scholarly journals Necessary and Sufficient Solution to Optimal Control for Linear Continuous Time Mean-field System * *This work is supported by the National Natural Science Foundation of China under Grants 61120106011, 61573221, 61633014.

2017 ◽  
Vol 50 (1) ◽  
pp. 1495-1501 ◽  
Author(s):  
Qingyuan Qi ◽  
Huanshui Zhang
2020 ◽  
Vol 2020 ◽  
pp. 1-16
Author(s):  
Ruijing Li ◽  
Chaozhu Hu

The present paper concerns with a near-optimal control problem for systems governed by mean-field forward-backward stochastic differential equations (FBSDEs) with mixed initial-terminal conditions. Utilizing Ekeland’s variational principle as well as the reduction method, the necessary and sufficient near-optimality conditions are established in the form of Pontryagin’s type. The results are obtained under restriction on the convexity of the control domain. As an application, a linear-quadratic stochastic control problem is solved explicitly.


2020 ◽  
Vol 26 ◽  
pp. 41
Author(s):  
Tianxiao Wang

This article is concerned with linear quadratic optimal control problems of mean-field stochastic differential equations (MF-SDE) with deterministic coefficients. To treat the time inconsistency of the optimal control problems, linear closed-loop equilibrium strategies are introduced and characterized by variational approach. Our developed methodology drops the delicate convergence procedures in Yong [Trans. Amer. Math. Soc. 369 (2017) 5467–5523]. When the MF-SDE reduces to SDE, our Riccati system coincides with the analogue in Yong [Trans. Amer. Math. Soc. 369 (2017) 5467–5523]. However, these two systems are in general different from each other due to the conditional mean-field terms in the MF-SDE. Eventually, the comparisons with pre-committed optimal strategies, open-loop equilibrium strategies are given in details.


Author(s):  
Marco Guerrazzi

AbstractIn this paper, I develop a dynamic version of the efficient bargaining model grounded on optimal control in which a firm and a union bargain over the wage in a continuous-time environment under the supervision of an infinitely lived mediator. Overturning the findings achieved by means of a companion right-to-manage framework, I demonstrate that when employment is assumed to adjust itself with some attrition in the direction of the contract curve implied by the preferences of the two bargainers, increases in the bargaining power of the firm (union) accelerate (delay) the speed of convergence towards the stationary solution. In addition, confirming the reversal of the results obtained when employment moves over time towards the firm’s labour demand, I show that the dynamic negotiation of wages tends to penalize unionized workers and favour the firm with respect to the bargaining outcomes retrieved with a similar static wage-setting model.


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