Determinants of CEO Pay: A Comparison of ExecuComp and Non-ExecuComp Firms

2010 ◽  
Vol 85 (5) ◽  
pp. 1511-1543 ◽  
Author(s):  
Brian Cadman ◽  
Sandy Klasa ◽  
Steve Matsunaga
Keyword(s):  
Executive Compensation ◽  
Stock Returns ◽  
Institutional Ownership ◽  
Stock Option ◽  
Ownership Concentration ◽  
Positive Relation ◽  
Stock Liquidity ◽  
Compensation Contracts ◽  
Cash Compensation ◽  
Ceo Pay

ABSTRACT: We document that firms included in the ExecuComp database tend to be larger, more complex, followed by more analysts, have greater stock liquidity levels, and have higher total, but less concentrated, institutional ownership than other firms. Based on these differences, we test and find support for three predictions. First, ExecuComp firms rely more heavily on earnings and stock returns in determining CEO cash compensation. Second, the weight on earnings is more sensitive to differences in the extent of growth opportunities for ExecuComp firms. Third, the positive relation between institutional ownership concentration and the value of stock option grants is stronger for ExecuComp firms. Overall, our results suggest that ExecuComp and non-ExecuComp firms operate in different contracting environments that lead to differences in the design of their executive compensation contracts. As a result, care should be taken in extending results based on ExecuComp samples to non-ExecuComp firms.

Corporate Governance, Accounting Outcomes, and Organizational Performance

2007 ◽  
Vol 82 (4) ◽  
pp. 963-1008 ◽  
Author(s):  
David F. Larcker ◽  
Scott A. Richardson ◽  
I˙rem Tuna
Keyword(s):  
Principal Component Analysis ◽  
Corporate Governance ◽  
Organizational Performance ◽  
Executive Compensation ◽  
Stock Returns ◽  
Operating Performance ◽  
Principal Component ◽  
Institutional Ownership ◽  
Stock Ownership ◽  
Excess Stock Returns

The empirical research examining the association between typical measures of corporate governance and various accounting and economic outcomes has not produced a consistent set of results. We believe that these mixed results are partially attributable to the difficulty in generating reliable and valid measures for the complex construct that is termed “corporate governance.” Using a sample of 2,106 firms and 39 structural measures of corporate governance (e.g., board characteristics, stock ownership, institutional ownership, activist stock ownership, existence of debtholders, mix of executive compensation, and anti-takeover variables), our exploratory principal component analysis suggests that there are 14 dimensions to corporate governance. We find that these indices have a mixed association with abnormal accruals, little relation to accounting restatements, but some ability to explain future operating performance and future excess stock returns.

scholarly journals Accounting For Stock Based Employee Compensation: A Continuing Controversy

2011 ◽  
Vol 3 (4) ◽  
Author(s):  
William Wrege ◽  
Mark Myring ◽  
Joe Schroeder
Keyword(s):  
Executive Compensation ◽  
Stock Options ◽  
Accounting Standards ◽  
Market Value ◽  
Stock Option ◽  
Font Size ◽  
Significant Component ◽  
Employee Compensation ◽  
Compensation Contracts ◽  
History Of

<p class="MsoBlockText" style="text-align: justify; margin: 0in 0.6in 0pt 67.5pt;"><span style="font-size: x-small;"><span style="font-family: Times New Roman;">Stock options represent an increasingly significant component of executive compensation. Theoretically, the inclusion of stock options in executive compensation contracts motivates managers to take actions that increase the market value of the firm's stock. Accounting standards regulating the treatment of stock options continue to be controversial. The focus of this paper is to examine the accounting treatment of stock options. We begin by outlining the controversial history of accounting for stock options.<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;">&nbsp; </span>Next, we examine the alternative accounting treatments for stock option.<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;">&nbsp; </span>Finally, we critique the proposed changes to the methods of accounting for stock options.<strong style="mso-bidi-font-weight: normal;"></strong></span></span></p>

Geographic and Industrial Corporate Diversification: The Level and Structure of Executive Compensation

2002 ◽  
Vol 17 (1) ◽  
pp. 1-24 ◽  
Author(s):  
Augustine Duru ◽  
David M. Reeb
Keyword(s):  
Executive Compensation ◽  
Ceo Compensation ◽  
Performance Criteria ◽  
Corporate Diversification ◽  
Geographic Diversification ◽  
Compensation Contracts ◽  
Industrial Diversification ◽  
Diversification Strategies ◽  
Ceo Pay ◽  
And Performance

