Dynamic pricing for new and remanufactured products in a closed-loop supply chain

2013 ◽  
Vol 146 (1) ◽  
pp. 153-160 ◽  
Author(s):  
Jen-Ming Chen ◽  
Chia-I Chang
2021 ◽  
Author(s):  
Yuhao Zhang ◽  
Tao Zhang

Abstract In this paper, we study a dual-channel closed-loop supply chain(CLSC), where the manufacturer wholesales the new product through the traditional retail channel and distributes the remanufactured product via a direct channel established by himself. We focus on developing two dynamic Stackelberg game models under the assumption of the retailer is an adaptive agent and the manufacturer is a bounded rational player with non-delay and delay decisions. The existence and locally asymptotic stability of Nash equilibrium is investigated, and also the complex dynamics of each model is illustrated including period-doubling bifurcation, Neimark-Sacker bifurcation, strange attractor and chaotic phenomena. Numerical simulations are conducted to examine the impacts of key parameters on the complex behaviors of the long-run dynamic Stackelberg game and the performance of chain members under various scenarios. The results reveal that the excessively high value of the price adjustment speed of the manufacturer, the consumer discount perception for the remanufactured product as well as the consumer preference degree to the direct channel have adestabilization effect on the Nash equilibrium. Besides, the delay decision adopted by manufacturer no matter in the traditional or direct channel does not always necessarily make the system more stable, but the appropriately delay weights can expand the stability domain of the system. Moreover, the manufacturer would suffer a significant profit loss while the retailer can capture more profits when the dual-channel CLSC system falls into periodic cycles and chaos motions. At last, the variable feedback control method is utilized to eliminate the delayed system chaos.


2020 ◽  
Vol 30 (04) ◽  
pp. 2050052
Author(s):  
Junhai Ma ◽  
Fang Zhang ◽  
Hui Jiang

The importance of closed-loop supply chains has been widely recognized both in academic communities and in industrial sectors. This paper starts from the traditional supply chains and the new self-supply chain of GREE to extract realistic problems, to mainly investigating two noncooperative dynamic pricing policies in a dual-channel closed-loop supply chain consisting of a manufacturer and a retailer. Then, it studies the influence of different channel power structures on dynamic decisions and their complexities. Furthermore, the reference price affects the purchase decisions of consumers. Therefore, the model takes into account the influence of reference price of the market demands. Results show that the manufacturer who opens up a direct channel can make a huge profit in the game. In the dynamic game evolution process, the game leader is in a more advantageous position when the system is in a stable region; once entering into the bifurcating region or chaotic region, the game follower needs to adjust his price to follow the leader’s decision in order to make a profit. In addition, the system’s stable region becomes smaller when the market demand becomes more sensitive to the difference between the reference price and the actual price. In this model, if the manufacturer acts as a leader, he is in a more advantageous position when the market is sensitive to channel competition in the stable stage while the result is opposite in the unstable stage.


2018 ◽  
Vol 10 (2) ◽  
pp. 157 ◽  
Author(s):  
Zhichao Zhang ◽  
Qing Zhang ◽  
Zhi Liu ◽  
Xiaoxue Zheng

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