Self-interest and the common good: The impact of norms, selfishness and context in social policy opinions

1997 ◽  
Vol 26 (5) ◽  
pp. 475-494 ◽  
Author(s):  
Olli E. Kangas
Author(s):  
Gerardo Sanchis Muñoz

The proper provision of public goods by a well-functioning, impartial government is not the only thing necessary for attaining the common good, but it is essential. The economic view of the human person as a rational, self-interested maximizer has become pervasive in analyzing government dysfunction and is employed by international agencies to generate proposals to realign the economic incentives of government officials. But this mindset assumes and encourages self-interest and undermines idoneidad (suitability)—which includes integrity, motivation, and competence—as the most fundamental characteristic that must be demanded of both elected and appointed officials at all levels of government. The failure of public institutions in Argentina is employed as a telling example of such problems.


Author(s):  
C. Daniel Batson

Despite its virtues, empathy-induced altruism can at times harm those in need, other people, and the altruistically motivated person. Specifically, it can hurt those in need when acted on without wisdom and sensitivity or when a cool head is required. It can produce paternalism. It is less likely to be evoked by nonpersonalized, abstract, chronic needs. It can be a source of immoral action, leading us to show partiality toward those for whom we feel empathic concern even when we know that to do so is neither fair nor best for all. Indeed, when our behavior is public, empathy-induced altruism can pose a more serious threat to the common good than does self-interest. Finally, it can at times jeopardize our mental and physical health—even our life. Any attempt to call on empathy-induced altruism to build a more humane society needs to take these problems into account lest we do more harm than good.


2013 ◽  
Vol 44 (2) ◽  
pp. 345
Author(s):  
John Kleinsman

This article will argue that the notion of the common good is imperilled by a particular contemporary account of the moral good; one which, because of its (somewhat narrow) emphasis on the individual, readily lends itself to a state of 'moral hyperpluralism' in which 'the good' is primarily defined in terms of the promotion and protection of self-interest. At the same time, it will be argued that any quest to recover the notion of the common good cannot be achieved by either returning to, or holding onto, a more traditional account of morality. It will also be proposed that, as part of the quest to recover the common good, close attention needs to be paid to how the term is understood. The tension between individual autonomy and the welfare of society, and the differing ways in which this tension is resolved within different moral paradigms, will emerge as central to any discussion about the ongoing place of the common good in contemporary legal and moral debates. Finally, it is suggested that a solid basis for articulating a robust account of the common good may be found in the foundational and innovative work being done by thinkers of the gift to establish an alternative account of morality. 


2016 ◽  
Vol 2 (2) ◽  
pp. 14-27
Author(s):  
Fernando Suárez Müller ◽  
Christian Felber

This paper explores the possibility of an economic system different from both capitalism and communism, that is based on the major ethical values that constitute the principles of human dialogue, the so-called Idealism of Dialogue. This implies an economic model based on cooperativism. An economy modelled in this way envisions the Common Good of society. This is more than the sum of the interests of individuals and it can be measured by looking at the intended impact on society of actions taken by organizations. If the impact of these organizations is oriented towards cooperative action they can be characterized as developing the Common Good. If they block cooperative action they can be seen to be serving private interests. This paper shows how a group of Austrian entrepreneurs has started a network of enterprises that functions both as a kind of cooperative and as a non-governmental organization (Gemeinwohl-Ökonomie). They promote the ideals of Greek oỉkonomía and at the same time consider their own efforts to be the accomplishment of the main principles of Enlightenment which are liberty, equality and fraternity. 


Author(s):  
Rachel Ablow

This chapter argues that one of the most famous invalids of the age—and one of the most important political theorists—used her many writings on illness to imagine a model of impersonality uniquely well suited to the responsibilities of legislation. The relation of the legislator to the community represents a recurring problem for utilitarianism: if self-interest is the only reliable motivation, it becomes difficult to account for the legislator's—and hence, the ideal citizen's—supposed commitment to the common good. In Harriet Martineau's account, only the enlightened sufferer is able to regard all persons as equally valuable, and hence, their own pain is of no greater or lesser consequence than that experienced by anyone else.


