Role of foreign direct investment and fiscal decentralization on urban haze pollution in China

2022 ◽  
Vol 305 ◽  
pp. 114287
Author(s):  
Feng Wang ◽  
Jingze He ◽  
Yuan Niu
2021 ◽  
Vol 13 (10) ◽  
pp. 5439
Author(s):  
Chenggang Li ◽  
Tao Lin ◽  
Zhenci Xu ◽  
Yuzhu Chen

With the development of economic globalization, some local environmental pollution has become a global environmental problem through international trade and transnational investment. This paper selects the annual data of 30 provinces in China from 2000 to 2017 and adopts exploratory spatial data analysis methods to explore the spatial agglomeration characteristics of haze pollution in China’s provinces. Furthermore, this paper constructs a spatial econometric model to test the impact of foreign direct investment (FDI) and industrial structure transformation on haze pollution. The research results show that the high-high concentration area of haze pollution in China has shifted from the central and western regions to the eastern region and from inland regions to coastal regions. When FDI increases by 1%, haze pollution in local and neighboring areas will be reduced by 0.066% and 0.3538%, respectively. However, the impact of FDI on haze pollution is heterogeneous in different stages of economic development. FDI can improve the rationalization level of industrial structure, and then inhibit the haze pollution. However, FDI inhibits the upgrading level of industrial structure to a certain extent, and then aggravates the haze pollution. The research in this paper provides an important decision-making basis for coordinating the relationship between FDI and environmental pollution and realizing green development.


2013 ◽  
Vol 67 (4) ◽  
pp. 863-888 ◽  
Author(s):  
Stephen G. Brooks

AbstractPolitical scientists and economists have long been interested in the role of special interests in the policymaking process. In the past few years, a series of important new books have argued forcefully that the lobbying activities of economic actors have an important influence on the prospects for war and peace. All of these analyses claim that whether economic actors enhance or decrease the likelihood of conflict ultimately depends on the domestic political balance between economic actors who have a strong vested interest in pushing for peace versus those that do not. I advance two contrary arguments. At least among the advanced states, I posit there are no longer any economic actors who will be favorable toward war and who will lobby the government with this preference. All of the identified mechanisms that previously contributed to such lobbying in these states have been swept away with the end of colonialism and the rise of economic globalization. In particular, I show that the current structure of the global economy now makes it feasible for foreign direct investment to serve as an effective substitute for conquest in a way that was not possible in previous eras. My second argument concerns those economic actors in advanced states with a preference for peace. I posit that it has become unnecessary for them to directly lobby the government to avoid war on economic grounds because economic globalization—the accumulation of decisions by economic actors throughout the globe—now has sufficiently clear economic incentives for leaders.


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