expected profit difference between choosing authorization and not choosing authorization and the third-party recyclers’ profit when paying the licensing fee are both positive. Then, the two groups’ involvement in dual-cycle ELV recycling and the remanufacturing system can be ensured. This research implicates the government to devise appropriate reward and punishment strategy to encourage OVMs and third-party recyclers to collaborate for efficient recycling and remanufacturing systems. Particularly, the government is suggested to impose strict restrictions on OVMs to carry ELV recycling and provide support to promote recycling quantity standards. Hence, the ELV recycling and remanufacturing system would be strengthened, thus improving waste management which is crucial for both environmental and resource efficiency.

Evolutionary Game Theory: Darwinian Dynamics and the G Function Approach

Classical evolutionary game theory allows one to analyze the population dynamics of interacting individuals playing different strategies (broadly defined) in a population. To expand the scope of this framework to allow us to examine the evolution of these individuals’ strategies over time, we present the idea of a fitness-generating (G) function. Under this model, we can simultaneously consider population (ecological) and strategy (evolutionary) dynamics. In this paper, we briefly outline the differences between game theory and classical evolutionary game theory. We then introduce the G function framework, deriving the model from fundamental biological principles. We introduce the concept of a G-function species, explain the process of modeling with G functions, and define the conditions for evolutionary stable strategies (ESS). We conclude by presenting expository examples of G function model construction and simulations in the context of predator–prey dynamics and the evolution of drug resistance in cancer.

Evolutionary Stable Strategies for Supply Chains: Selfishness, Fairness, and Altruism

The management strategies of a firm are inevitable affected by individual behavior preferences. The effect of individual preference on the evolutionary dynamics for supply chains is studied by employing replicator dynamics. Each firm has three behavior preferences: selfishness, fairness, and altruism. Firstly, the case that the strategy set of manufacturers and retailers including two pure strategies is considered and the effect of preference parameter on the equilibrium outcome in the short-term interaction is discussed. Secondly, the equilibrium state in the short-term is always disturbed because the change of the environment, firm’s structure, and so forth. Using the replicator dynamics, the evolutionary stable strategies of manufacturers and retailers in the long-term interaction are analyzed. Finally, the extend case that the strategy set of manufacturers and retailers include three pure strategies is investigated. These results are found that the strategy profile in which both manufacturer and retailer choose fairness or altruism, or one player chooses fair or altruistic strategy and the other player chooses selfish strategy may be evolutionary stable, the stability of these equilibria depends on the the preference parameters.

The Evolutionary Game Theoretic Analysis for Emission Reduction and Promotion in Low-Carbon Supply Chains

Aiming at exploring the interplay principles of operations strategies among members of dvertising and emission reduction cost sharing contracts and coordination in low-carbon sulow-carbon supply chain, as well as their impact on system performance, we develop an evolutionary game model to capture emission reduction and low-carbon promotion actions, which are typically conducted by one manufacturer and one retailer in every two-echelon supply chain, respectively. We exploit the evolutionary game model to analyze players’ behavioral patterns of their interacting strategies, whereby we attain the evolutionary stable strategies and their associated existing preconditions under various scenarios. We acquire a number of managerial insights, and particularly find that the evolutionary stable strategies of the channel carbon reduction and promotion are remarkably influenced by incremental profits resulted from causes, such as every player’s unilateral participation in emission reduction. In addition, we investigate a player’s free-rider opportunistic practice in cooperative carbon reduction and joint participation in emission reduction. However, the magnitude of profit increment will heavily influence the result of Evolutionary Stable Strategy (ESS). Finally, the extensive computational studies enable us to verify the effectiveness of preceding models.