Institutional investors and bank governance: An international analysis of bank earnings management

2021 ◽  
pp. 102055
Author(s):  
Steve M. Miller ◽  
Rabih Moussawi ◽  
Bin Wang ◽  
Tina Yang
Keyword(s):  
Earnings Management ◽  
Institutional Investors ◽  
Bank Governance

Earnings management before IPOs: Are institutional investors misled?

2017 ◽  
Vol 42 ◽  
pp. 90-108 ◽  
Author(s):  
Shenghao Gao ◽  
Qingbin Meng ◽  
Kam C. Chan ◽  
Weixing Wu
Keyword(s):  
Earnings Management ◽  
Institutional Investors

Large institutional investors and the pressure to manage earnings surrounding seasoned equity offerings

2019 ◽  
Vol 61 (2) ◽  
pp. 402-420
Author(s):  
Mouna Njah ◽  
Raoudha Trabelsi
Keyword(s):  
Earnings Management ◽  
Institutional Investors ◽  
Information Quality ◽  
Management Practices ◽  
Seasoned Equity Offerings ◽  
Equity Offerings ◽  
Content Type ◽  
Multivariate Tests ◽  
Regulated Firms ◽  
Investor Activism

Purpose The purpose of this paper is to investigate the monitoring role exerted by large institutional investors and their ability to restrict the earnings management practices conducted around seasoned equity offerings (SEOs). Design/methodology/approach The sample includes 130 French SEOs by non-regulated firms during 2004-2015. The authors used various cross-section, univariate and multivariate tests using several proxies for earnings management. They attempt to highlight that firms issuing SEOs are more able to manage earnings around SEOs owing to the predominance of large speculative institutional investors. Noteworthy, the monitoring role exerted by sophisticated institutional investors turns out to restrict the earnings management opportunities surrounding a SEOs event. Findings The results show that the issuing firms tend to manipulate earnings in an upward trend with respect to the year preceding the SEO offer. Thus, a special attention has been drawn on the fact that the issuing companies strive to prove their ability to manage earnings around SEOs in presence of large speculative institutional investors. Practical implications The results provide useful insights into the role different types of institutional investors play in terms of enhancing both governance and accounting information quality. Originality/value This paper adds to the literature questioning the evidence that institutional investor activism frequently engage in misleading earnings management around corporate events. The authors provide an alternative explanation for earnings management around SEOs in the French context.

Types of Institutional Investors and Earnings Management in Malaysia

2015 ◽  
Vol 21 (6) ◽  
pp. 2003-2006
Author(s):  
Hasan Mohammed Bamahros ◽  
Wan Nordin Wan-Hussin
Keyword(s):  
Earnings Management ◽  
Institutional Investors

Institutional Investors and Bank Earnings Management

2018 ◽  
Author(s):  
Steve Miller ◽  
Camelia Minoiu ◽  
Bin Wang ◽  
Tina Yang
Keyword(s):  
Earnings Management ◽  
Institutional Investors

scholarly journals MEKANISME CORPORATE GOVERNANCE DAN MANAJEMEN LABA MODEL LONG TERM DISCRETIONARY ACCRUAL PADA PERUSAHAAN GO PUBLIK DI INDONESIA

2019 ◽  
Vol 21 (1) ◽  
pp. 55-69
Author(s):  
Wiyadi Wiyadi ◽  
Rina Trisnawati ◽  
Ecclisia Sulistyowati
Keyword(s):  
Corporate Governance ◽  
Earnings Management ◽  
Institutional Investors ◽  
Audit Committee ◽  
Governance Mechanism ◽  
Purposive Sampling ◽  
Discretionary Accrual ◽  
Corporate Governance Mechanisms ◽  
Corporate Governance Mechanism

