Short interest, institutional ownership, and stock returns

This study examines the economic implications of fair value liability gains and losses arising from the adoption of Statement of Financial Accounting Standards No. 159 (hereafter, FAS 159). We find a positive correspondence between a firm’s FAS 159 fair value liability gains and losses and current period stock returns, consistent with the notion that these gains and losses are priced by equity investors. However, further analysis indicates that fair value gains and losses from liabilities have a statistically significant negative association with future returns, suggesting that investors misprice this earnings component and subsequently correct the mispricing. We also find that the negative association for fair value gains is stronger for firms with lower levels of institutional ownership.

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Short interest, stock returns and credit ratings

Journal of Banking & Finance ◽

10.1016/j.jbankfin.2019.105617 ◽

2019 ◽

Vol 108 ◽

pp. 105617

Author(s):

Xu Guo ◽

Chunchi Wu

Keyword(s):

Stock Returns ◽

Credit Ratings ◽

Short Interest

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Daily short interest, idiosyncratic risk, and stock returns

Journal of Financial Markets ◽

10.1016/j.finmar.2008.09.001 ◽

2009 ◽

Vol 12 (2) ◽

pp. 290-316 ◽

Cited By ~ 29

Author(s):

Andrea S. Au ◽

John A. Doukas ◽

Zhan Onayev

Keyword(s):

Stock Returns ◽

Idiosyncratic Risk ◽

Short Interest

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The impacts of institutional ownership on stock returns

Empirical Economics ◽

10.1007/s00181-018-1519-3 ◽

2018 ◽

Vol 58 (2) ◽

pp. 507-533

Author(s):

Hongwei Chuang

Keyword(s):

Stock Returns ◽

Institutional Ownership

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Corporate Governance, Accounting Outcomes, and Organizational Performance

The Accounting Review ◽

10.2308/accr.2007.82.4.963 ◽

2007 ◽

Vol 82 (4) ◽

pp. 963-1008 ◽

Cited By ~ 720

Author(s):

David F. Larcker ◽

Scott A. Richardson ◽

I˙rem Tuna

Keyword(s):

Principal Component Analysis ◽

Corporate Governance ◽

Organizational Performance ◽

Executive Compensation ◽

Stock Returns ◽

Operating Performance ◽

Principal Component ◽

Institutional Ownership ◽

Stock Ownership ◽

Excess Stock Returns

The empirical research examining the association between typical measures of corporate governance and various accounting and economic outcomes has not produced a consistent set of results. We believe that these mixed results are partially attributable to the difficulty in generating reliable and valid measures for the complex construct that is termed “corporate governance.” Using a sample of 2,106 firms and 39 structural measures of corporate governance (e.g., board characteristics, stock ownership, institutional ownership, activist stock ownership, existence of debtholders, mix of executive compensation, and anti-takeover variables), our exploratory principal component analysis suggests that there are 14 dimensions to corporate governance. We find that these indices have a mixed association with abnormal accruals, little relation to accounting restatements, but some ability to explain future operating performance and future excess stock returns.

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Determinants of CEO Pay: A Comparison of ExecuComp and Non-ExecuComp Firms

The Accounting Review ◽

10.2308/accr.2010.85.5.1511 ◽

2010 ◽

Vol 85 (5) ◽

pp. 1511-1543 ◽

Cited By ~ 62

Author(s):

Brian Cadman ◽

Sandy Klasa ◽

Steve Matsunaga

Keyword(s):

Executive Compensation ◽

Stock Returns ◽

Institutional Ownership ◽

Stock Option ◽

Ownership Concentration ◽

Positive Relation ◽

Stock Liquidity ◽

Compensation Contracts ◽

Cash Compensation ◽

Ceo Pay

ABSTRACT: We document that firms included in the ExecuComp database tend to be larger, more complex, followed by more analysts, have greater stock liquidity levels, and have higher total, but less concentrated, institutional ownership than other firms. Based on these differences, we test and find support for three predictions. First, ExecuComp firms rely more heavily on earnings and stock returns in determining CEO cash compensation. Second, the weight on earnings is more sensitive to differences in the extent of growth opportunities for ExecuComp firms. Third, the positive relation between institutional ownership concentration and the value of stock option grants is stronger for ExecuComp firms. Overall, our results suggest that ExecuComp and non-ExecuComp firms operate in different contracting environments that lead to differences in the design of their executive compensation contracts. As a result, care should be taken in extending results based on ExecuComp samples to non-ExecuComp firms.

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