Game analysis for the impact of carbon trading on low-carbon supply chain

2020 ◽  
Vol 276 ◽  
pp. 123220
Author(s):  
Xiqiang Xia ◽  
Chengyu Li ◽  
Qinghua Zhu
Keyword(s):  
Supply Chain ◽  
Carbon Trading ◽  
Low Carbon ◽  
Game Analysis ◽  
Carbon Supply ◽  
The Impact

scholarly journals Incentive Strategies for Low-Carbon Supply Chains with Asymmetric Information of Carbon Reduction Efficiency

2018 ◽  
Vol 15 (12) ◽  
pp. 2736 ◽  
Author(s):  
Qinpeng Wang ◽  
Longfei He
Keyword(s):  
Supply Chain ◽  
Private Information ◽  
High Efficiency ◽  
Low Carbon ◽  
Carbon Reduction ◽  
Carbon Supply ◽  
Reduction Efficiency ◽  
Information Rent ◽  
Low Efficiency ◽  
The Impact

Information concerning carbon reduction efficiency is of great significance to supply chain operations. Considering the impact of information asymmetry on the performance of low-carbon supply chain, we therefore analyze a chain system with a single product designer and a single manufacturer. The manufacturer owns information on carbon reduction efficiency, whereas the product designer only knows that the carbon reduction efficiency of the manufacturer is either high or low. To induce the manufacturer to reveal his true private information of carbon-reduction efficiency to the product designer, we devise the pooling and separating equilibrium models to compare the impacts of these two models on supply chain performance, respectively. We find that the high-efficiency manufacturer gets his first-best choice at the equilibrium decision in the separating model, and obtains the information rent in the pooling model. The information rent increases in the efficiency difference between the two emission-reduction types. Additionally, we examine how the probability of the high (or low)-efficiency manufacturer being chosen impacts on both the profits of chain members and carbon-reduction levels. The research provides a reference for companies about how to cooperate with partner who possess private information of carbon emissions.

scholarly journals The Impact of Retailers’ Low-Carbon Investment on the Supply Chain under Carbon Tax and Carbon Trading Policies

2020 ◽  
Vol 12 (9) ◽  
pp. 3597
Author(s):  
Fei Zou ◽  
Yanju Zhou ◽  
Caihua Yuan
Keyword(s):  
Supply Chain ◽  
Emission Reduction ◽  
Carbon Emission ◽  
Carbon Tax ◽  
Carbon Trading ◽  
Low Carbon ◽  
Emission Permits ◽  
Cost Coefficient ◽  
The Impact ◽  
Reduction Cost

In the current low-carbon economy, the government has adopted carbon taxes and carbon trading policies to control the carbon emissions of manufacturers. As consumers become increasingly aware of low-carbon, some retailers have also started investing in low-carbon to shape their public image and increase their competitiveness to attract more customers. In this paper, the Stackelberg game method is utilized to solve the model, and the graphs are used to analyze the benefits of retailers' low-carbon investment on the supply chain through numerical analysis. It is found that when the emission reduction cost coefficient of manufacturers is relatively low, manufacturers are willing to reduce carbon emissions. At this time, increasing carbon tax and the carbon emission permits price can effectively promote the emission reduction behavior of manufacturers, because it increases demand for products and the profit of manufacturers and retailers. However, when the emission reduction cost coefficient of the manufacturers is quite high, increasing carbon tax and carbon emission permits price cannot effectively promote the emission reduction behavior, because this situation of the emission reduction reduces the profit of manufacturers. The main contribution of this paper discovers that the green cost coefficient of retailers' low-carbon investment will adjust the impact of the carbon tax and the carbon trading price on the profits of retailers and manufacturers which proves that retailers’ low-carbon investment is beneficial to the supply chain. When the emission reduction cost coefficient is high and the green cost coefficient is low, increasing the carbon tax or carbon emission permits price can increase the profit of manufacturers and retailers. Finally, we design a supply chain coordination of comprehensive sharing contact for retailers and manufacturers. The result shows that this contract has economic and environmental benefits, and that it is beneficial for the environment and economy of sustainable development.

scholarly journals The Impact of Equity Financing on the Performance of Capital-Constrained Supply Chain under Consumers’ Low-Carbon Preference