Author(s):  
James Stacey Taylor

The first question that is often raised in a discussion of the ethics of voting is whether or not there is a duty to vote. The view that there is a duty to vote is supported by two main arguments. The first holds that since the value of democratic governance is high persons should vote to preserve stable democracy. The second is that there is a duty to vote because if nobody voted the effects would be disastrous. The first of these arguments is criticized by Jason Brennan, who holds that since each individual vote will play little to no role in preserving stable democracy nobody has a duty to vote. The second is criticized by Loren Lomasky and Geoffrey Brennan, who argue that it is incomplete unless its supporters can show that democracy needs everyone to vote to continue. The question of whether there is a duty to vote naturally leads to the question of whether it is permissible for persons to vote in their own self-interest. Jason Brennan argues that persons should only (morally) vote for candidates or policies that they are justified in believing would promote the common good. It is unclear, however, what “the common good” consists of. This discussion of the morality of voting in one’s self-interest leads to the question of whether voting for a politician because she has made campaign promises is morally analogous to a voter selling her vote. In discussing this issue it is important to distinguish between the “restricted” defense of markets in votes (that the purchased votes are to be cast in favor of what the buyer is justified in believing is the common good) and the “unrestricted” defense of such a market (that purchased votes can be cast in any way the buyer pleases). Much of this discussion focuses on the morality of unrestricted markets in votes. Christopher Freiman has offered four main arguments in favor of such a market: (1) that it will make both the buyer and the seller better off; (2) that it is required by respect for voter liberty; (3) that it is relevantly similar to other practices that are currently allowed, such as logrolling; and (4) that it would enable electoral outcomes to better express voter preferences. None of these arguments are persuasive. The first is based on illicitly inferring from the claim that persons would voluntarily buy and sell votes if a market were allowed to the claim that they would thereby desire that this market be allowed. The second argument is flawed because if some persons would prefer that a market not be allowed, this could provide a sufficient reason to restrict their liberty by precluding them from selling their votes. The third argument overlooks important disanalogies between votes traded between voters, and votes traded between legislators. The fourth argument is based on the implausible assumption that vote sellers would not misrepresent their political preferences in a market for votes.


Author(s):  
Rob Boddice

Chapter 5 returns to the blueprint for the evolution of sympathy in Darwin’s Descent, picking up at the point where Darwin introduces a paradoxical prediction of degeneration, caused by the same force that inspired social cohesion and moral progress. This chapter analyses the birth of the eugenics movement as a department of statistics, arising directly from a concern for the common good of civilised society – the central tenet of highly evolved sympathy. Unlike most studies of eugenics, this chapter focuses largely on the period before 1900, when the parameters of eugenic thought were being hashed out. It particularly focuses on the problem of degeneration as seen through the eyes of Francis Galton and Karl Pearson, who pointed to the need for social-policy interventions in breeding.


1987 ◽  
Vol 61 (2) ◽  
pp. 125-145
Author(s):  
Richard J. Connell ◽  

Author(s):  
Andrew S Targowski

The purpose of this investigation is to define the central contents and issues of the impact of informing systems on the rise and development of Virtual Civilization. The methodology is based on an interdisciplinary big-picture view of the Virtual Civilization’s elements of development and their interdependency. Among the findings are: Virtual Civilization has infrastructural characteristics, a world-wide unlimited, socially constructed work and leisure space in cyberspace, and it can last centuries/millennia - as long as informing systems are operational. Practical implications: The mission of Virtual Civilization is to control the public policy of real civilizations in order to secure the common good in real societies. Social implication: The quest for the common good by virtual society may limit or even replace representative democracy by direct democracy which, while positively solving some problems, may eventually trigger permanent political chaos in real civilizations. Originality: This investigation, by providing an interdisciplinary and civilizational approach at the big-picture level defined the ethics question of the role of informing systems in the development of Virtual Civilization.


2009 ◽  
Vol 4 (1) ◽  
Author(s):  
J. Fred Humphrey

If you recall Homer's Iliad, you will remember that the poem, as we are often told, is the story of the Trojan War. The mythological background of the war is tied to a most unlikely source - namely, "the judgment of Paris." All the gods and goddesses, according to the poets, with the exception Eris (the goddess of strife or discord), were invited to the wedding of Thetis and Peleus. When Eris tried to attend the celebration, she was turned away. To spite those who had denied her entrance, Eris tossed a golden apple inscribed with the words, "To the Fairest," amongst the goddesses attending the wedding festivities.


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