Tata Kelola Perusahaan dan Transaksi Pihak Berelasi Terhadap Manipulasi Laba

Earnings manipulation is an interesting phenomenon to study where corporate governance (GCG) can reduce management behavior that is opertunistic in manipulating earnings and through related transactions can motivate companies to make profits. LQ45 companies for the 2016-2019 period listed on the Indonesia Stock Exchange become this object. Samples were selected based on certain criteria so as many 20 sample companies. This study is a descriptive study with multiple linear regression analysis tools performed classical assumption test and hypothesis testing. The results of the study confirm that companies that implement good corporate governance have good governance and can suppress opportunistic behavior. Related party transactions show that it is not directly proportional to the practice of profit. Companies can reduce opportunistic management by implementing good governance and obtaining more information about relationships in making investment decisions.

PENGARUH EARNINGS MANAGEMENT DAN GOOD CORPORATE GOVERNANCE TERHADAP EXPENSE STICKINESS

Abstract—Expense stickiness is the thickness of the charge showed a response asymmetric load behavior towards a change in activity, ie when the activity decreases the burden will decline more slowly than when the activity increases. If a company's activity has decreased but also followed the rapid decline in the cost, also has been called Decrease expense stickiness, researchers predict there are motivation of management to manage earnings. The existence of good corporate governance, that with good corporate governance activities of companies that declined to follow a decreasing cost also for their efficiency on costs. It was concluded that good corporate governance also affects decreasing expense stickiness, although not as strong earnings management.The purpose of this study was to examine the pattern of expense stickiness whether companies in Indonesia tend to earnings management or good corporate governance to increase corporate profits. The population used in this study are all non-financial entities listed on the Indonesia Stock Exchange (BEI) in the period 2014-2015. To see the effect of earnings management to use variable expense stickiness total log administration and operational expense (SGA). As for the influence of good corporate governance to use variable expense stickiness total log administration and operational expense (SGA) or the FACT which is a variable of good corporate governance.The results of this study found that companies using earnings management do not lower the expense stickiness. This shows that company management directs the achievement of performance through real activities management rather than just accrual recognition of performance. As for good corporate governance tends to decrease the stickiness expense, prove that GCG is able to oversee management activities in managing the company. Asymmetric/ opportunistic management actions can be reduced through the effectiveness of the GCG mechanism. Keywords: Corporate Governance; Earnings Management; Expense Stickiness.

Influence of sponsor's management style in project prioritization

Purpose: The purpose of this paper is understand how the different styles of sponsor management influence the prioritization of projects.Design/methodology/approach: The empiric analysis used in-depth interviews with 11 executives as method for data collection and qualitative content analysis using theory and data driven categories for analysis is performed.Findings: This research points to the emergence of opportunistic management style, and to evidences of lack of strategic alignment in the project prioritization process.Research limitations/implications: The lack of prioritization methods evidences to compare with project management style. Also, the number of project managers to interview as experts.Practical implications: The analysis shows that committees and post-project evaluation be established to mitigate failures in the prioritization process impacted from sponsor’s management styles influence.Originality/value: The paper provides a critical perspective about sponsor’s management styles and project prioritization context; it is important to highlight how different management styles of the sponsor result in different behaviors in the companies.

Fiscal forecast manipulations and electoral results: evidence from Portuguese municipalities

This article aims to evaluate the impact of budget forecast manipulations on election results using a sample that covers all 308 Portuguese municipalities over the period running from 1998 to 2017. The results reveal that incumbent mayors overestimate revenues and expenditures. Overstating the budget more on the revenue side, they end up with a deficit. We check if this opportunistic behaviour is electorally beneficial. The results provide little or no evidence that election-year manipulations of revenue forecasts affect the vote shares of the party of the incumbent mayor. On the other hand, the opportunistic management of total and capital expenditure forecasts pays off, which is consistent with previous results for Portugal indicating that increased total and, mainly, capital expenditures lead to higher vote shares.

