On the impact of quotas and decision rules in collective bargaining

2017 ◽  
Vol 100 ◽  
pp. 175-192 ◽  
Author(s):  
Robert Feicht ◽  
Veronika Grimm ◽  
Holger A. Rau ◽  
Gesine Stephan
2015 ◽  
Author(s):  
Robert Feicht ◽  
Veronika Grimm ◽  
Holger Andreas Rau ◽  
Gesine Stephan

2021 ◽  
pp. 102425892199500
Author(s):  
Maria da Paz Campos Lima ◽  
Diogo Martins ◽  
Ana Cristina Costa ◽  
António Velez

Internal devaluation policies imposed in southern European countries since 2010 have weakened labour market institutions and intensified wage inequality and the falling wage share. The debate in the wake of the financial and economic crisis raised concerns about slow wage growth and persistent economic inequality. This article attempts to shed light on this debate, scrutinising the case of Portugal in the period 2010–2017. Mapping the broad developments at the national level, the article examines four sectors, looking in particular at the impact of minimum wages and collective bargaining on wage trends vis-à-vis wage inequality and wage share trajectories. We conclude that both minimum wage increases and the slight recovery of collective bargaining had a positive effect on wage outcomes and were important in reducing wage inequality. The extent of this reduction was limited, however, by uneven sectoral recovery dynamics and the persistent effects of precarious work, combined with critical liberalisation reforms.


2016 ◽  
Vol 54 (7) ◽  
pp. 1649-1668 ◽  
Author(s):  
Petru Lucian Curseu ◽  
Sandra G. L. Schruijer ◽  
Oana Catalina Fodor

Purpose – The purpose of this paper is to test the influence of collaborative and consultative decision rules on groups’ sensitivity to framing effect (FE) and escalation of commitment (EOC). Design/methodology/approach – In an experimental study (using a sample of 233 professionals with project management experience), the authors test the effects of collaborative and consultative decision rules on groups’ sensitivity to EOC and FE. The authors use four group decision-making tasks to evaluate decision consistency across gain/loss framed decision situations and six decision tasks to evaluate EOC for money as well as time as resources previously invested in the initial decisions. Findings – The results show that the collaborative decision rule increases sensitivity to EOC when financial resources are involved and decreases sensitivity to EOC when time is of essence. Moreover, the authors show that the collaborative decision rule decreases sensitivity to FE in group decision making. Research limitations/implications – The results have important implications for group rationality as an emergent group level competence by extending the insights concerning the impact of decision rules on emergent group level cognitive competencies. Due to the experimental nature of the design, the authors can probe the causal relations between the investigated variables, yet the authors cannot generalize the results to other settings. Practical implications – Managers can use the insights of this study in order to optimize the functioning of decision-making groups and to reduce their sensitivity to FEs and EOC. Originality/value – The study extends the research on group rationality and it is one of the few experimental attempts used to understand the role of decision rules on emergent group level rationality.


1961 ◽  
Vol 56 (295) ◽  
pp. 765
Author(s):  
Milton Derber ◽  
Sumner H. Slichter ◽  
James J. Healy ◽  
E. Robert Livernash

2018 ◽  
Vol 48 (3) ◽  
pp. 343-376
Author(s):  
Breen Creighton ◽  
Catrina Denvir ◽  
Richard Johnstone ◽  
Shae McCrystal ◽  
Alice Orchiston

Abstract In 2016, the UK Parliament passed the Trade Union Act 2016 (TU Act 2016), which introduced new quorum and approval requirements for pre-strike ballots. In Australia, mandatory pre-strike ballots, including a quorum requirement, were first introduced in 2006. This article explains the key features of the Australian pre-strike ballot system and reports on quantitative and qualitative empirical research findings on the operation of the ballots process to analyse the majority and quorum requirements, mode of ballot (postal, attendance or electronic) and choice of ballot agent. Quorum is the biggest obstacle to Australian unions authorising strike action under the pre-strike ballot rules, and postal ballots fail to reach quorum at significantly higher rates than do attendance ballots. By introducing quorums and retaining the requirement that all pre-strike ballots must be conducted by post, the TU Act 2016 endorsed the two factors under the Australian regime most likely to impede the authorisation of strike action in a pre-strike ballot.


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