CEO inside debt, market structure and payout policy

2021 ◽  
Vol 76 ◽  
pp. 101755
Author(s):  
Shahbaz Sheikh
Keyword(s):  
Market Structure ◽  
Payout Policy ◽  
Inside Debt ◽  
Debt Market

Corporate Payout Policy and CEO‘s Inside Debt Holdings

2015 ◽  
Vol 23 (1) ◽  
pp. 99-123
Author(s):  
Yura Kim ◽  
Jeongsun Yun ◽  
Hyun Woo Choi ◽  
Gyuyoung Hwang
Keyword(s):  
Default Risk ◽  
Payout Policy ◽  
Managerial Compensation ◽  
Defined Benefit ◽  
Firm Risk ◽  
Dividend Payout ◽  
Inside Debt ◽  
Equity Compensation ◽  
Compensation Ratio ◽  
Retirement Funds

Literature documents that executives' inside debt holdings (debt-based managerial compensation) such as defined-benefit pensions and retirement funds are often unfunded and unsecured and have long maturities, and thus provide managerial incentives to pursue strategies to avoid the overall firm risk. This study investigates the effect of managerial inside debt compensation relative to equity-based compensation on a firm's dividend payout policy. We find that a inside debt holdings are positively associated with various measures of a firm's dividend payout policy. Additionally, we find empirical evidence in firms with inside debt holdings that the inverse relationship between high default risk measured by KZ index and dividend payout weakens as the portion of inside debt relative to equity-based compensation rises. This finding indicates that the needs for the firm to restrain dividend payouts to equity holders is reduced as the executive's debt-to-equity compensation ratio becomes larger. Overall, the results suggests the mitigating effect of executives' inside debt holdings on the conflicts between bondholders and shareholders can lead to generous payout policy.

CEO inside debt, market competition and corporate risk taking

2019 ◽  
Vol 15 (4) ◽  
pp. 636-657 ◽  
Author(s):  
Shahbaz Sheikh
Keyword(s):  
Risk Taking ◽  
Market Competition ◽  
Ordinary Least Squares ◽  
Negative Association ◽  
Firm Risk ◽  
Content Type ◽  
Inside Debt ◽  
Debt Market ◽  
Practical Tool ◽  
Corporate Risk

Purpose The purpose of this paper is to investigate the effect of market competition on the relation between CEO inside debt and corporate risk-taking. Design/methodology/approach Ordinary least squares regressions are used to estimate the relation between CEO inside debt and firm risk. Additionally, instrumental variable (IV-GMM) regressions are used to check the robustness of the results. Findings The results of this paper indicate that CEO inside debt is negatively associated with the measures of future risk. However, this negative association is influenced by market competition. Specifically, CEO inside debt results in lower levels of firm risk when market competition is high. When market competition is low, inside debt has no effect on firm risk. Additional results show that CEOs with large inside debt tend to decrease R&D investments and financial leverage and increase firm cash holdings and working capital only when market competition is high. Overall, these results suggest that market competition significantly influences the effect of CEO inside debt on corporate risk-taking by changing the strength of incentives from inside debt. Practical implications CEO inside debt could be used to provide incentives to CEOs to manage corporate risk-taking. Social implications The empirical results in this paper provide a practical tool to the boards of corporations to manage corporate risk-taking. The results suggest that boards can reduce excessive risk-taking by increasing the level of debt type compensation incentives. However, this strategy is effective only when market competition is high because in such markets inside debt provides the strongest incentives to reduce corporate risk. When competition is low, incentives from inside debt are ineffective in managing corporate risk-taking. Originality/value This is the first study that shows that the negative association between CEO inside debt and corporate risk-taking critically depends on the intensity of market competition.

Financial Systems and economic Development in the Russian Regions: A Comparative Analysis

2015 ◽  
pp. 94-108 ◽  
Author(s):  
K. Krinichansky
Keyword(s):  
Economic Development ◽  
Comparative Analysis ◽  
Financial Development ◽  
Public Debt ◽  
Fixed Capital ◽  
Russian Regions ◽  
Growth Mechanisms ◽  
Financial Systems ◽  
Debt Market ◽  
Regions Of Russia

The paper identifies and assesses the closeness of the connection between incremental indicators of the financial development in the regions of Russia with the incremental regional GDP and the investment in fixed capital. It is shown that the positioning of the region as an independent participant of public debt market matters: the regional GDP and investment in fixed capital grow more rapidly in the regions which are regularly borrowing on the sub-federal bonds market. The paper also demonstrates that the poorly developed financial system in some regions have caused the imperfection of the growth mechanisms since the economy is not able to use the financial system’s functions.

Contract institutions in the Russian economy: The sphere of state, municipal, and regulated procurement

2017 ◽  
pp. 93-110 ◽  
Author(s):  
O. Anchishkina
Keyword(s):  
Economic Growth ◽  
Theoretical Model ◽  
Market Structure ◽  
Market Equilibrium ◽  
Statistical Evidence ◽  
Market Model ◽  
Market Behavior ◽  
Database Analysis ◽  
Russian Economy ◽  
Contracting Model

The article synthesizes information on database analysis of state, municipal, and regulated procurement through which Russian contract institutions and the market model are investigated. The inherent uncertainty of quantity indicators on contracting activities and process is identified and explained. The article provides statistical evidence for heterogeneous market structure in state and municipal procurement, and big player’s dominance. A theoretical model for market behavior, noncooperative competition and collusion is proposed, through which the major trends are explained. The intrinsic flaws and failure of the current contracting model are revealed and described. This ineffectiveness is regarded to be not a limitation, but a challenge to be met. If responded to, drivers for economic growth and market equilibrium will be switched on.

The Risks of Russia's Debt Policy against the Background of the Global Debt Crisis

2012 ◽  
pp. 80-97
Author(s):  
B. Kheifets
Keyword(s):  
Debt Crisis ◽  
Strong Dependence ◽  
Domestic Debt ◽  
Debt Market ◽  
State Paternalism ◽  
High Level ◽  
External Borrowing ◽  
Pension Liabilities ◽  
Policy Problems ◽  
Debt Policy

The paper discusses the debt component of the current global crisis, which becomes stronger in 2011—2012. The Russian economy is analyzed in terms of its debt stability: a thorough analysis shows that it is not quite adequate. This paper presents the main problems that could be exacerbated by the global debt crisis (strong dependence of the budget on the volatility of oil prices, deterioration of conditions for external borrowing and overheat of the domestic debt market, too high public pension liabilities, substantial corporate debt and high level of state paternalism in regard to big business). Some measures to address Russian debt policy problems are proposed.

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