Legal Advice in Council Decision-Making

2021 ◽  
pp. 197-256
Author(s):  
Richard Gowan

During Ban Ki-moon’s tenure, the Security Council was shaken by P5 divisions over Kosovo, Georgia, Libya, Syria, and Ukraine. Yet it also continued to mandate and sustain large-scale peacekeeping operations in Africa, placing major burdens on the UN Secretariat. The chapter will argue that Ban initially took a cautious approach to controversies with the Council, and earned a reputation for excessive passivity in the face of crisis and deference to the United States. The second half of the chapter suggests that Ban shifted to a more activist pressure as his tenure went on, pressing the Council to act in cases including Côte d’Ivoire, Libya, and Syria. The chapter will argue that Ban had only a marginal impact on Council decision-making, even though he made a creditable effort to speak truth to power over cases such as the Central African Republic (CAR), challenging Council members to live up to their responsibilities.


Res Publica ◽  
1994 ◽  
Vol 36 (3-4) ◽  
pp. 381-398
Author(s):  
Jan Beyers

In spite of its importance in European Union decision making, research on the functioning of the Council is scarce (Wessels, 1991). Based on empirical findings this article gives some new insights in the way Council decision making is institutionalized. The first part focusses on the characteristics of Council working groups and the different positions of actors in the decision making network. Our findings confirm the definition of the Council as a highly bureaucratized institution. Interesting is that the diversity of tasks of the different actors(working groups, Coreper, CSA etc.) strengthens the impact of national administrations in Council decision making. The second part explores the reasons for this impact. This article adds to the functional approach, which over-emphasizes the adaptive character of the Council, the perception of the Council as an intergovernmental component in a supranational system.


2021 ◽  
Vol 39 (1) ◽  
pp. 214-230
Author(s):  
Jeremy Farrall ◽  
Christopher Michaelsen

Abstract This article examines the UN Security Council’s response to the escalating COVID-19 pandemic in 2020, which has been criticised as hesitant and half-hearted. It argues that the Council’s inability to respond more assertively to the COVID threat was more predictable than surprising. Indeed, the Council’s approach to the COVID threat tended to follow, rather than diverge from, its past practice, exhibiting three increasingly entrenched features of Council decision-making in a crisis. First, the Council is hesitant and ill-equipped to respond to non-traditional or unorthodox threats to international peace and security, even where relevant precedents exist to support such a response. Second, the Council struggles to act when there is friction between permanent members. Third, when all else fails, the Council can still do reliably well on process.


Author(s):  
Stephen Bouwhuis

The inquiry by the United Kingdom into its decision to intervene in Iraq is one of the longest running and most comprehensive examinations of government decision-making. In particular, the inquiry examined in detail the processes by which legal advice was provided to and formed a part of the decision by the Government of the United Kingdom to intervene in Iraq. Through this lens, the current chapter examines what the inquiry illustrates about the general relevance of international law to the decision to intervene in Iraq and more broadly what illustrates about the role of international law in decision-making more generally. In particular, the chapter pertains to the practical and ethical aspects providing international legal advice to government as well as the nature of government legal practice more generally.


2019 ◽  
Vol 33 (1) ◽  
pp. 101-115 ◽  
Author(s):  
Jeremy Farrall ◽  
Marie-Eve Loiselle ◽  
Christopher Michaelsen ◽  
Jochen Prantl ◽  
Jeni Whalan

AbstractThis article reassesses how members of the UN Security Council exercise influence over the Council’s decision-making process, with particular focus on the ten elected members (the E10). A common understanding of Security Council dynamics accords predominance to the five permanent members (the P5), suggesting bleak prospects for the Council as a forum that promotes the voices and representation of the 188 non-permanent members. The assumption is that real power rests with the P5, while the E10 are there to make up the numbers. By articulating a richer account of Council dynamics, this article contests the conventional wisdom that P5 centrality crowds out space for the E10 to influence Council decision-making. It also shows that opportunities for influencing Council decision-making go beyond stints of elected membership. It argues that the assumed centrality of the P5 on the Council thus needs to be qualified and re-evaluated.


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