scholarly journals Erratum to “Algebras, Projective Geometry, Mathematical Logic, and Constructing the World: Intersections in the Philosophy of Mathematics of A.N. Whitehead”

2003 ◽  
Vol 30 (1) ◽  
pp. 96
Author(s):  
I Grattan-Guinness
Discourse ◽  
2020 ◽  
Vol 6 (3) ◽  
pp. 109-117
Author(s):  
O. M. Polyakov

Introduction. The article continues the series of publications on the linguistics of relations (hereinafter R–linguistics) and is devoted to an introduction to the logic of natural language in relation to the approach considered in the series. The problem of natural language logic still remains relevant, since this logic differs significantly from traditional mathematical logic. Moreover, with the appearance of artificial intelligence systems, the importance of this problem only increases. The article analyzes logical problems that prevent the application of classical logic methods to natural languages. This is possible because R-linguistics forms the semantics of a language in the form of world model structures in which language sentences are interpreted.Methodology and sources. The results obtained in the previous parts of the series are used as research tools. To develop the necessary mathematical representations in the field of logic and semantics, the formulated concept of the interpretation operator is used.Results and discussion. The problems that arise when studying the logic of natural language in the framework of R–linguistics are analyzed. These issues are discussed in three aspects: the logical aspect itself; the linguistic aspect; the aspect of correlation with reality. A very General approach to language semantics is considered and semantic axioms of the language are formulated. The problems of the language and its logic related to the most General view of semantics are shown.Conclusion. It is shown that the application of mathematical logic, regardless of its type, to the study of natural language logic faces significant problems. This is a consequence of the inconsistency of existing approaches with the world model. But it is the coherence with the world model that allows us to build a new logical approach. Matching with the model means a semantic approach to logic. Even the most General view of semantics allows to formulate important results about the properties of languages that lack meaning. The simplest examples of semantic interpretation of traditional logic demonstrate its semantic problems (primarily related to negation).


2006 ◽  
Vol 113 (9) ◽  
pp. 855
Author(s):  
Charles R. Hampton ◽  
James Robert Brown ◽  
Alexander George ◽  
Daniel J. Velleman ◽  
Stewart Shapiro

2019 ◽  
Author(s):  
Akihito Maruya ◽  
Qasim Zaidi

AbstractJudging poses, sizes and shapes of objects accurately is necessary for organisms and machines to operate successfully in the world. Retinal images of 3D objects are mapped by the rules of projective geometry, and preserve the invariants of that geometry. Since Plato, it has been debated whether geometry is innate to the human brain, and Poincare and Einstein thought it worth examining whether formal geometry arises from experience with the world. We examine if humans have learned to exploit projective geometry to estimate sizes and shapes of objects in 3D scenes.Numerous studies have examined size invariance as a function of physical distance, which changes scale on the retina, but surprisingly, possible constancy or inconstancy of relative size seems not to have been investigated for object pose, which changes retinal image size differently along different axes. We show systematic underestimation of length for extents pointing towards or away from the observer, both for static objects and dynamically rotating objects. Observers do correct for projected shortening according to the optimal back-transform, obtained by inverting the projection function, but the correction is inadequate by a multiplicative factor. The clue is provided by the greater underestimation for longer objects, and the observation that they appear more slanted towards the observer. Adding a multiplicative factor for perceived slant in the back-transform model provides good fits to the corrections used by observers. We quantify the slant illusion with relative slant measurements, and use a dynamic demonstration to show the power of the slant illusion.In biological and mechanical objects, distortions of shape are manifold, and changes in aspect ratio and relative limb sizes are functionally important. Our model shows that observers try to retain invariance of these aspects of shape to 3D rotation by correcting retinal image distortions due to perspective projection, but the corrections can fall short. We discuss how these results imply that humans have internalized particular aspects of projective geometry through evolution or learning, and how assuming that images are preserving the continuity, collinearity, and convergence invariances of projective geometry, supplements the Generic Viewpoint assumption, and simply explains other illusions, such as Ames’ Chair.


2021 ◽  
Author(s):  
◽  
Scott Waygood

<p>The central claim of this thesis is that geometry is a quasi-empirical science based on the idealisation of the elementary physical operations that we actually perform with pen and paper. This conclusion is arrived at after searching for a theory of geometry that will not only explain the epistemology and ontology of mathematics, but will also fit with the best practices of working mathematicians and, more importantly, explain why geometry gives us knowledge that is relevant to physical reality. We will be considering all the major schools of thought in the philosophy of mathematics. Firstly, from the epistemological side, we will consider apriorism, empiricism and quasi-empiricism, finding a Kitcherian style of quasi-empiricism to be the most attractive. Then, from the ontological side, we will consider Platonism, formalism, Kitcherian ontology, and fictionalism. Our conclusion will be to take a Kitcherian epistemology and a fictionalist ontology. This will give us a kind of quasiempirical-fictionalist approach to mathematics. The key feature of Kitcher's thesis is that he placed importance on the operations rather than the entities of arithmetic. However, because he only dealt with arithmetic, we are left with the task of developing a theory of geometry along Kitcherian lines. I will present a theory of geometry that parallels Kitcher's theory of arithmetic using the drawing of straight lines as the most primitive operation. We will thereby develop a theory of geometry that is founded upon our operations of drawing lines. Because this theory is based on our line drawing operations carried out in physical reality, and is the idealisation of those activities, we will have a connection between mathematical geometry and physical reality that explains the predictive power of geometry in the real world. Where Kitcher uses the Peano postulates to develop his theory of arithmetic, I will use the postulates of projective geometry to form the foundations of operational geometry. The reason for choosing projective geometry is due to the fact that by taking it as the foundation, we may apply Klein's Erlanger programme and build a theory of geometry that encompasses Euclidean, hyperbolic and elliptic geometries. The final question we will consider is the problem of conventionalism. We will discover that investigations into conventionalism give us further reason to accept the Kitcherian quasi-empirical-fictionalist approach as the most appealing philosophy of geometry available.</p>


