Pricing and effort decisions in a closed-loop supply chain under different channel power structures

2016 ◽  
Vol 112 ◽  
pp. 2043-2057 ◽  
Author(s):  
Juhong Gao ◽  
Hongshuai Han ◽  
Liting Hou ◽  
Haiyan Wang
2020 ◽  
Vol 30 (04) ◽  
pp. 2050052
Author(s):  
Junhai Ma ◽  
Fang Zhang ◽  
Hui Jiang

The importance of closed-loop supply chains has been widely recognized both in academic communities and in industrial sectors. This paper starts from the traditional supply chains and the new self-supply chain of GREE to extract realistic problems, to mainly investigating two noncooperative dynamic pricing policies in a dual-channel closed-loop supply chain consisting of a manufacturer and a retailer. Then, it studies the influence of different channel power structures on dynamic decisions and their complexities. Furthermore, the reference price affects the purchase decisions of consumers. Therefore, the model takes into account the influence of reference price of the market demands. Results show that the manufacturer who opens up a direct channel can make a huge profit in the game. In the dynamic game evolution process, the game leader is in a more advantageous position when the system is in a stable region; once entering into the bifurcating region or chaotic region, the game follower needs to adjust his price to follow the leader’s decision in order to make a profit. In addition, the system’s stable region becomes smaller when the market demand becomes more sensitive to the difference between the reference price and the actual price. In this model, if the manufacturer acts as a leader, he is in a more advantageous position when the market is sensitive to channel competition in the stable stage while the result is opposite in the unstable stage.


2019 ◽  
Vol 11 (22) ◽  
pp. 6413 ◽  
Author(s):  
Gong ◽  
Chen ◽  
Zhuang

The recycling and remanufacturing of e-waste is linked to a worldwide emphasis on the establishment and implementation of Extended Producer Responsibility system (ERP), which has become an important problem in the process of cycling economy. Meanwhile, with the development and expansion of large-scale retail enterprises, the power structure of supply chain channels is showing a tendency towards diversity as well. However, few studies on closed-loop supply chains (CLSC) have considered both recycling modes and channel power structures. We aim to explore the influence of different recycling modes and channel power structures on the optimal decisions and performance of a closed-loop supply chain (CLSC), considering three recycling channels including manufacturer recycling, retailer recycling and hybrid recycling of retailer and manufacturer and two dominant modes including manufacturer-led and retailer-led. We construct six closed-loop supply chain models under different combinations of three recycling channels and two dominant modes. We analyze the effect of different recycling channels on company decision-making under the same dominant mode, whether participating in recycling has an impact on company decision-making under different dominant modes, and the effect on supply chain members and supply chain system under different dominant modes and recycling channels. The results show that the hybrid recycling strategy is always optimal for both supply chain members; the sub-optimal recycling strategies are both recycled by the subordinate enterprise, and the worst recycling strategies are both recycled by the leading enterprise. Moreover, it is always the worst strategy for manufacturer to participate in a closed-loop supply chain dominated by retailer and recycled by retailer; participating in a closed-loop supply chain dominated by manufacturer and recycled by manufacturer is always the worst strategy for retailer. From a system point of view, system efficiency is the highest under hybrid recycling, and system efficiency is the lowest if leading company recycles separately.


2020 ◽  
Vol 257 ◽  
pp. 120281 ◽  
Author(s):  
Wenjie Liu ◽  
Dingzhi Qin ◽  
Ningning Shen ◽  
Jing Zhang ◽  
Mingzhou Jin ◽  
...  

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