Abstract
In this paper, we study a dual-channel closed-loop supply chain(CLSC), where the manufacturer wholesales the new product through the traditional retail channel and distributes the remanufactured product via a direct channel established by himself. We focus on developing two dynamic Stackelberg game models under the assumption of the retailer is an adaptive agent and the manufacturer is a bounded rational player with non-delay and delay decisions. The existence and locally asymptotic stability of Nash equilibrium is investigated, and also the complex dynamics of each model is illustrated including period-doubling bifurcation, Neimark-Sacker bifurcation, strange attractor and chaotic phenomena. Numerical simulations are conducted to examine the impacts of key parameters on the complex behaviors of the long-run dynamic Stackelberg game and the performance of chain members under various scenarios. The results reveal that the excessively high value of the price adjustment speed of the manufacturer, the consumer discount perception for the remanufactured product as well as the consumer preference degree to the direct channel have adestabilization effect on the Nash equilibrium. Besides, the delay decision adopted by manufacturer no matter in the traditional or direct channel does not always necessarily make the system more stable, but the appropriately delay weights can expand the stability domain of the system. Moreover, the manufacturer would suffer a significant profit loss while the retailer can capture more profits when the dual-channel CLSC system falls into periodic cycles and chaos motions. At last, the variable feedback control method is utilized to eliminate the delayed system chaos.
Dynamic Pricing Model for the Operation of Closed-Loop Supply Chain System