2021 ◽  
Author(s):  
Daniel Sutherland

Kant's Mathematical World aims to transform our understanding of Kant's philosophy of mathematics and his account of the mathematical character of the world. Daniel Sutherland reconstructs Kant's project of explaining both mathematical cognition and our cognition of the world in terms of our most basic cognitive capacities. He situates Kant in a long mathematical tradition with roots in Euclid's Elements, and thereby recovers the very different way of thinking about mathematics which existed prior to its 'arithmetization' in the nineteenth century. He shows that Kant thought of mathematics as a science of magnitudes and their measurement, and all objects of experience as extensive magnitudes whose real properties have intensive magnitudes, thus tying mathematics directly to the world. His book will appeal to anyone interested in Kant's critical philosophy -- either his account of the world of experience, or his philosophy of mathematics, or how the two inform each other.


Author(s):  
Matthew Handelman

Chapter 2 investigates the moment in 1917 when the philosophy of mathematics revealed to Gershom Scholem the symbolic potential of privation. Mathematics—in particular, the translation of logic into the symbols and operations of mathematics known as mathematical logic—produced novel results by discarding the conventional representational and meaning-making functions of language. Drawing on these mathematical insights, Scholem’s theorization of the poetic genre of lament and his translations of the biblical book of Lamentations employed erasure on the level of literary form to symbolize experiences, such as the Jewish diaspora, that exceed the limits of linguistic and historical representation. For Scholem, both poetry and history can mobilize deprivation as a means of retaining in language a symbol of experiences and ideas that remain unsayable in language and inexpressible in history—accounting for the erasure of exile and finding historical continuity in moments of silence, rupture, and catastrophe.


Author(s):  
Raymond M. Smullyan

Kurt Godel, the greatest logician of our time, startled the world of mathematics in 1931 with his Theorem of Undecidability, which showed that some statements in mathematics are inherently "undecidable." His work on the completeness of logic, the incompleteness of number theory, and the consistency of the axiom of choice and the continuum theory brought him further worldwide fame. In this introductory volume, Raymond Smullyan, himself a well-known logician, guides the reader through the fascinating world of Godel's incompleteness theorems. The level of presentation is suitable for anyone with a basic acquaintance with mathematical logic. As a clear, concise introduction to a difficult but essential subject, the book will appeal to mathematicians, philosophers, and computer scientists.


2016 ◽  
Vol 18 (1) ◽  
pp. 242-256
Author(s):  
Oleg Hirnyy

The paper presents scientific portrait of the famous Polish scientist, the last representative of the famous Lviv-Warsaw logical-philosophical school, a great friend of Ukraine, Professor Andrzej Grzegorczyk, who died two years ago. In addition to his main passion – mathematical logic, in which he has the world-class results. Andrzej Grzegorczyk studied ethics and philosophy, in particular in such its sphere, which he called “rationalism, opened to values”. It is briefly described his studies in that area, which is often called the “philosophy of education”, although in many cases it should say rather the “philosophy in education”. This research sphere is undeservingly considered as a peripheral one in his work. In fact, it is of prime importance for the development of the theoretical bases of pedagogy. In particular, his scientific program of anthropological description (so-called “human condition”) and based on this description the program developed by him (so-called “Universal School Program”) deserve the special attention.


1983 ◽  
Vol 15 (43) ◽  
pp. 51-78
Author(s):  
Lorenzo Peña

In this essay I bring up the issue of how to deal with dialectical views -especialIy with dialectic negation- from the standpoint of a transitive logic, which is a particular paraconsistent logic. After briefly tracing the development of the debate between dialectic thinkers and those who, hewing to entrenched logical theories, did out of hand reject any contradictorial proposal -up to recent developments of paraconsistent systems of mathematical logic- I canvass a variety of grounds shoring up the thesis of the contradictoriality of the world. Chief among them is fuzziness. The paper tries to show that fuzziness has nothing to do with uncertainty, and that accepting fuzzy sets and facts not only does not compel us to waive the law of excluded middle, but -on the base of reasonable presuppositions- entails recognition of that law's relevant instances -the ones that purportedly ought to be dropped as true sentences, should fuzziness be acknowledged. True enough, fuzziness plus excluded middle leads to contradiction, i.e. to negation inconsistency. But then fuzziness is -or can he viewed as being- negation inconsistency, since a fuzzy situation is one wherein something neither is nor fails to be the case: which -in virtue of involutivity of simple negation and De Morgan laws- means that something both ia and yet is not the case. [L.P.]


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