The effectiveness of China’s regional carbon market pilots in reducing firm emissions

China has implemented an emission trading system (ETS) to reduce its ever-increasing greenhouse gas emissions while maintaining rapid economic growth. With low carbon prices and infrequent allowance trading, whether China’s ETS is an effective approach for climate mitigation has entered the center of the policy and research debate. Utilizing China’s regional ETS pilots as a quasi-natural experiment, we provide a comprehensive assessment of the effects of ETS on firm carbon emissions and economic outcomes by means of a matched difference-in-differences (DID) approach. The empirical analysis is based on a unique panel dataset of firm tax records in the manufacturing and public utility sectors during 2009 to 2015. We show unambiguous evidence that the regional ETS pilots are effective in reducing firm emissions, leading to a 16.7% reduction in total emissions and a 9.7% reduction in emission intensity. Regulated firms achieve emission abatement through conserving energy consumption and switching to low-carbon fuels. The economic consequences of the ETS are mixed. On one hand, the ETS has a negative impact on employment and capital input; on the other hand, the ETS incentivizes regulated firms to improve productivity. In the aggregate, the ETS does not exhibit statistically significant effects on output and export. We also find that the ETS displays notable heterogeneity across pilots. Mass-based allowance allocation rules, higher carbon prices, and active allowance trading contribute to more pronounced effects in emission abatement.

When you talk, I remain silent: Spillover effects of peers' mandatory disclosures on firms' voluntary disclosures

We predict and find that regulated firms' mandatory disclosures crowd out unregulated firms' voluntary disclosures. Consistent with information spillovers from regulated to unregulated firms, we document that unregulated firms reduce their own disclosures in the presence of regulated firms' disclosures. We further find that unregulated firms reduce their disclosures more the greater the strength of the regulatory information spillovers. Our findings suggest that a substitutive relationship between regulated and unregulated firms' disclosures attenuates the effect of disclosure regulation on the market-wide information environment.

Industrial Energy Regulation: The Role of Business Conglomerates in China

This paper characterizes the importance of ownership networks of firms that are subject to a prominent energy regulation in China: the Top 1000 Enterprises Energy-Saving Program. We use data on the activities of regulated and unregulated firms that are part of the same conglomerate to study the overall importance of conglomerates as well as their geographic concentration. Accounting for business networks of regulated firms significantly increases the fraction of output that is affected by the regulation. We also document that most related firms of Top 1000 firms are located in the same province.

Carbon Emission Regulation, Green Boards, and Corporate Environmental Responsibility

In this study, we examine various effects of carbon emission regulation enacted in South Korea. We provide empirical evidence of regulated firms strategically hedging against potential risks by increasing the number of directors with environment-related backgrounds. We also find that this relationship is clearly evidenced when the firm is owned by a lower proportion of foreign investors. Further analysis shows that these directors successfully change their firms to become environmentally friendly. Overall, we conclude that the role of governments in promoting green finance is crucial. The findings of this study may be used as a guideline for decision makers and environmental policymakers to create systems and policies to increase the firm’s awareness about the environment in relation to corporate environmental responsibility (CER) ratings of firms.

Regulating for Future Needs

This chapter summarizes the book’s argument for taking a positive approach to regulation and for seeing regulation as part of the core process for furthering both business success and social welfare. If regulation is to develop in a way that meets future needs, as well as current ones, it will be necessary to develop the key attributes of positive regulation. This involves a predisposition to maximize the degree to which objectives (substantive and procedural) can be achieved by harnessing corporate capacities to behave well. Such a minimalist approach to ‘taming the corporation’ implies that enabling and flexible modes of influence should be the first choices of regulators, rather than restrictive control mechanisms. Realism, however, demands that regulators take on board the inclinations and capacities of regulated firms to behave well and that they act firmly with corporations and individuals who are not likely to deliver desired outcomes without strong forms of external stimulation.

Adopt or Innovate: Understanding Technological Responses to Cap-and-Trade

One important motivation for creating cap-and-trade programs for carbon emissions is the expectation that they will stimulate much-needed low-carbon innovation. I construct a new panel of British firms to investigate this hypothesis, finding that the European carbon market has encouraged greater low-carbon patenting and R&D spending among regulated firms without necessarily driving short-term reductions in carbon intensity of output. This stands in contrast to past cap-and-trade programs, which have primarily spurred adoption of existing pollution control technologies, with little effect on innovation. I discuss how to reconcile these contrasting findings and implications for the future of carbon markets. (JEL D22, O32, O34, Q52, Q54, Q58)

Domestic Outsourcing and Workers’ Bargaining Power in a Simple Production System

Outsourcing is normally conceived as the result of a cost-minimizing choice of a new technique that also implies a redefinition of the boundaries between firms and sectors. In this paper, we will argue instead that many outsourcing activities do not necessarily imply technical change and that the phenomenon can be explained by placing it in connection with the radical modification of the way in which wages are set for workers in a wide range of poorly regulated firms and industries. More than as an aspect of the spread of technical progress, outsourcing will be analyzed as an important mechanism through which workers are divided and their bargaining power is weakened, thus changing the outcome of the distributive conflict between profit and wages.