2021 ◽  
Vol 18 (5) ◽  
pp. 2329
Author(s):  
Xiaoli Zhang ◽  
Guoyi Xiu ◽  
Fakhar Shahzad ◽  
Caiquan Duan
Keyword(s):  
Supply Chain ◽  
Carbon Emissions ◽  
Bank Loan ◽  
Low Carbon ◽  
Equity Financing ◽  
Industrial Enterprises ◽  
Carbon Supply ◽  
Financing Preference ◽  
Loan Financing ◽  
The Impact

The reduction in carbon emissions by industrial enterprises is an important means for promoting environmental protection and achieving sustainable development. To determine the impact of carbon emissions reduction on supply chain operation and financing decision-making, in this study we designed three financing strategies, i.e., bank loan financing, equity financing, and hybrid financing (a combination of bank loan financing and equity financing), for a manufacturer (leader) and a low-carbon supply chain composed of a capital-constrained retailer, constructed Stackelberg game models, solved the equilibrium results under each financing strategy using the reverse recursion method, and revealed the financing preference of the supply chain member companies through comparative analysis. The results showed that the increase in the consumers’ low-carbon preference and equity financing ratio have positive impacts on supply chain equilibrium, a result that is opposite that for the impact of the interest rate of bank loan financing; additionally, the abovementioned three factors jointly determine the profit of the manufacturer of the low-carbon supply chain, while the retailer’s profit is affected by the equity dividend ratio. Finally, we present the conditions for the financing preference of the manufacturer and the retailer. The findings of this study can provide references for low-carbon supply chain companies to make appropriate management decisions.

scholarly journals Corporate Governance and Low Carbon Supply Chains: Why Integrity Matters?

2020 ◽  
Vol 3 (2) ◽  
Author(s):  
Norma Mohter ◽  
Yudi Fernando
Keyword(s):  
Decision Making ◽  
Corporate Governance ◽  
Supply Chain ◽  
Firm Performance ◽  
Supply Chains ◽  
Low Carbon ◽  
Board Of Director ◽  
Carbon Supply ◽  
Social Expectation ◽  
The Impact

In this study, we aimed to understand the role of integrity in low carbon supply chain and their benefits towards firm performance and corporate governance. This paper also discussed the importance of Board of Director (BoD) in decision making in the supply chain.  As stakeholders continue to increasingly emphasize integrity practices in their supply chains, the firm should understand and practice the integrity especially involved low carbon supply chain (LCSC) by provided accurate carbon disclosure and report carbon verification and etc. This is important to shareholder especially Board of Director to make sure the firm performance meet their expectation. By monitoring the decision making in the low carbon supply chain, the BoD believe can avoid unethical issues such as corruption, manipulation and fraud. Practising integrity in the supply chain, the firm will obtain many advantages in their firm performance.  The firm’s performance will increase other than being more trustable and gain competitive advantages from the competitor. The BoD is concern about the impact of decision making on society.  The BoD believe by being integrity in the firm’s management they will meet the social expectation.

scholarly journals Optimal Operation Strategies under a Carbon Cap-and-Trade Mechanism: A Capital-Constrained Supply Chain Incorporating Risk Aversion

2020 ◽  
Vol 2020 ◽  
pp. 1-17
Author(s):  
Linming Qi ◽  
Lu Liu ◽  
Liwen Jiang ◽  
Zicheng Wang ◽  
Weiliang Zhao
Keyword(s):  
Supply Chain ◽  
Risk Aversion ◽  
Emission Reduction ◽  
Carbon Emission ◽  
Trade Credit ◽  
Carbon Trading ◽  
Low Carbon ◽  
Carbon Emission Reduction ◽  
Carbon Supply ◽  
Reduction Effort

