Turning free speech into corporate speech: Philip Morris' efforts to influence U.S. and European journalists regarding the U.S. EPA report on secondhand smoke

2004 ◽  
Vol 39 (3) ◽  
pp. 568-580 ◽  
Author(s):  
Monique E Muggli ◽  
Richard D Hurt ◽  
Lee B Becker
Author(s):  
Edward A. Jr. Purcell

This chapter explores Justice Antonin Scalia’s constitutional jurisprudence across the broad range of issues he addressed. The chapter shows that he contradicted his originalist jurisprudence in interpreting the First Amendment (both its free speech and religion clauses) as well as the Fourth, Fifth, and Eleventh Amendments, and that he did the same in construing a variety of other constitutional doctrines including those involving standing, the treaty power, affirmative action, the Commerce Clause, the Fourteenth Amendment, and the U.S. Supreme Court’s own appellate jurisdiction. The chapter argues that he frequently twisted, ignored, and abandoned his jurisprudential principles and methodologies he proclaimed and that the principal consistency his decisions and opinions reveal was his commitment to his own ideological goals and values.


2002 ◽  
Vol 20 (3) ◽  
pp. 517-539 ◽  
Author(s):  
Patrick Schmidt

Even today, the U.S. Supreme Court's decision in Terminiello v. City of Chicago (1949) strikes students of constitutional law as a vexing factual situation. The problems the case posed for the High Court are all the more daunting considering its historical context, directly following the nation's confrontation with Nazism and standing on the cusp of the Cold War against Communism. In the broader view, most observers would locate the decision within the ascendance of liberal protection for free speech rights occurring over the second half of the twentieth century. But progressive accounts should not be allowed to mask the contemporary momentousness for the justices hearing the case. Indeed, in this constitutional conflict over the speech of a rabble-rousing priest was lodged a sober question about the polity's health at that time and the preferred response to the nation's need.


2004 ◽  
Vol 21 (2) ◽  
pp. 23-47
Author(s):  
Scott D. Gerber

Freedom of speech long has been regarded as one of the “preferred freedoms” in the United States: one of the freedoms the U.S. Supreme Court deems “implicit in the concept of ordered liberty.” However, what freedom of speech does—and should—mean is a highly charged question in American constitutional law. I will explore this question by examining how several prominent constitutional theorists have proposed particular approaches to free speech law in order to further their political objectives. I will examine the free speech theories of the nation's leading feminist legal theorist (regarding pornography), critical race theorists (regarding hate speech), libertarian (regarding commercial speech), and legal republican (regarding deliberative democracy). I also will discuss the principal criticisms of each of these theories, whether the courts have been influenced by any of them, and, in conclusion, whether it is possible to advance a nonpolitical (i.e., a purely law-based or value-free) theory of free speech.


2015 ◽  
Vol 15 (2) ◽  
pp. 197-223
Author(s):  
Mary Margaret Roark

The First Amendment protects one of our most precious rights as citizens of the United States—the freedom of speech. Such protection has withstood the test of time, even safeguarding speech that much of the population would find distasteful. There is one form of speech which cannot be protected: the true threat. However, the definition of what constitutes a "true threat" has expanded since its inception. In the new era of communication—where most users post first and edit later—the First Amendment protection we once possessed has been eroded as more and more speech is considered proscribable as a "true threat." In order to adequately protect both the public at large and our individual right to free speech, courts should analyze a speaker’s subjective intent before labeling speech a "true threat." Though many courts have adopted an objective, reasonable listener test, the U.S. Supreme Court now has the opportunity, in deciding Elonis v. United States, to take a monumental step in protecting the First Amendment right to free speech. By holding that the speaker’s subjective intent to threaten is necessary for a true threat conviction, the Court will restore the broad protection afforded by the First Amendment and repair years of erosion caused by an objective approach.


Troublemakers ◽  
2019 ◽  
pp. 11-50
Author(s):  
Kathryn Schumaker

This chapter examines how two student free speech cases, Burnside v. Byars and Blackwell v. Issaquena County, emerged out of the 1964 Freedom Summer voter registration campaign in Mississippi in 1964. This chapter argues that the two cases were the result of increased student activism following Freedom Summer and that these two First Amendment cases were the result of conflict over the broader issues of racial discrimination and school segregation in Mississippi. These cases were eventually cited in the U.S. Supreme Court lawsuit Tinker v. Des Moines, which established the constitutional rights of all students and led to increased litigation. This chapter explains how the rationale in these cases focused on whether students were considered disorderly, and it argues that concepts like disorder can be racially coded and therefore affect the perception of student actions differently based on the race of students and the context of the action.


2019 ◽  
pp. 145-156
Author(s):  
Gamonal C. Sergio ◽  
César F. Rosado Marzán

Chapter 6 acknowledges that labor law principles are not the end-all for all labor law cases and controversies. Labor law may conflict with other laws and their principles, complicating adjudication. The chapter discusses two major conflicts between labor law and other law, particularly in the United States, but likely also present elsewhere: constitutional rights concerning property and free speech. The U.S. Supreme Court has held in ways that essentially sustain that labor law conflicts with property rights and free speech and, in addition, must cede space to property rights and free speech. The U.S. doctrine of permanent strike replacements, which violates international labor standards, is based on protecting employer property rights. The recent Janus v. AFSCME decision outlawing compulsory union service fees in the public sector is based on protecting individual free speech. But such conflicts need not be. By understanding labor law principles and how labor norms operate, we should recognize that labor law protects workers’ property rights and their capacity to consume, which better guarantees the health of capitalism and societal property rights generally. Moreover, labor law provides a voice to workers, who would be otherwise subordinated. As long as labor norms stem from democratic processes, labor norms should respect constitutional free speech rights. Labor law can thus live side by side with important constitutional principles. Given the importance of property rights and free speech in contemporary, liberal societies, the U.S. case can help warn other jurisdictions from heading down the same erroneous jurisprudential path.


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