Minimum wage restrictions and employee effort in incomplete labor markets: An experimental investigation

2010 ◽  
Vol 73 (3) ◽  
pp. 317-326 ◽  
Author(s):  
Mark F. Owens ◽  
John H. Kagel
Keyword(s):  
Experimental Investigation ◽  
Labor Markets ◽  
Minimum Wage ◽  
Employee Effort

scholarly journals Optimal minimum wage policy in competitive labor markets

2012 ◽  
Vol 96 (9-10) ◽  
pp. 739-749 ◽  
Author(s):  
David Lee ◽  
Emmanuel Saez
Keyword(s):  
Labor Markets ◽  
Minimum Wage ◽  
Wage Policy

scholarly journals Efficiency Wages, Unemployment, And Labor Discipline

2011 ◽  
Vol 9 (3) ◽  
Author(s):  
Aaron Pacitti
Keyword(s):  
Labor Markets ◽  
Economic Effects ◽  
Efficiency Wages ◽  
Unemployment Duration ◽  
Efficiency Wage ◽  
Economic Implications ◽  
Labor Discipline ◽  
Employee Effort ◽  
Analysis And Synthesis ◽  
Agency Issues

This paper explores the economic implications of unemployment by appealing to efficiency wage models. Agency issues in labor markets are first surveyed and discussed, providing the foundation for a detailed analysis and synthesis of two shirking models using uniform language and terminology. The use of a class-based analysis shows that unemployment disciplines both unemployed and employed labor, and explains the presence of unemployment as an equilibrium phenomenon. The economic effects of unemployment on wages, employee effort, labor surveillance, and other aspects, such as unemployment duration, are developed and explored.

scholarly journals Minimum Wages in Monopsonistic Labor Markets

2020 ◽  
Author(s):  
Luis Felipe Munguia Corella
Keyword(s):  
Labor Markets ◽  
Minimum Wage ◽  
Minimum Wages ◽  
Perfect Competition ◽  
External Shocks ◽  
Omitted Variables ◽  
Heterogeneous Effects ◽  
Wage Effects ◽  
Teenage Employment ◽  
The U.S

Over the last 30 years, researchers have disputed the mixed evidence of the effect of the minimum wage on teenage employment in the U.S. Whenever the minimum wage has positive or no effects on employment, they appeal to monopsony models to explain their results. However, very few of these studies have empirically tested whether their results are due to monopsonistic characteristics in the labor markets. In this paper, I estimate the effects of the minimum wage for the U.S. under concentrated labor markets and low-mobility jobs (two variables that measure monopsony), identify heterogeneous effects among different scenarios derived from the monopsony model, and provide a plausible explanation of the mixed results about the minimum wage effects in the literature. My main findings indicate that minimum wages have an elasticity to teenage employment of -0.418 under perfect competition, which is, as expected, much higher than the usual results in the literature. If the monopsony variable is one standard deviation higher than the baseline, it implies a positive change in elasticity between of 0.05. The minimum wage has a positive insignificant effect between 0.04 and 0.29 under full monopsonistic labor markets. The results are consistent among different specifications and controlling for possible external shocks to the monopsony and omitted variables.

Employment and Labor Law

2021 ◽  
pp. 122-135
Author(s):  
Eric A. Posner
Keyword(s):  
Labor Markets ◽  
Minimum Wage ◽  
Labor Law ◽  
Search Costs ◽  
Antitrust Law ◽  
Wage Subsidies ◽  
Labor Regulations ◽  
Monopsony Power ◽  
Governance Reforms

Antitrust law cannot directly address wage suppression that occurs as a result of search costs and job differentiation, which cause frictions in labor markets. The question arises whether other employment and labor regulations can be used to reduce the monopsony power of employers that arises from these sources, or to mitigate its ill effects. These regulations include minimum wage law, tax and wage subsidies, mandatory benefits, job protection, licensing, training, job standardization, labor law, governance reforms, and macroeconomic reform. While some of these regulations, if well-designed, can help mitigate the harms of labor monopsony, many of them are ill-suited to this task.

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