Many small and medium enterprises (SMEs) with capital constraints often have no access or find it costly to obtain a loan from a bank; the retailer tends to borrow money from other enterprises in the supply chain by trade credit financing. We consider an emission-dependent supply chain with one emission-dependent manufacturer and one capital-constrained retailer in need of financing to explore the optimal operational and environmental strategies of a low-carbon supply chain under trade credit financing. We use a Stackelberg game model to depict the low-carbon supply chain. We analyse the optimal carbon-emission reduction effort, wholesale price, and order quantity in the equilibrium state. The impacts of key parameters, such as the retailer’s internal working capital, the manufacturer’s risk-aversion degree, and the carbon-trading price on the supply chain operation, are analysed. The results show that the retailer’s capital constraint causes the carbon-emission reduction effort, wholesale price, and order quantity to improve synchronously. The supply chain achieves a win-win outcome for both the manufacturer and the retailer when the capital-constrained retailer is funded via trade credit from the manufacturer. The in-depth development of financing is beneficial to the manufacturer but is a disadvantage for the retailer. When the initial carbon-emission quota is low, the manufacturer benefits from a relatively lower carbon-trading price. Otherwise, a higher carbon-trading price is better for the manufacturer. The “carbon-trading price trap” ensures that the retailer’s profit is minimal. We further investigate the scenario in which the manufacturer is risk averse and find that the retailer will purchase fewer products and that the manufacturer will gain less profit to decrease the carbon-emission reduction effort. The manufacturer’s risk aversion is unfavourable to both the economic and environmental outcomes of the whole supply chain. This research provides strategic support for a low-carbon supply chain to carry out operational decisions in the context of enterprise capital constraint. To examine the theoretical results, the data used in the existing literature are further used to simulate the corresponding conclusions. Our research enriches the existing supply chain finance literature and provides decision support for the supply chain core enterprise.

scholarly journals Supply Chain Strategy Analysis of Low Carbon Subsidy Policies Based on Carbon Trading

2020 ◽  
Vol 12 (9) ◽  
pp. 3532 ◽  
Author(s):  
Yinjie Zhang ◽  
Chunxiang Guo ◽  
Liangcheng Wang
Keyword(s):  
Supply Chain ◽  
Supply Chains ◽  
Carbon Emissions ◽  
Stackelberg Game ◽  
Carbon Trading ◽  
Low Carbon ◽  
Government Subsidies ◽  
Carbon Supply ◽  
Consumer Prices ◽  
The Government

The low-carbon economy has become the focus of global attention and scientific measurement standards with the concepts of low energy consumption, low pollution, and sustainable development. More and more attentions are paid to the research of low-carbon supply chains. Based on a two-level low-carbon supply chain in the context of carbon trading, a Stackelberg game model was established for government subsidies to determine a coordinated and balanced solution for supply chains in situations dominated by manufacturers. The optimal strategies for low-carbon technology innovation are analyzed within the context of governmental subsidies. This study’s conclusions are as follows: (1) When government subsidies are in place, regardless of who the government subsidies are meant for, manufacturers and retailers that do not generate carbon emissions will transfer the subsidies to the companies that generate carbon emissions by adjusting wholesale prices and retail prices to maximize their own profits. (2) When consumer prices are sensitive, the government’s optimal subsidy intensity increases as consumers’ low-carbon preferences increase. When consumer prices are not sensitive, the government should not provide any subsidies. (3) When consumers’ low-carbon preferences are weak, the retail price of products will decrease with the increase in subsidies; when consumers’ low-carbon preferences are strong, the opposite dynamic occurs.

scholarly journals Corporate Governance and Low Carbon Supply Chains: Why Integrity Matters?

10.15282/5308 ◽  
2020 ◽  
Vol 3 (2) ◽  
Author(s):  
Norma Mohter ◽  
Yudi Fernando
Keyword(s):  
Decision Making ◽  
Corporate Governance ◽  
Supply Chain ◽  
Firm Performance ◽  
Supply Chains ◽  
Low Carbon ◽  
Board Of Director ◽  
Carbon Supply ◽  
Social Expectation ◽  
The Impact

In this study, we aimed to understand the role of integrity in low carbon supply chain and their benefits towards firm performance and corporate governance. This paper also discussed the importance of Board of Director (BoD) in decision making in the supply chain.  As stakeholders continue to increasingly emphasize integrity practices in their supply chains, the firm should understand and practice the integrity especially involved low carbon supply chain (LCSC) by provided accurate carbon disclosure and report carbon verification and etc. This is important to shareholder especially Board of Director to make sure the firm performance meet their expectation. By monitoring the decision making in the low carbon supply chain, the BoD believe can avoid unethical issues such as corruption, manipulation and fraud. Practising integrity in the supply chain, the firm will obtain many advantages in their firm performance.  The firm’s performance will increase other than being more trustable and gain competitive advantages from the competitor. The BoD is concern about the impact of decision making on society.  The BoD believe by being integrity in the firm’s management they will meet the social expectation.

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