Loan growth, ownership, and regulation in the European Banking Sector: Old versus new banking landscape

Author(s):  
Maria-Eleni K. Agoraki ◽  
Georgios P. Kouretas
2015 ◽  
Vol 5 (2) ◽  
pp. 52-70 ◽  
Author(s):  
Themistokles Lazarides ◽  
Evaggelos Drimpetas ◽  
George Kyriazopoulosr

The inactivity of banks may be the result of a number of events, such as merger & acquisition (M&A), liquidation, default-bankruptcy, etc. All these phenomena of inactivity contribute to the same result, the reform of the European banking sector and they may have the same causes. The paper will address the issue of inactivity and will try to detect its causes using econometric models. Six groups of indicators are examined: performance, size, ownership, corporate governance, capital adequacy or capital structure and loan growth. Three econometric methods (Probit, Logit, OLS) have been used to create a system that predicts inactivity. The results of the econometric models show that from the six groups of indicators, four have been found to be statistically important (performance, size, ownership, corporate governance). Two have a negative impact (ownership, corporate governance) on the probability of inactivity and two positive (performance, size). The paper’s value and innovation is that it has given a systemic approach to find indicators of inactivity and it has excluded two groups of indicators as non-statistically important (capital adequacy or capital structure and growth).


2017 ◽  
Author(s):  
Konstantinos Gkillas ◽  
Christoforos Konstantatos ◽  
François Longin ◽  
Athanasios Tsagkanos

Author(s):  
Viral V. Acharya ◽  
Tim Eisert ◽  
Christian Eufinger ◽  
Christian Hirsch

This chapter compares the recapitalizations of the Japanese banking sector in the 1990s with those in the ongoing European debt crisis. The analysis points to four main policy implications. First, recapitalizing banks by insuring or purchasing troubled assets alone is not likely to solve the problem of banks’ weak capitalization, as this measure is not able to adjust the extent of the recapitalization to the banks’ specific needs. Second, the amount of the recapitalization should be based on actual capital shortages and not risk-weighted assets to avoid banks decreasing their loan supply. Third, banks should face restrictions regarding the amount of dividends they are allowed to pay out. Finally, banks must be induced to clean up their balance sheets and reduce the amount of bad (non-performing) loans to rebuild confidence in the European banking system.


2020 ◽  
Author(s):  
Viral V. Acharya ◽  
Lea Borchert ◽  
Maximilian Jager ◽  
Sascha Steffen

2017 ◽  
Vol 10 (10) ◽  
pp. 169 ◽  
Author(s):  
Elisabetta D‘Apolito ◽  
Antonia P. Iannuzzi

The new regulations of banking compensation following the sub-prime crisis require that incentive plans must be linked not only to performance parameters, but also to non-financial or qualitative metrics related to social value produced by banks. This paper aims to analyze this issue by developing a qualitative rating (ESG-remuneration performance rating) to be used not only to investigate the spread and the diversification of such qualitative indicators, but also to analyze the best practices by banks. At a methodological level, the content analysis approach is adopted. The sample covers all of the “European globally systemically important institutions” (G-SIIs), while the investigation period regards the three-years 2014-2016. The main results are encouraging as they show a good diffusion of qualitative metrics by bank incentive plans; however, the intensive use, synthesized by the “ESG-remuneration performance rating”, is still inadequate. Moreover, the analysis reveal other criticalities linked to the implementation of the balance scorecard and the use of measurement tools in order to quantify the qualitative metrics correctly. (Note 1).


Author(s):  
Silvia Gabrieli ◽  
Dilyara Salakhova ◽  
Guillaume Vuillemey

2017 ◽  
Vol 10 (10) ◽  
pp. 45 ◽  
Author(s):  
Giuseppe Di Martino ◽  
Grazia Dicuonzo ◽  
Graziana Galeone ◽  
Vittorio Dell'Atti

In the recent past, the financial crisis has shown important lacks in the EU regulation relating to the banking sector, making the introduction of a unified regulatory framework necessary. Since June 2009 the European Council has recommended a “Single Rulebook”, that is a unique and harmonizing discipline applicable to all financial institutions in the Single Market, become effective on January 2014. This prudential discipline requires much more minimum capital, liquidity and information transparency and it defines format and minimum standards of contents.The aim of this research is to investigate the relation between the new mandatory disclosure and earnings management policies in banking sector realized through Loan Loss Provisions (LLP), the component of income statement mainly subject to manipulations, especially in form of earnings smoothing. Because the new integrated regulatory framework requires a more transparent disclosure, we expected that accruals manipulation (basically LLP) could be discouraged. The empirical analysis is based on a sample of 116 listed European banks over the period prior (2011-2012-2013) and after (2014-2015-2016) the effective date of the Single Rulebook. The evidence confirm our hypothesis suggesting that this banking reform discourages earnings manipulation and improves earnings quality, making financial reporting more useful for investors. The results are important to the regulatory institutions (such as European Union and European Central Bank) supporting more stringent discipline introduced by Basel III.


2018 ◽  
Vol 32 (8) ◽  
pp. 2921-2954 ◽  
Author(s):  
Peter Hoffmann ◽  
Sam Langfield ◽  
Federico Pierobon ◽  
Guillaume Vuillemey

Abstract We study the allocation of interest rate risk within the European banking sector using novel data. Banks’ exposure to interest rate risk is small on aggregate, but heterogeneous in the cross-section. Contrary to conventional wisdom, net worth is increasing in interest rates for approximately half of the institutions in our sample. Cross-sectional variation in banks’ exposures is driven by cross-country differences in loan-rate fixation conventions for mortgages. Banks use derivatives to partially hedge on-balance-sheet exposures. Residual exposures imply that changes in interest rates have redistributive effects within the banking sector. Received October 31, 2017; editorial decision August 30, 2018 by Editor Philip Strahan. Authors have furnished an Internet Appendix, which is available on the Oxford University Press Web site next to the link to the final published paper online.


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