Earnings Management and Institutional Ownership in Turkey

Earnings management is an important factor that considerably affects the reporting quality of firms and conceivably results in suboptimal investor decisions. The presence of active institutional investors among the equity holders is generally accepted as an external control mechanism that moderates earnings management problems. This chapter aimed to evaluate the role of institutional investors on earnings management with a data of firms listed on Borsa Istanbul between 2005 and 2011. The study found a significant and negative relation between institutional ownership level and managerial discretion exercised in opportunistic management of accruals and confirmed the substantial role played by institutional investors in monitoring and disciplining corporate managers. In other words, the managers' tendency for earnings management practices is observed to be mitigated by institutional shareholdings.

PENGARUH AKTIVA PAJAK TANGGUHAN TERHADAP MANAJEMEN LABA PERUSAHAAN INDUSTRI MANUFAKTUR BASIC INDUSTRI YANG TERDAFTAR DI BURSA EFEK INDONESIA

Agent conflicts that result in opportunistic management that will result in reported earnings, which will cause the company's value to decrease in the future. Deferred tax assets occur when accounting income is less than fiscal profit due to temporary differences. The smaller accounting earnings than the fiscal profit resulted in the company being able to postpone taxes in the future period. However, if the fiscal profit may not be available in sufficient quantities to be compensated with the balance of the tax loss carry forward, or where possible the realization of future tax benefits with a probability of less than 50 per cent, deferred tax assets are not recognized and the company will record the reserves Deferred tax assets. Other problems also arise when the company has a large accounting income (Book Income) in comparison with the fiscal (Taxable Income) earnings in the financial statements. Problems in these conditions include companies, especially companies that have Go Public on its management will conduct earnings management as a fraud (fraud) relation in tax payment or reporting tax payable on the company. Companies that have a higher account income (Income Income) than a fiscal profit (Taxable Income) tendency to manage earnings at the company will be high in order to avoid large tax payments. This research is feasible to find empirical evidence whether the ownership of the deferred tax of the company or the difference between the Company's Book Income and Taxable Income affects Profit Management. The results of the research found that Deferred Tax Assets did not affect the Earning Management, Size did not affect the Earning Management, Growth (growth) did not affect the Earning Management, Leverage has no effect on Earning Management, Simultaneously Deferred Tax Assets, Size, Growth and Leverage Has no effect on earnings management for basic manufacturing industries for 2014 and 2015. Keyword: Deferred Tax Asset, Profit Management (Earning Management), Size, Growth, Leverage.

The impact of fair value accounting on the behavior and trends of profit management in the banking sector in Sudan: أثر محاسبـة القيمة العادلـة على سلـوك و إتجاهــات إدارة الاربــاح فى القطـاع المصرفي في السودان

This study aimed to show the impact of fair value accounting on the behavior and trends of the management of profits in the banking sector by assessing the relationship between profit management and fair value under the accounting reservation as one of the contemporary accounting trends. To achieve the goal of the study, the qualitative and descriptive approach was followed in the analysis of the results that were obtained by questionnaire in a sample of the Sudanese banks that formed the study community, and the sample of the study was selected in the sample method (intended) to obtain certain opinions and information, and The number of (80) forms was distributed to the target sample. The study reached many results , the most important of which is that the use of fair value estimates in accounting measurement and disclosure provides a more objective and realistic method of performance of economic units, and that the flexibility of the application of accounting principles and the existence of multiple alternatives to accounting policies is a big reason for the existence of management Profits, the use of fair value estimates affects profit management and reduces them when using the accounting reservation policy and limits the motivations of opportunistic management to achieve their own motivations.

The impact of quality audit on the management of earnings

In a Tunisian context, the purpose of this research is to study the aspects related to the quality of external audit, relating to the opportunistic management of earnings. Indeed, we are interested in the aspect of handling the earnings as a means for the manager to achieve its objectives by publishing a result different from that which is achieved. Thus, the quality of external audit, as an essential element of the system of government of the companies, may be able to limit the process of accounting manipulation, and therefore to protect the interests of investors and creditors. Given these factors, there is a key question: To what extent can the quality of the external audit influence the opportunistic management of earnings in Tunisian businesses? In this research, our goal is to empirically test a sample of Tunisian companies listed on the stock market, the impact of audit quality on the opportunistic practice of earnings