Penelitian ini bertujuan menganalisis pengaruh mekanisme corporate governanceinternal dan eksternal terhadap manajemen laba dengan pendekatan long termdiscretionary accrual perusahaan go publik di Indonesia yang tergabung dalamindeks LQ45 dan JII selama periode 2011-2015. Sampel penelitian berjumlah 226perusahaan diambil secara purposive sampling. Mekanisme CorporateGovernance terbagi menjadi: Mekanisme Corporate Governance internal daneksternal. Mekanisme Corporate Governance internal diproksikan dengan komiteaudit dan dewan komisaris independen. Sedangkan corporate governanceeksternal diproksikan dengan konsentrasi kepemilikan dan investor institusi.Metode analisis data menggunakan regresi linier berganda. Hasil penelitianmenunjukkan bahwa konsentrasi kepemilikan berpengaruh terhadap manajemenlaba. Sedangkan komite audit, dewan komisaris independen dan investor institusitidak berpengaruh terhadap manajemen laba.This study aims to analyze the influence of internal and external corporate governance mechanisms on earnings management with the long term discretionary accrual approach of companies incorporated in the LQ45 and JII indices during the period 2011-2015. The research sample was 226 companies taken by purposive sampling. The Corporate Governance mechanism is divided into: Internal and external Corporate Governance Mechanisms. The internal Corporate Governance mechanism is proxied by the audit committee and independent board of commissioners. While external corporate governance is proxied by the concentration of ownership and institutional investors. Methods of data analysis using multiple linear regression. The results showed that ownership concentration had an effect on earnings management. While the audit committee, independent board of commissioners and institutional investors have no effect on earnings management

scholarly journals Mekanisme Tata Kelola Korporasi sebagai Pereduksi Praktik Perekayasaan Laba

2018 ◽  
Vol 17 (2) ◽  
pp. 81
Author(s):  
Alwan Sri Kustono
Keyword(s):  
Earnings Management ◽  
Firm Size ◽  
Institutional Investors ◽  
Audit Committees ◽  
Managerial Ownership ◽  
Board Size ◽  
Independent Variables ◽  
Size Firm ◽  
Independent Variable ◽  
Management Changes

Management can choose accounting policies for expected earnings reporting. This study purpose to examineeffect of corporate governance mechanism managerial ownership, such as audit committees, board size, composition of independent commissioners, board size, and firm size. The sample used is manufacturing companies listed on the Indonesia Stock Exchange (IDX) during the period 2014-2015. Institutional investors, managerial ownership, audit committees, have a positive coefficient. This shows that the independent variable has a positive influence on earnings management that means earnings management changes in the direction of changes in the independent variables. The proportion of independent commissioners, board size, firm size has a negative coefficient. This shows that these independent variables has a negative influence on earnings management which means earnings management changes direction with changes in the independent variable. Keywords: Institutional investors, managerial ownership, audit committees, independent commissioners, board size, firm size, earnings management

scholarly journals Institutional Investors, Earnings Management And Mispricing Of Accruals: Evidence From China

2012 ◽  
Vol 29 (1) ◽  
pp. 275
Author(s):  
Zhen Zeng ◽  
Peiyu Ou ◽  
Bin Li
Keyword(s):  
Earnings Management ◽  
Institutional Investors ◽  
Discretionary Accruals ◽  
Individual Investors ◽  
The Individual ◽  
A Share

This study examines the role of institutional investors in the pricing of normal accruals and discretionary accruals using the firms listed in the Chinese A-share Market. The results show that significant overpricing of discretionary accruals exists for individual investors and institutional investors, suggesting that they are both misled by the earnings management, while institutional investors are associated with significantly less overpricing. With respect to normal accruals, we find there is no evidence that institutional investors misprice normal accruals, while the individual investors overprice normal accruals. Our results suggest that institutional investors superiority in mitigating the mispricing of total accruals is mainly due to their accurate pricing of normal accruals, and the reason why institutional investors cannot fully eliminate mispricing of accruals is that they are partly misled by earnings management.

Earnings Management and Institutional Ownership in Turkey

2018 ◽  
pp. 252-272
Author(s):  
Aslı Aybars ◽  
Levent Ataünal
Keyword(s):  
Earnings Management ◽  
Institutional Investors ◽  
Management Practices ◽  
Reporting Quality ◽  
Institutional Ownership ◽  
External Control ◽  
Corporate Managers ◽  
Opportunistic Management

Earnings management is an important factor that considerably affects the reporting quality of firms and conceivably results in suboptimal investor decisions. The presence of active institutional investors among the equity holders is generally accepted as an external control mechanism that moderates earnings management problems. This chapter aimed to evaluate the role of institutional investors on earnings management with a data of firms listed on Borsa Istanbul between 2005 and 2011. The study found a significant and negative relation between institutional ownership level and managerial discretion exercised in opportunistic management of accruals and confirmed the substantial role played by institutional investors in monitoring and disciplining corporate managers. In other words, the managers' tendency for earnings management practices is observed to be mitigated by institutional shareholdings.

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