scholarly journals Market structure, regulation and the speed of mobile network penetration

2012 ◽  
Vol 30 (6) ◽  
pp. 697-707 ◽  
Author(s):  
Yan Li ◽  
Bruce Lyons
Keyword(s):  
Market Structure ◽  
Mobile Network ◽  
Structure Regulation

scholarly journals Liquidity, Trading, and Price Determination in Equity Markets: A Finance Course Application

2021 ◽  
pp. 21-49
Author(s):  
Deniz Ozenbas ◽  
Michael S. Pagano ◽  
Robert A. Schwartz ◽  
Bruce W. Weber
Keyword(s):  
Market Structure ◽  
Price Discovery ◽  
Investment Decision ◽  
Equity Markets ◽  
Regulatory Environment ◽  
Trading Costs ◽  
Price Determination ◽  
Liquidity Trading ◽  
Portfolio Decision ◽  
Structure Regulation

AbstractTrading is the implementation of an investment decision. After a portfolio decision has been made by a portfolio manager, it must be implemented, and especially for handling large orders and navigating stressful markets, specific skills and responsibilities are needed that require the expertise of a professional trader. However, the efficiency with which orders are handled and turned into trades depends, not just on traders’ abilities, but also on a market’s liquidity, on the design of the marketplace where shares are traded, and on the regulatory environment. In this chapter, we cover trading costs, liquidity, volatility, price discovery, market structure, and market structure regulation.

scholarly journals Competition and Mobile Network Operator’s Investment Relationship: Empirical Evidence for Developing Countries

2019 ◽  
Vol 7 (4) ◽  
pp. 17-32
Author(s):  
Kasmad Ariansyah ◽  
Chaikal Nuryakin
Keyword(s):  
Market Structure ◽  
Mobile Network ◽  
Competitive Market ◽  
Empirical Estimation ◽  
Competition Intensity ◽  
Telecommunication Sector ◽  
Telecommunication Companies ◽  
Short Run ◽  
Current Context ◽  
Telecommunications Market

Policymakers have reformed telecommunications market structure since several decades ago, from a monopoly to a more competitive market. They believed that the competitive market structure would be able to overcome the limitations of investment required to develop the industry and to provide equitable access. However, the advance of digital age has changed the competition landscape in telecommunication sector considerably. Telecommunication companies are also required to provide higher investment to further improve their networks quality as well as coverage. This study aims to reinvestigate effect of competition on investment under the current context. The empirical estimation results show the intensity of competition has a significant short-run impact on the investment behaviour of cellular telecommunications companies. The effect is not linear, but in the form of an inverted U curve. This points out the existence of a competition intensity that maximizes mobile network operator (MNO)'s investment. We find that the intensity is in the level of 0.61 or when a company has an EBITDA margin of 39%. This finding implies a different behaviour of MNOs having EBITDA margins of less and more than 39% in respond to the change in competition intensity. MNOs in the first groups will react to the increase of competition intensity by decreasing their investment. Meanwhile, the others will respond to the rise in competition intensity by increasing their investment. The empirical results also show the accumulative impact of the competition intensity on investment is 12,5 times of the short-run

Contract institutions in the Russian economy: The sphere of state, municipal, and regulated procurement

2017 ◽  
pp. 93-110 ◽  
Author(s):  
O. Anchishkina
Keyword(s):  
Economic Growth ◽  
Theoretical Model ◽  
Market Structure ◽  
Market Equilibrium ◽  
Statistical Evidence ◽  
Market Model ◽  
Market Behavior ◽  
Database Analysis ◽  
Russian Economy ◽  
Contracting Model

The article synthesizes information on database analysis of state, municipal, and regulated procurement through which Russian contract institutions and the market model are investigated. The inherent uncertainty of quantity indicators on contracting activities and process is identified and explained. The article provides statistical evidence for heterogeneous market structure in state and municipal procurement, and big player’s dominance. A theoretical model for market behavior, noncooperative competition and collusion is proposed, through which the major trends are explained. The intrinsic flaws and failure of the current contracting model are revealed and described. This ineffectiveness is regarded to be not a limitation, but a challenge to be met. If responded to, drivers for economic growth and market equilibrium will be switched on.

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