scholarly journals On monotone strategy equilibria in simultaneous auctions for complementary goods

2019 ◽  
Vol 85 ◽  
pp. 109-128 ◽  
Author(s):  
Matthew Gentry ◽  
Tatiana Komarova ◽  
Pasquale Schiraldi ◽  
Wiroy Shin
Keyword(s):  
2011 ◽  
Vol 6 (2) ◽  
pp. 215-224 ◽  
Author(s):  
Jorge Tarziján

PurposeThis paper aims to examine the equilibrium limit price charged by a producer trying to deter the entry of a firm that can choose one of the two markets of complementary goods.Design/methodology/approachThe authors model a dynamic game of incomplete information solved using a “perfect Bayesian equilibrium” approach.FindingsIt is shown that an incumbent will be willing to spend more resources – i.e. charge a lower limit price – to deter entry into its market as products become more complementary. This is because additional benefits are gained from entry deterrence by facing a more competitive market in the complementary product. The additional benefits of entry deterrence are shown to be a function of the degree of complementarity between goods.Practical implicationsA managerial implication of this article is that firms are willing to compete more fiercely to send an entrant to the other's incumbent market as the degree of complementarity between goods increases. An interesting conclusion that is derived from the above analysis is that managers should invest to understand the interdependences (e.g. complementarities) of the goods they sell, since the strategic variables chosen to compete may be affected by them, in some cases in a non‐trivial way.Social implicationsFrom a public policy perspective, the main contribution of this paper is to point out that regulators who analyze predatory pricing, or other (probably) illegal “low‐price strategies”, should consider the degree of complementarity between goods and its effect on pricing.Originality/valueAs far as the authors' knowledge goes, there are no other papers that analyze entry decisions involving multiple markets of complementary goods.


2001 ◽  
Vol 70 (3) ◽  
pp. 431-437 ◽  
Author(s):  
Jean Gabszewicz ◽  
Nathalie Sonnac ◽  
Xavier Wauthy

2020 ◽  
Vol 9 (1) ◽  
pp. 31
Author(s):  
Carmen D. Álvarez-Albelo

This paper studies optimal pricing when a monopolist firm produces two complementary goods and may undertake a bundling strategy. To do so, a modified version of Yan and Bandyopadhyay’s (2011) framework is used, in which the efficacy of the bundling strategy depends positively on the degree of complementarity of goods. Two main results are obtained. First, mixed bundling turns out to be the optimal strategy for the firm, since it yields higher profits than pure unbundling and pure bundling. Second, sales and profits from the bundling (unbundling) strategy increase (decrease) as the products become more complementary, which entails an empirically sensible behavior.


Author(s):  
Berkeley Hill

Abstract This chapter discusses the theories of demand and supply, including the factors affecting the demand for commodities (the price of the commodity itself, the incomes of consumers, the price of competitive (or substitute) goods, the price of complementary goods, and the tastes of consumers) as well as the factors affecting supply (the price of the good, the prices of other goods that firms could produce or do produce, the prices of factors of production, the state of technology, and the goals/objectives of firms). The significance of the price and income elasticities of demand to the agricultural sector is highlighted.


2020 ◽  
pp. 014920632096979
Author(s):  
Joost Rietveld ◽  
Melissa A. Schilling

Over the past three decades, platform competition—the competition between firms that facilitate transactions and govern interactions between two or more distinct user groups who are connected via an indirect network—has attracted significant interest from the fields of management and organizations, information systems, economics, and marketing. Despite common interests in research questions, methodologies, and empirical contexts by scholars from across these fields, the literature has developed mostly in isolated fashion. This article offers a systematic and interdisciplinary review of the literature on platform competition by analyzing a sample of 333 articles published between 1985 and 2019. The review contributes by (a) documenting how the literature on platform competition has evolved; (b) outlining four themes of shared scholarly interest, including how network effects generate “winner-takes-all” dynamics that influence strategies, such as pricing and quality; how network externalities and platform strategy interact with corporate-level decisions, such as vertical integration or diversification into complementary goods; how heterogeneity in the platform and its users influences platform dynamics; and how the platform “hub” orchestrates value creation and capture in the overall ecosystem; and (c) highlighting several areas for future research. The review aims to facilitate a broader understanding of the platform competition research that helps to advance our knowledge of how platforms compete to create and capture value.


2006 ◽  
Vol 13 (3) ◽  
pp. 373-386 ◽  
Author(s):  
Oleksiy Andriychenko ◽  
Audrius Girnius ◽  
Atanu Saha

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