Gestión organizacional y productividad laboral en las unidades educativas en el Sur De Manabí De Ecuador

Con el objetivo de conocer la gestión organizacional y la dinámica de productividad laboral del talento humano para el funcionamiento y evolución de las instituciones educativas del Distrito 13D03 de la zona 4 en Jipijapa – Manabí, se realizó un estudio para identificar si se aplican o no los procesos administrativos, si la gestión realizada en la organización es correcta, y con ello se logra la productividad laboral del talento humano. La metodología utilizada en la investigación fue cualitativa - cuantitativa, las técnicas aplicadas fueron: encuestas al personal docente, administrativo y de servicio, y la entrevista, a los directivos de los planteles educativos. El número de la muestra correspondió a 536 personas. En los resultados obtenidos, se determinó que no se está llevando de forma eficiente la gestión organizacional, y con ello el talento humano se siente insatisfecho por la no aplicación de los reglamentos en la aplicación de planes de incentivos económicos o no económicos, controles inadecuados de horarios de trabajo, sueldos y salarios indignos, carencia de capacitaciones en áreas administrativas, así como en desarrollo personal, incorrecta comunicación, deficiente colaboración de equipos de trabajo, y demás deberes y derechos del trabajador. Por lo que se concluye que la inexistencia de un modelo de gestión organizacional ajustado a las necesidades del entorno, influye de manera directa en la productividad de quienes laboran en las unidades educativas. With the objective of knowing the organizational management and the dynamics of labor productivity of human talent for the operation and evolution of the educational institutions of District 13D03 of zone 4 in Jipijapa - Manabí, a study was carried out to identify whether or not the administrative processes, if the management carried out in the organization is correct, and with this the labor productivity of human talent is achieved. The methodology used in the research was qualitative - quantitative, the techniques applied were: surveys of the teaching, administrative and service personnel, and the interview with the directors of the educational establishments. The number of the sample corresponded to 536 people. In the results obtained, it was determined that the organizational management is not being carried out efficiently, and with this human talent feels dissatisfied by the non-application of the regulations in the application of economic or non-economic incentive plans, inadequate controls of unworthy working hours, wages and salaries, lack of training in administrative areas, as well as in personal development, incorrect communication, poor collaboration of work teams, and other duties and rights of the worker. Therefore, it is concluded that the lack of an organizational management model adjusted to the needs of the environment directly influences the productivity of those who work in educational units.

Beyond Reward Expectancy: How Do Periodic Incentive Payments Influence the Temporal Dynamics of Performance?

Prior theory suggests that incentive plans, such as piece-rate or commission plans, motivate good performance because employees anticipate that current performance will generate matching future incentive payments. In this article, we move beyond reward expectancy to argue that performance can also derive from employees’ reactive responses to received incentive payments. We propose a salience-based theory casting incentive payments as recurring temporal markers that periodically increase the salience of the incentive plan, to which employees respond by temporarily increasing incentivized and unincentivized performance. We introduce multivariate time-series methods to test our hypotheses in longitudinal data spanning 169 weeks (1,183 days), drawn from an online firm using an incentive plan for its customer-support employees. While we find no evidence that incentive payments affect the dynamics of incentivized performance, they do temporarily boost several unincentivized behaviors and outcomes. Combined with fieldwork, these findings support our proposed mechanism of “salience-induced reciprocity”—that is, the temporary reciprocity in response to a periodic increase in the salience of the incentive plan. This article contributes to a more complete understanding of performance and effort dynamics in incentive plans, offers new inroads into studying temporality in the functioning of human resources practices, and provides other future research avenues.

El concepto de salario emocional

This paper aims to list the different variables that have been written about Emotional Salary (ES) and establish a definition of the concept itself, through a bibliographic search between 2014 and 2019, in different scientific databases, using as searching words: salary, emotional compensation, emotional salary, work motivation and emotions at work; several meanings that refer to the term ES were identified, proposing our definition for the concept Emotional Salary, as the outward and within elements of work that generates positive emotions. Concluding that the ES, contributes to the generation of favorable and healthy organizational environments. Keywords: salaries and fringe benefits, employee incentive plans, concept formation.

Tailoring the Weights on Objective versus Subjective Performance Measures between Top Management and Middle Managers: Evidence from Performance-Based Equity Incentive Plans

ABSTRACT This study examines the determinants of performance measurement tailoring between top management and middle managers in compensation contracts. Theoretically, while tailoring potentially enhances the informativeness of performance measures for top management and middle managers respectively, it may reduce the incentives for the two parties to coordinate with each other. We expect a firm's decision to tailor performance measurement between top management and middle managers to be driven by this cost-benefit trade-off. Using hand-collected data from performance-based equity incentive plans from Chinese public firms, we find evidence consistent with the predictions derived from our theoretical framework. Specifically, we find that the likelihood that a firm tailors the weights on objective versus subjective performance measures between top and middle managers increases with competition intensity, non-price competition, environmental uncertainty, and CEO power, and decreases with organizational stability and growth opportunity. Furthermore, we find that suboptimal tailoring decisions are associated with higher management turnover.