We explore the relation between corporate diversification and CEO compensation. We document that geographic diversification provides a compensation premium, while industrial diversification is associated with lower levels of CEO pay. We also examine the effect of corporate diversification on the structure and performance criteria of CEO compensation contracts. We find that both diversification strategies are associated with a greater use of incentive-based compensation and with a greater reliance on market-based, rather than accounting-based measures of firm performance. Finally, we address the question of whether shareholders reward CEOs for corporate diversification. We document that while value-enhancing geographic diversification is rewarded, non-value-enhancing industrial diversification is penalized.

scholarly journals Management Earnings Forecasts as a Performance Target in Executive Compensation Contracts

2017 ◽  
Vol 35 (1) ◽  
pp. 139-167 ◽  
Author(s):  
Shota Otomasa ◽  
Atsushi Shiiba ◽  
Akinobu Shuto
Keyword(s):  
Executive Compensation ◽  
Earnings Forecasts ◽  
Management Forecasts ◽  
Management Earnings Forecasts ◽  
Initial Management ◽  
Compensation Contracts ◽  
Japanese Firms ◽  
Cash Compensation ◽  
Performance Target ◽  
A Performance

This article investigates whether and how Japanese firms use management earnings forecasts as a performance target for determining executive cash compensation. Consistent with the implications of the agency theory, we find that the sensitivity of executive cash compensation varies with the extent to which realized earnings exceed initial management forecasts. In particular, we find that the executive cash compensation is positively related to management forecast error ( MFE) for a sample of Japanese firms comprising 15,941 firm-year observations from 2005 to 2013. Moreover, we show that the relationship between executive cash compensation and MFE strengthens (weakens) when current realized earnings exceed (fall short of) aggressive initial forecasts. In additional analysis, we find that pay-for-performance sensitivity is weaker for extremely positive MFEs due to the ceiling on total cash compensation. Overall, we find that initial management forecasts can be used as a performance target in executive compensation contracts. These findings also suggest that management earnings forecasts are important for improving contract efficiency as well as for providing useful information to investors in the capital market.

scholarly journals Pay performance sensitivity and earnings restatements

2014 ◽  
Vol 11 (3) ◽  
pp. 273-293
Author(s):  
Surjit Tinaikar ◽  
Kun Yu
Keyword(s):  
Earnings Management ◽  
Institutional Ownership ◽  
Public Confidence ◽  
Accounting Earnings ◽  
Compensation Contracts ◽  
Earnings Restatements ◽  
Cash Compensation ◽  
The Board Of Directors ◽  
Earnings Restatement

We examine whether the board of directors adjusts the sensitivity of CEO compensation to earnings following an earnings restatement. Using a sample of 598 restating firms and 2,065 non-restating firms during the period of 1995-2011, we find that firms decrease the sensitivity of cash compensation to accounting earnings after restatements and that this decrease is more pronounced for firms that appoint new CEOs after restatements than those whose CEOs continue to remain in office after restatements. Furthermore, the results suggest that the decrease in the sensitivity of cash compensation to earnings for restating firms with new CEOs is more pronounced for firms with a higher level of institutional ownership. This highlights the monitoring role of institutional investors in the redesign of compensation contracts following restatements. Overall, our results are consistent with the argument that the board adjusts the sensitivity of cash compensation to earnings downwards following restatements to constrain earnings management and recover public confidence in the firm.

The Influence of CEO Power on Compensation Contract Design

2014 ◽  
Vol 90 (4) ◽  
pp. 1265-1306 ◽  
Author(s):  
Margaret A. Abernethy ◽  
Yu Flora Kuang ◽  
Bo Qin
Keyword(s):  
Executive Compensation ◽  
Performance Measures ◽  
Stock Option ◽  
Data Availability ◽  
Ceo Power ◽  
Performance Targets ◽  
Public Pressure ◽  
Ceo Pay ◽  
The Impact ◽  
Do So

