scholarly journals Market-makers’ supply and pricing of financial market liquidity

2002 ◽  
Vol 76 (1) ◽  
pp. 53-58 ◽  
Author(s):  
Pu Shen ◽  
Ross M. Starr
2015 ◽  
Author(s):  
Serge Darolles ◽  
Gaalle Le Fol ◽  
Gulten Mero

2011 ◽  
Vol 15 (S1) ◽  
pp. 119-144 ◽  
Author(s):  
Pierre-Olivier Weill

We study a competitive dynamic financial market subject to a transient selling pressure when market makers face a capacity constraint on their number of trades per unit of time with outside investors. We show that profit-maximizing market makers provide liquidity in order to manage their trading capacity constraint optimally over time: they use slack trading capacity early to accumulate assets when the selling pressure is strong in order to relax their trading capacity constraint and sell to buyers more quickly when the selling pressure subsides. When the trading capacity constraint binds, the bid–ask spread is strictly positive, widening and narrowing as market makers build up and unwind their inventories. Because the equilibrium asset allocation is constrained Pareto-optimal, the time variations in bid–ask spread are not a symptom of inefficient liquidity provision.


Significance The government has locked the country down for four weeks and legislated to borrow up 52 million dollars (30.7 million US dollars), equivalent to 17% of GDP. The Reserve Bank of New Zealand (RBNZ) is using several monetary policy tools to meet its inflation and employment targets, keep interest rates low and support financial market liquidity. Impacts Tourism, the largest export-earner, and high-earners logging and education, will suffer. Dairy, meat and horticultural exports will be shielded by continuing global demand, aided by a weak New Zealand dollar. The country heads into the COVID-19 crisis with low debt-to-GDP, but debt taken out now will take a future toll. Opposition and minor political parties will get reduced media coverage, while the September general election may be delayed.


Author(s):  
Gabriel Augusto de Carvalho ◽  
João Eduardo Ribeiro ◽  
Laíse Ferraz Correia

Purpose: This study aimed to analyze whether the introduction of market makers as specialized intermediaries in the trading of stocks listed on the Brazilian stock exchange is a useful procedure for increasing the market liquidity of these assets. Methodology: The Chow structural break test was performed in the time series of the liquidity proxies, average spread, turnover ratio, and financial volume on a sample of 55 stocks. We chose to consider data in the window of 260 days before and after the start of the market maker's activity, because it represents the approximate number of trading sessions in a year, and to avoid erroneous conclusions due to the volatility of the Brazilian stock market. Results: The results showed with a 99% confidence level that after the introduction of market makers, (i) 67% of the stocks analyzed had abrupt and statistically significant changes in the average spread; (ii) 47% in the turnover ratio; and (iii) 60% had changes in the volume transactions. At the confidence level of 95%, (i) 76% of the stocks analyzed showed abrupt changes in the average spread; (ii) 65% had changes in turnover; (iii) and 69% had changes in the trading volume. Using a lower confidence level of 90%, the results revealed 85% of the stocks had abrupt and statistically significant changes in the average spread, 78% in the turnover ratio, and 73% in the trading volume. Contributions of the Study: This paper provides strong evidence on the performance of market makers and the influence they have on the market liquidity of stocks traded on the Brazilian stock exchange. We found that contracting market makers increase market liquidity and contribute significantly to the assets’ transactions.


Social Text ◽  
2019 ◽  
Vol 37 (4) ◽  
pp. 51-74
Author(s):  
Robert Meister

The article develops political implications of the late Randy Martin’s idea of “derivative sociality” as the real subsumption of human life under the option form. The option form, beginning with the hedge, allows realized surplus value to be preserved (locked in) and eventually accumulated by securing its convertibility back into money—its “liquidity.” The opposite, financial illiquidity is capital disaccumulation in Marx’s sense. It follows that the acceptability of capital accumulation depends on making financial market illiquidity politically unimaginable. This limitation on political imagination can, however, be largely overcome in the spirit of Marx (and Randy Martin) by using the conceptual resources of options theory itself. In options theory, for example, privately produced financial derivatives are priced as though a component of them is synthetic public debt (“risk-free”). But this can be true only because in crisis scenarios the government guarantees to swap its own debt for synthetic equivalents to it at par. However, such guarantees are themselves options that can be priced. That price in 2008, the “liquidity premium,” has been calculated by leading financial economists to be trillions of dollars. This is equivalent to the premium that a justice-seeking democracy could have extracted for wiping out the cumulative effects of capital accumulation, had doing so been understood as a political option that could be rolled over for a price. The goal of this article is to identify financial market liquidity as a political choke point in today’s capitalism so as to focus political attention on reversing the cumulative effect of capital markets in compounding historical injustices.


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