Two essays on new B2B sales incentive mechanisms for enhancing selling effectiveness and coordinating inside and outside sales forces

Essay 1: Motivating Salespeople to Enhance Selling Effectiveness: The Role and Optimal Design of Activity-Based Incentive Plans This paper provides a rationale and model for the use and optimal design of salesplus activity-based incentive plans that are quite common in sales management practice. So far, there is no theoretical research providing guidance on why and how to structure such mechanisms. To meet this need, I argue that the role of appropriate activity-based sales force incentives is to increase selling effectiveness just like the usual sales commissions are utilized for motivating higher selling effort. I conceptualize that enhanced selling effectiveness stems from greater thinking efforts in the preparation for as well as execution of customer sales calls, and appropriately selected activities induce such thinking efforts. By relaxing the assumption of fixed selling effectiveness that is present in all agency-theoretic sales force incentive models to date, and allowing for adaptable selling effectiveness and sales that are a function of both selling and thinking efforts, I derive and compare optimal sales plus activity-based incentive plans with only sales-based incentives. I establish the conditions under which the former multidimensional plans produce outcomes for both the firm and the salesperson that are superior, as well as provide guidance for their operational design in practice. Essay 2: Compensation Mechanism for Coordinating Inside and Outside Sales Forces To ensure cooperation between inside and outside salespeople of business-to-business (B2B) sales organizations I propose and analytically demonstrate the benefits of a new joint compensation system. This proposed new compensation system is designed to facilitate the exchange of well-qualified leads between inside and outside salespeople. The motivation for designing this new system is the Internet-induced fundamental changes in B2B buyers purchasing behavior from a reactive or sellerdriven to a proactive or buyer-driven approach. These trends have led to inside sales forces rising in importance and value relative to outside sales forces in B2B sales. However, they pose problems to B2B selling firms: 1) dissonance between inside and outside salespeople; 2) loss of potential customers as each sales group pursues those leads of most relevance to the group; and 3) increasing costs when each group passes on poorly qualified leads to the other group. To mitigate these problems, my proposed compensation mechanism ties each sales groups incentives to achievement against self-selected targets for leads to be passed on to the other group. In this research, I describe and investigate the impacts of properties of this compensation plan and also compare its impact on salespeoples utilities and earnings, and firms profits, with those of two other incentive mechanisms (i) A system that rewards salespeople for their own performance; and (ii) A system under which salespeople are partly rewarded for corporate performance but receive no extra incentive for exchanging leads. My simulation results show that the target-value compensation system is optimal for the firm and salespeople. More specifically, the target-value compensation system ensures that (1) salespeople of one group will endeavor to deliver well-qualified leads to the other side and (2) firms do not need to observe sales forces actions.

Performance-based equity incentives, vesting restrictions, and corporate innovation

Purpose Based on the institutional background of mandatory requirement of performance-based executive equity incentives, this paper aims to investigate the impacts of executive equity incentives, vesting periods and vesting performance conditions on corporate innovation. Design/methodology/approach The empirical analysis is based on the detailed data of equity incentives in China’s listed companies from 2006 to 2014, the Tobit method is implemented to estimate the regression coefficients, and the instrumental variable (IV) approach, Heckman two stage regression, propensity score matching and difference-in-difference models are adopted to solve the problem of endogeneity in several robust tests. Findings This paper documents that equity incentives and vesting periods are significantly and positively related to corporate innovation measured by R&D investment and patent applications, yet requirements on vesting performance impede corporate innovative activities. Specifically, compared with non-equity incentive companies, the R&D investment and the number of patent applications of equity incentive companies are 40 and 46.2 per cent higher, respectively. A one year increase in equity incentive duration can correspondingly increase the R&D investment by 15 per cent and the patent applications by 18.3 per cent. However, a one standard deviation increase in industry-adjusted ROE target reduces corporate R&D investment by 5 per cent and the patent applications by 8.39 per cent. The main empirical findings still hold after several robust tests. Research limitations/implications This paper confirms that the impact of performance-based compensation system on corporate innovation depends on its structure. Specifically, the empirical findings suggest that equity incentive plans being correctly designed can enhance corporate innovative activities, but myopic managers will damage the corporate innovation. Originality/value This paper investigates the influence of equity incentive structure on equity incentive effect based on the institutional background of mandatory requirement of performance-based executive equity incentives. It provides an opportunity to understand the mystery of equity incentives, which helps to enrich the structure of equity incentive theoretically. The empirical evidence confirms the importance of tolerating short-term failure and extending the horizon of managerial decision-making on promoting innovation. Overall, the research indicates that only well-designed equity incentive plans can promote innovation, which contributes to regulators and practitioners to form a rational understanding of the premise of equity incentives in promoting innovation and provides a reference for their decision-making.