Preference Reversals, Delay Discounting, Rational Choice, and the Brain

Author(s):  
Leonard Green ◽  
Joel Myerson
2012 ◽  
Vol 23 (3) ◽  
pp. 228-240 ◽  
Author(s):  
Christopher A. Krebs ◽  
Karen G. Anderson

2008 ◽  
Vol 24 (3) ◽  
pp. 419-429 ◽  
Author(s):  
Anthony Landreth ◽  
John Bickle

We briefly describe ways in which neuroeconomics has made contributions to its contributing disciplines, especially neuroscience, and a specific way in which it could make future contributions to both. The contributions of a scientific research programme can be categorized in terms of (1) description and classification of phenomena, (2) the discovery of causal relationships among those phenomena, and (3) the development of tools to facilitate (1) and (2). We consider ways in which neuroeconomics has advanced neuroscience and economics along each line. Then, focusing on electrophysiological methods, we consider a puzzle within neuroeconomics whose solution we believe could facilitate contributions to both neuroscience and economics, in line with category (2). This puzzle concerns how the brain assigns reward values to otherwise incomparable stimuli. According to the common currency hypothesis, dopamine release is a component of a neural mechanism that solves comparability problems. We review two versions of the common currency hypothesis, one proposed by Read Montague and colleagues, the other by William Newsome and colleagues, and fit these hypotheses into considerations of rational choice.


Author(s):  
Albert Weale

From some points of view, Harsanyi stands apart from other theorists discussed in this book. He was a utilitarian, and he focuses on the hypothetical choices of a single individual. Nevertheless, his construction has been influential, and he has good claim to be the founder of the device of the veil of ignorance. He uses the orthodox utility theory of rationality to show that behind a veil of ignorance in which a hypothetical individual had an equal chance of being anyone in society, rationality would lead to that person adopting the principle of maximizing average utility. Utilitarianism can be represented as the maximizing choice of a rational individual behind the veil of ignorance. A central element in Harsanyi’s construction is the idea of ethical individualism, which he holds is captured in an axiom of independence defining the rationality of choice. He also revives the idea of the interpersonal comparability of utility. His reliance on interpersonal comparisons is a potential point of criticism, as is the argument that, strictly speaking, he has not shown that utilitarianism is required, as distinct from merely being consistent with, his principles of rational choice. A more fundamental criticism is that the phenomenon of preference reversals, well established in empirical literature, call into question the independence axiom. Preference reversals are intelligible. In relation to some cases, they suggest too an important distinction between rational choice and prudent choice.


2016 ◽  
Vol 66 (2) ◽  
pp. 235-242 ◽  
Author(s):  
Richard Yi ◽  
Alexis K. Matusiewicz ◽  
Antonio Tyson

2019 ◽  
Vol 27 (1) ◽  
pp. 19-28
Author(s):  
Derek A. Pope ◽  
Lindsey Poe ◽  
Jeffrey S. Stein ◽  
Sarah E. Snider ◽  
Alexander G. Bianco ◽  
...  

Author(s):  
Megan Eileen Collins ◽  
Thomas A. Loughran

A growing body of research on offender decision making has focused on studying the use of heuristic biases, or cognitive shortcuts taken in certain situations, when offenders make decisions in the face of uncertainty. The idea is that when offenders (or any individuals) are contemplating uncertain decisions with limited time, information, or resources to make a rational choice calculus, heuristics enable a suitable decision to be reached quickly. However, often heuristics can lead to biases, errors, preference reversals, or suboptimal decisions. This chapter considers departures from rational behavior and heuristics and biases, specifically how the latter have been integrated into the study of offenders’ choice calculus. In particular, it reviews how biases and deviations from rationality have been routinely observed when studying offender decisions.


Author(s):  
Paul Ekblom

This chapter seeks to enrich and extend thinking about the rational choice perspective to offender decision making and its pivotal application in situational crime prevention by taking an evolutionary approach, which is still uncommon in crime science and criminology. The chapter introduces basic concepts of evolution, covering the brain and behavior, levels and types of explanation, the strained relationship with social science, and the evidencing of evolutionary processes. The focus then shifts to rationality, covering decision making; the wider suite of processes needed to understand rationality in action; and specific discussions of cooperation, humans’ wider “sociocognitive niche,” and development. Although evolutionary issues are addressed throughout, the penultimate section discusses how rationality in the broadest sense has unfolded over evolutionary history and the significant connection between maximization of utility in contemporary rational choice and maximization/optimization of fitness in evolution. The conclusion raises practical, empirical, and theoretical questions for crime science.


Author(s):  
Roy F. Baumeister

This chapter examines free will as a distinctive element of the human essence, arguing that it evolved to enable the development of culture and that culture requires “responsible autonomy”—personal choices for actions that balance the achievement of individual objectives and control with respect for the rules of society. Understanding the human essence as produced by evolution to facilitate culture provides a useful context for understanding free will. The chapter shows that the evolution of free will partly depended on finding a way for the brain to use some of the body’s energy in order to permit advanced and complex psychological processes, including self-control and rational choice. It also considers the incorporation of meaning into the causation of behavior and how meaning is expressed in language. Finally, it explores some uses of self-control in morality and how self-control capacity relates to ego-depletion effects as well as the conservation of willpower.


2015 ◽  
Vol 146 ◽  
pp. e5
Author(s):  
Kayla N. Tormohlen ◽  
Alexis K. Matusiewicz ◽  
Antonio Tyson ◽  
Richard Yi

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