ABSTRACT We investigate whether CEO power influences a firm's decision to change its compensation system in response to regulatory and public pressure. In particular, we assess whether CEO power influences the choice of performance measures as a form of camouflage to minimize the impact of these reforms on their wealth. We examine one component of CEO pay, namely, the use of performance-vested stock option (PVSO) plans, and find that firms with powerful CEOs attach less challenging targets in the initial PVSOs granted to their CEOs. Such firms also appear to adopt PVSO plans early, and are more likely to do so when faced with public outrage over executive compensation. Our results suggest that powerful CEOs attempt to appease public outrage by quickly adopting PVSOs, but that adopting PVSOs early does not appear to be an optimal strategy for increasing shareholder value. Regulators intended that implementation of PVSOs would be beneficial to shareholders by improving the link between CEO pay and firm performance. However, our results indicate that powerful CEOs can negate some of the beneficial effect of PVSOs through their influence on adoption and choice of performance targets. Data Availability: All data used in this study are publicly available from the sources indicated in the paper.

Compensation Consultant Fees and CEO Pay

2020 ◽  
Vol 32 (1) ◽  
pp. 51-78
Author(s):  
Jeh-Hyun Cho ◽  
Iny Hwang ◽  
Jeong-Hoon Hyun ◽  
Jae Yong Shin
Keyword(s):  
Corporate Governance ◽  
Executive Compensation ◽  
Positive Association ◽  
Data Availability ◽  
Compensation Contracts ◽  
Strong Incentive ◽  
Ceo Pay ◽  
Jel Classifications

ABSTRACT While compensation consultants are known to play an important role in the design of executive compensation contracts, evidence on the effect of consultant incentives on CEO pay is mixed. Using compensation consultant observations with mandatory fee disclosures, which a prior study identifies as an optimal pay setter, we examine whether CEO pay is associated with consultants' incentives to retain clients, measured by fees for executive compensation services. In contrast to previous studies that find no support for repeat business incentives, we find evidence that CEO pay is higher when consultants receive abnormally high fees, demonstrating a strong incentive to retain the client, and that this positive association occurs only in weakly governed firms. This finding highlights the importance of consultant incentives and corporate governance in executive compensation settings. JEL Classifications: M12; G34; G38. Data Availability: Data used in this study are publicly available.

scholarly journals Ownership structure and bid-ask spread: evidence from Tunisian companies

2008 ◽  
Vol 5 (3) ◽  
pp. 445-451
Author(s):  
Nadia Belkhir Boujelbéne ◽  
Abdelfettah Bouri
Keyword(s):  
Ownership Structure ◽  
Institutional Ownership ◽  
Market Liquidity ◽  
Ownership Concentration ◽  
Stock Liquidity ◽  
Insider Ownership ◽  
Bid Ask Spread ◽  
The Relationship

The majority of previous studies are limited to study the aspects of the ownership structure within the framework of government of company without wondering about the incidence of this mechanism on the stock liquidity. The objective of this paper is to examine the relationship between ownership structure and market liquidity. From a sample of Tunisian firms listed in the period from 2001 to 2005. We showed that ownership concentration by blockholders is positively related to spread. A positive but generally insignificant relation is found between spreads and insider ownership. However, institutional ownership does not add any explicative power to the liquidity

scholarly journals Valuation Implications of FAS 159 Reported Gains and Losses From Fair Value Accounting for Liabilities

2021 ◽  
pp. 0148558X2110178
Author(s):  
Sung Gon Chung ◽  
Cheol Lee ◽  
Gerald J. Lobo ◽  
Kevin Ow Yong
Keyword(s):  
Stock Returns ◽  
Accounting Standards ◽  
Institutional Ownership ◽  
Fair Value ◽  
Negative Association ◽  
Financial Accounting ◽  
Fair Value Accounting ◽  
Economic Implications ◽  
Current Period ◽  
Gains And Losses

This study examines the economic implications of fair value liability gains and losses arising from the adoption of Statement of Financial Accounting Standards No. 159 (hereafter, FAS 159). We find a positive correspondence between a firm’s FAS 159 fair value liability gains and losses and current period stock returns, consistent with the notion that these gains and losses are priced by equity investors. However, further analysis indicates that fair value gains and losses from liabilities have a statistically significant negative association with future returns, suggesting that investors misprice this earnings component and subsequently correct the mispricing. We also find that the negative association for fair value gains is stronger for firms with lower levels of institutional ownership.

Sign in / Sign up

Export Citation Format

Share Document