Complements to cognition: a longitudinal study of the relationship between complex syntax and false-belief-understanding

2002 ◽  
Vol 17 (1) ◽  
pp. 1037-1060 ◽  
Author(s):  
Jill G. de Villiers ◽  
Jennie E. Pyers
2013 ◽  
Vol 16 ◽  
Author(s):  
Elisabet Serrat Sellabona ◽  
Carles Rostan Sánchez ◽  
Eduard Vallès Majoral ◽  
Moisès Esteban Guitart ◽  
Francesc Sidera Caballero ◽  
...  

AbstractA total of 104 children aged between 41 and 47 months were selected to study the relationship between language and false belief understanding. Participants were assigned to four different training conditions: discourse, labelling, control (all with deceptive objects), and sentential complements (involving non-deceptive objects). Post-test results showed an improvement in children’s false belief understanding in the discourse and the labelling conditions, but not in the sentential complements with non-deceptive objects or the control group. Furthermore, the most remarkable improvement in false belief understanding occurred in the labelling group. These results suggest that some types of linguistic experience promote the development of false belief understanding, provided that differing perspectives are confronted.


2017 ◽  
Vol 15 (2) ◽  
pp. 172-183 ◽  
Author(s):  
Yusuke Moriguchi ◽  
Midori Ban ◽  
Hidekazu Osanai ◽  
Ichiro Uchiyama

2021 ◽  
Vol 12 ◽  
Author(s):  
Changzhi Zhao ◽  
Siyuan Shang ◽  
Alison M. Compton ◽  
Genyue Fu ◽  
Liyang Sai

This study used longitudinal cross-lagged modeling to examine the contribution of theory of mind (ToM), executive function (EF) to children’s lying development and of children’s lying to ToM and EF development. Ninety-seven Chinese children (initial Mage = 46 months, 47 boys) were tested three times approximately 4 months apart. Results showed that the diverse desire understanding and knowledge access understanding components of ToM, as well as the inhibitory control component of EF predicted the development of children’s lying, while the diverse belief understanding and false belief understanding components of ToM, and the working memory component of EF did not predict development of children’s lying. Meanwhile, children’s lying predicted development of children’s belief-emotion understanding components of ToM, but not any other ToM components, or EF components. These findings provide longitudinal evidence for the relation between ToM, EF, and children’s lying during the preschool years.


2014 ◽  
Vol 42 (4) ◽  
pp. 645-654 ◽  
Author(s):  
Yifang Wang ◽  
Hongyun Liu ◽  
Yanjie Su

To explore the developmental trajectory of emotions (happiness, sadness, anger, and fear) and false belief understanding (an unexpected-location and an unexpected-contents task), we measured the performance of 3- and 4-year-olds 4 times at approximately half-yearly intervals. The results indicated that the children's ability to understand emotions and false beliefs increased significantly at each time point in the first year and a half, but no significant increases were found in the last 6 months. The developmental trajectories of the understanding of emotions and false beliefs were similar during the 2 years, however, the developing track of the emotions of happiness, sadness, fear, and anger were different. Understanding of happiness developed earlier and faster than understanding of sadness, fear, and anger. In regard to understanding false beliefs, the children performed better in the unexpected-contents task than in the unexpected-location task. We found that a developmental relationship existed between emotion and false belief understanding.


2021 ◽  
pp. 016502542098859
Author(s):  
Zhenlin Wang ◽  
Lamei Wang

To successfully pull a practical joke on someone, children need to understand that their victims do not know what they themselves know, be able to intentionally manipulate others’ beliefs, and maintain a straight face to safeguard the integrity of the joke. This study examined the relationship between children’s developing theory of mind (ToM), inhibitory control, and their ability to pull a practical joke. Ninety-five children between ages 2 and 6 participated in, among other measures, a practical joke task that required them to knowingly give one of the experimenters a gift box containing a rubber insect. Results showed that children’s ability to pull a practical joke was significantly related to their age, false belief understanding (FBU), inhibitory control, and verbal ability. Children with more siblings were more likely to successfully pull a practical joke. Most importantly, inhibitory control was shown to mediate the relation between FBU and practical joking. The findings provide evidence that practical joking as an example of ToM use is effortful.


Sign in / Sign up

Export Citation Format

Share Document