scholarly journals Investor protection and the value effects of bank merger announcements in Europe and the US

2008 ◽  
Vol 32 (7) ◽  
pp. 1333-1348 ◽  
Author(s):  
Jens Hagendorff ◽  
Michael Collins ◽  
Kevin Keasey
Keyword(s):  
Investor Protection ◽  
Bank Merger ◽  
The Us ◽  
Merger Announcements

Winding-Up and Liquidation

2016 ◽  
Author(s):  
Michael Schillig
Keyword(s):  
Financial Institutions ◽  
Investor Protection ◽  
Competent Authority ◽  
The Us

Liquidation procedures may be relevant for unprofitable or defunct subsidiaries, even though other parts of a financial group may be successfully restructured. For certain types of financial companies, liquidation may be the only available process. The chapter provides an overview of the liquidation proceedings available for financial institutions in England, Germany and the US. It focuses on the English compulsory winding-up procedure and bank insolvency, the German general insolvency procedure with an enhanced role for BaFin as the competent authority, and the liquidation of broker-dealers in the US through a Chapter 7 stockbroker liquidation and under the Securities Investor Protection Act of 1970 (SIPA liquidation).

scholarly journals Bank Acquisition Announcements And Intra-Industry Effects

2011 ◽  
Vol 5 (7) ◽  
Author(s):  
Yvette M. Bendeck ◽  
Edward R. Waller
Keyword(s):  
Geographical Area ◽  
Font Size ◽  
Industry Effects ◽  
Bank Merger ◽  
Normal Text ◽  
Bank Consolidation ◽  
Acquisition Announcements ◽  
Merger Announcements ◽  
Economic Efficiencies

<p class="MsoBodyTextIndent2" style="text-align: justify; line-height: normal; text-indent: 0in; margin: 0in 34.2pt 0pt 0.5in;"><span style="font-size: 10pt; mso-bidi-font-style: italic;"><span style="font-family: Times New Roman;">In this paper we attempt to assess whether gains in wealth associated with bank consolidation are the result of economic efficiencies by analyzing effects of bank merger announcements on the values of bidders, targets, and rival banks in the target&rsquo;s geographical area.<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;">&nbsp; </span>We find target banks earn positive returns, while bidding banks sustain negative returns at acquisition announcement. These findings are consistent with previously reported results in the bank consolidation literature.<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;">&nbsp; </span>We also find rival banks earn positive returns that are enhanced when the target bank is in distress. We suggest the results are consistent with the view that investors interpret acquisition announcements as positive, geographically specific signals that may, in turn, reflect event-specific or bank-specific characteristics rather than expectations of increased efficiencies.</span></span></p>

Madoff’s dirty money

2019 ◽  
Vol 22 (2) ◽  
pp. 289-299
Author(s):  
Linus Wilson
Keyword(s):  
Money Laundering ◽  
Stock Price ◽  
Design Methodology ◽  
Investor Protection ◽  
Content Type ◽  
Doing Business ◽  
The Us ◽  
Ponzi Scheme ◽  
Bank Accounts

Purpose The purpose of this study is to estimate the profits to JPMorgan Chase from the Madoff Ponzi scheme’s checking account deposits at the bank based on the data in Harbeck (2011). The Madoff Ponzi scheme was sitting on a cash hoard in excess of a US$1bn by the 1990s. Most of that money came into and stayed in the 703 account at JPMorgan Chase or it was transferred to one of the 11 other bank accounts. The author uses previously unanalyzed data from the Security Investor Protection Corporation (SIPC) to estimate JPMorgan Chase’s earnings from the accounts. Design/methodology/approach The author estimates the checking account balances of the Madoff Ponzi scheme with JPMorgan Chase and its ancestor corporation, Chemical Bank. He estimates the earnings from those large checking accounts and reinvests them in the stock price from 1986 to 2011. He uses data on the Madoff checking accounts released by Harbeck (2011) to estimate that JPMorgan Chase earned over US$900m from those large and suspicious checking deposits. Findings The US$907m in estimated profits from the Madoff Ponzi scheme bank accounts are much smaller than the US$2.6bn fine that JPMorgan Chase paid in 2014 to limit its liability for its dealings with Bernard L. Madoff. Any failure of anti-money laundering compliance in this case was very costly for the bank. Originality/value This is only study to analyze the Harbeck (2011) data to estimate JPMorgan Chase’s profits from the Madoff Ponzi scheme’s checking deposits. As JPMorgan Chase paid a US$2.6bn fine in this matter, it is relevant to look at how big the fine was relative to the profits the corporation may have earned from doing business with Bernie Madoff.

The rise of crowd equity funding: where to now?

2017 ◽  
Vol 13 (3) ◽  
pp. 253-276 ◽  
Author(s):  
Marina Nehme
Keyword(s):  
New Zealand ◽  
Large Range ◽  
Small And Medium Enterprises ◽  
Investor Protection ◽  
Online Portal ◽  
Equity Funding ◽  
The Us ◽  
The World ◽  
The Right ◽  
Medium Enterprises

AbstractCrowd equity funding is a type of crowdfunding that allows companies to obtain seed or other capital through small equity investments from a large range of investors via an online portal. This form of finance has been viewed as a way to remedy the shortfall of capital for small and medium enterprises. As a result, a number of countries such as the US, Italy and New Zealand have promoted this form of finance. Accordingly, the paper first considers the reasons behind the rise of crowd equity funding on government agendas around the world. It then focuses on the Australian setting, by highlighting the different proposals that have been put forward to introduce legislation friendlier to crowd equity funding. The aim is to view the extent to which the proposed models provide the right balance between investor protection and entrepreneurship.

Crowdfunding and the Small Offering Exemption in European and US Prospectus Regulation: Striking a Balance Between Investor Protection and Access to Capital?

2017 ◽  
Vol 14 (1) ◽  
Author(s):  
Elif Härkönen
Keyword(s):  
Initial Public Offering ◽  
Investor Protection ◽  
The United States ◽  
The European Union ◽  
The Public ◽  
The Us ◽  
Public Offering ◽  
Business Financing ◽  
The Comparative Study ◽  
The Eu

Small and medium sized enterprises (SMEs) face proportionally higher costs than larger corporations when offering their shares to the public. An alternative to bank financing or an initial public offering is to raise small amounts of capital from the crowd, i.e. crowdfunding. During the past year, both the European Union (EU) and the United States (US) have either proposed or implemented changes to the regulation of prospectuses. The aim in both jurisdictions is to promote innovative forms of business financing. Changes in prospectus regulation should however not be at the expense of investor protection regulation. Non-qualified investors are generally seen as less sophisticated and in need of more comprehensive investor protection regulation than institutional and other qualified investors. In this article, the proposed changes to the EU prospectus regulation are examined in light of the newly adopted Regulation A and Regulation Crowdfunding in the US, with a focus on how the proposed changes will affect retail investors as well as SMEs and their ability to raise capital through crowdfunding. A conclusion drawn from the comparative study is that several safeguards intended to protect non-qualified investors in crowdfunding offers are present in the US but not in the EU. It is argued in this article that the changes proposed in the EU, making it easier for SMEs to raise capital on the capital markets, should be accompanied by more robust investor protection regulation.

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